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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY
by
Asim K. Dasgupta
Submitted to the Department of Economics on May 12, 1975
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy.
This thesis is a collection of two essays.on the relationship
between the distribution of income and the behavior of some crucial
macro-variables in a developing economy.
The first essay purports to analyze, with reference to such an
economy, the interaction between the distribution of income, education
and the accumulation of capital. Given the distribution of income
between different groups at any point of time and their accumulation
functions of education and physical capital, it is shown how the
incomes of these groups are determined at the next point of time
through the interaction between education and physical capital, and
therefore how the distribution of income changes over time. An
analytical framework is constructed and on the basis of that a policy
model developed. The crucial relationships of this model are estimable
and these estimations have been made for two less developed countries,
India and Colombia, to judge the egalitarian or non-egalitarian
character of government policies in these countries over some specific
periods of time.
The second essay is concerned with the interrelation between the
distribution of income, the structure of markets, particularly of the
credit market, and the problem of capital accumulation in a developing
economy. The central idea is developed within the agricultural sector
of such an economy, and then it is pointed out how this can be extended
to cover the industrial sector as well. A model is built by taking
into account the dualism that exists in such agriculture between the
family and the capitalist farm*, the distribution of income between
these farms, the implication of that distribution on the structure of
credit market and the decisions that these farms have to take on the
use of inputs and the allocation of wealth under these circumstances.
This model is then used to analyze the special problem of capital
accumulation of this agriculture. It is found that given an unequal
iii
initial distribution of income and the resulting imperfection
of the credit market, such an agriculture can show a tendency to
approach a state of zero rate of capital accumulation under very
plausible conditions,' and this can be accompanied by a process of
itmiserization of the family farms. Several ways of resolving
this crisis are discussed including the solutions offered by
technological progress as well as those offered by institutional
changes.
Thesis Supervisor: Jagdish N. Bhagwati
Title: Professor of Economics
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Income Distribution, Education And Capital Accumulation
Asim K. Dasgupta
Introduction
The economic literature has a long tradition of thoughts on
income distribution. It goes back to Ricardo, if not earlier. A
remarkable feature of this tradition, however, is its preoccupation
with the problem of income distribution among factors of production.
Attempts have rarely been made to explain the distribution of income
among individuals.1 Understandably, the classical economists, in
their days, might have had some justification in identifying any
income group by the ownership of only one factor and therefore
restricting their attention to the functional distribution of
income. In the context of contemporary economic situation, however,
it is the other problem - the distribution of income among individ-
uals, which is the more meaningful and fundamental thing to look at.
Exceptions to this are the works of Champernowne, Mandelbrot
and Stiglitz. See, D.G. Champernowne: "A Model of Income Distribuion,"
Economic Journal, Vol. LXIII, 1953; B. Mandelbrot: "Stable Paretian
Random Functions and the Multiplicative Variation of Income," Econo-
metrica, Oct. 1961; J.E. Stiglitz: "Distribution of Income and Wealth
Among Individuals," Econometrica, July, 1969.
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Another important area where the literature on income distri-
bution has definite gaps relates to the analysis of the role played
by eduction. It is indeed somewhat surprising that, in spite of an
increasingly wide recognition of education as a significant component
in the explanation of national income,2 when it comes to the related
question of distribution of this income, there have been very few
attempts to formulate an integrated structure to accommodate educa-
tion into the existing theories of income distribution.
The purpose of this essay is, first, to develop a comprehensive
theoretical framework to explain how education interacts with other
factors of production, particularly physical capital, to determine
the distribution of income among individuals, and then, estimate
econometrically all the crucial relationships of the model in order
to be able to point out the egalitarian or non-egalitarian tendencies
of particular economies. The case studies will refer to the develop-
ing world and we have decided to choose one developing country from
Asia and another from South America - India and Colombia respectively -
to provide a variation in terms of socio-cultural background within
the developing blocks.
2 See, T.W. Schultz: "Capital Formation by Education," Journal
of Political Economy, Dec. 1960; E.F. Denison: The Sources of Economic
Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us, New York,
1962; Why Growth Rates Differ, The Brookings Institute, 1967.
D.W. Jorgenson and Z. Griliches: The Explanation of Productivity Change,
The Review of Economic Studies 1967. For results in the developing
countries, see, M. Selowsky: Education and Economic Growth (Ph.D. Dis-
sertation), University of Chicago.
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Section 1 is a brief review of the existing literature on
education and income distribution. With this as the background, the
basic model is developed in Section 2. This model shows how the
accumulations of human and physical capital by different income groups
taken together determine the behavior of income distribution of an
economy over time. Section 3 then is devoted to finding out the
nature and implications of the conditions under which such an economy
can converge to an egalitarian state. Since in any actual economy,
the government usually plays a significant role in the educational
process, it is important that this role of the government is properly
accommodated in our analysis. With this in mind, a policy model has
been developed by introducing government educational expenditure and
taxes and then the nature of the optimal policies has been discussed
(Section 4). It turns out that the convergence conditions and optimal
policy rules involve essentially certain slope-characteristics of the
relationships posited in the model. To be able to make any statement
about the equalising or disequalising tendency of an economy, it is
therefore necessary to estimate those relationships carefully. This
is where the econometric estimation comes to play a significant role
and we have done such estimation for India and Colombia and, on the
basis of that, tried to reach some definite conclusions about the
nature of income distribution and the incidence of government policies
in these countries (Section 5). We conclude the essay by suggesting
possible generalisations of our analysis and directions of future
research (Section 6).
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1. The Review
There are essentially three different ways in which education
has been introduced into economic analysis. The most conventional
among these is the so-called "human capital" doctrine where education
is regarded as a productive factor and is supposed to play the most
important role, independent of any other factor, in the determination
of personal income. Then there is a second approach where education
is still characterised as having a productive role, but, in the deter-
mination of income, other socio-economic characteristics are recognized
to be at least as important as education. Finally, there is an inter-
esting "job-access" hypothesis and education in this paradigm is
looked upon just as a means of getting access to higher-paid jobs
without necessarily having any connotation of productivity. In all
these three approaches, there have been some attempts to relate educa-
tion to the problems of income distribution and it is worthwhile to
review them.
The "Human Capital" Doctrine:
If one is historically minded, one can trace back the germs of
this doctrine in the writings of classical economists. It is inter-
esting to go through the relevant passages of Adam Smith3 and John
Stuart ill 4 to see how very close they came to conceiving of
3Adam Smith: The Wealth of Nations, Book I, Part 1, Ch. X.
4See, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, University of
Toronto Press, pp. 374-75, 385-87.
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educational expenditure as a form of investment similar to any other
physical investment. Their ideas were further perfected later on by
5 6
Marshall and Cannan. This is a tradition which is interesting to
trace. However, for the purpose of this brief review, we might have
to start with a more contemporary presentation of the problem. The
doctrine, in its modern form, has developed primarily out of the
empirical works and theoretical formulations of the Chicago economists,
although there are some contributions from other places as well.
The concept of human capital was first used symmetrically with
physical capital by Schultz in his empirical research and then this
was followed up by Denison,8 Aukrust9 and others. These pioneering
empirical works, however, were not very complete in their theoretical
foundations. A complete theory of education as human capital gradually
developed in the writings of Bowman10 and particularly of Becker.1 1
5Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, Vol. 1 edited by
Guillebaud, p. 619.
6E. Cannan, Wealth, London, King, 1914, p. 199.
7See T.W. Schultz, op. cit. See Also his "Investment in Human
Capital," American Economic Review, Vol. Li, 1961.
8E.F. Denison, op. cit. See also "Measuring the Contribution
of Education (and the Residual) to Economic Growth" in The Residual
Factor and Economic Growth, Paris, OECD, 1964.
90. Aukrust: "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production
Function," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 39, 1957.
1OMary J. Bowman: "Human Capital: Concepts and Measures in The
Economics of Higher Education, (ad.) Mushkin, S., Washington, 1962.
1 1Gary S. Becker: Human Capital, New York, NBER, 1964.
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This theory is now just too well known to need to be discussed in
detail. We therefore present only a brief outline.
The doctrine essentially centers around the calculation of
returns to expenditure on education in a way similar to the calcula-
tion of returns to physical investment. There are two kinds of re-
turns one may be interested in. One is the "private rate of return"
from the standpoint of an individual, the other is the "social rate
of return" from the standpoint of a society. The private rate of
return of any particular level of education is obtained by comparing
the costs incurred by the individual and the returns received by him
as a result of this education. The total costs are divided into
monetary expenditures borne by him and opportunity costs. The returns,
on the other hand, are the extra post-tax life time earnings associated
with a particular level of education over some other level of educa-
tion. The private rate of return of this particular level of educa-
tion is the rate of discount which when applied to the stream of extra
life time earnings just equates them to the total cost of that education.
In principle, such private rates of return can be calculated for differ-
ent types of education. The social rates of return are calculated in
basically the same way with the difference that, in the calculation of
social cost, government expenditure on education is added to private
outlays, and the social returns are calculated from pre-tax rather than
post-tax income differentials.
This theoretical framework has provided the basis of a stream,
which at one time seemed to be never-ending, of empirical works, all
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aiming at the calculation of these private and social rates of return
from the same kind of age-education-earnings cross-section profiles
and cost data for one country or another, and all stressing the
importance of private rate of return in the explanation of individual
decision-making in education and the social rate of return as the
basis of educational expenditure policy of the State. The literature
on this kind of empirical research is rather extensive.12 However,
we do not intend to digress on that, because the purpose of this
review is not to survey the different approaches to economics of
education in their every detail but to report on a more specific
issue, namely, the analysis of the problem of income distribution with-
in different approaches.
In the "human capital" approach, the problem of income distri-
bution has been raised most notably by Gary Becker.13 His views on
12 For a collection of the major works, see W. Lee Hansen (ed.),
Symposium on Rates of Return to Investment in Education, 1967. For
important works in the context of less developed countries, see C.A.
Anderson and M.J. Bowman (eds.) Education and Economic Development.
For particular countries, e.g. India and Colombia, see M. Blaug et. al..
The Causes of Graduate Unemployment in India; M. Selowsky: Education
and Economic Growth: Some International Comparisons, Center for Inter-
national Affairs, Harvard University.
13To be bibliographically exact, however, one should mention
that some of the problems about the relationship between the distri-
bution of earnings and education were mentioned in an earlier work of
Mincer (see, J. Mincer: "Investment in Human Capital and Personal
Income Distribution," Journal of Political Economy, August 1958).
But his ideas can be found in a more developed form in Becker, op.
cit.
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this question, however, seem to have changed over time. His initial
position, presented in his book, 'Human Capital', 14 is this. Income
of an individual is predominantly determined by earnings from his
investment in education, and income of one individual differs from
another because there is a difference in the rate of return and also
in the amount of investment in human capital. This rate of return is
higher for people with, what he calls, higher "ability" and that is
why they invest more in education and accordingly the income distri-
bution can very well tilt in their favor. He illustrates this point
by suggesting that this can explain why white urban males with high
I.Q.'s acquire more education than others. Although it looks incred-
ible, this indeed is Becker's initial position and, as such, it certain-
ly is a very incomplete theory of income distribution.
Fortunately, however, he revises his opinion within a period of
three years and seems to recognise, as anyone should, also the supply
side of the problem.15 The optimal investment in human capital for a
welfare-maximising individual, it is argued, is determined by the inter-
section of the demand.;curve for investment showing his marginal rate
of return on an additional dollar of investment and the supply curve
showing the marginal cost of financing the investment. The total
amount invested in human capital therefore differs among persons
14
G.S. Becker: op. cit., pp. 52, 61-66.
1 5See G.S. Becker "Human Capital and the Personal Distribution
of Income," Woytinsky Lecture, University of Michigan, 1967.
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because of differences in either demand or supply conditions. Becker
then goes or to discuss the possible causes of variations in the demand
and supply curves among individuals and their effect on income distri-
bution. Apart from formulating a theory, he has also carried out,
along with Chiswick, an empirical study of income distribution for the
United States, Canada, Mexico, Israel and Puerto Rico (treated as a
country) and found that areas with greater income inequality have greater
schooling inequality.16 Chiswick later on did two more elaborate
empirical works - one on the regional income distribution17 and the
other (this is done jointly with Mincer) on the intertemporal behavior
of inequality in the United States.18 Theoretical foundations of both
these works are essentially Beckerite and empirical conclusions tend
to confirm the direct relationship between the skewness of income and
the skewness of schooling.
Although a special credit should go to Becker for initiating
the discussion on income distribution within a "human-capital" frame-
work, there are some major omissions in his analysis of the problem.
In the first place, the model is essentially static. It only tells us
how the demand and supply curves may be different among individuals
1 6 G.S. Becker and B.R. Chiswick: "Education and the Distribu-
tion of Earnings," American Economic Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (May 1966).
17B.R. Chiswick: "An Interregional Analysis of Schooling and
the Skewness of Income" in W. Lee Hansen (ed.), Education, Income and
Human Capital.
B.R. Chiswick and J. Mincer: "Time Series Changes in Personal
Income Inequality in the U.S. from 1939, with Projections to 1985,"
Journal of Political Economy, 1972 (Special Issue).
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to result in different possible distributions of income at a partic-
ular point of time. It does not consider the more interesting, and
of course more complex, problem of how, starting with an initial
distribution of resources and the demand and supply curves, different
forces may interact with one another to characterise the behavior of
this distribution over time. It should also be pointed out that even
the theoretical framework used by Chiswick and Mincer19 to study the
time series of income distribution is essentially static. What has
to be recognised, however, is a fundamental theoretical point - that
whenever capital is introduced in a model, whether it is in the form
of human capital or in any other form, at least two points (or, periods)
of time get essentially linked up and therefore the model has to be
unavoidably dynamic, and any problem of income distribution posed with-
in such a model has to be intertemporal in nature.
Secondly, there is a lack of a proper awareness of the important
co-existence of human capital with physical capital and their comple-
mentarity in production. The assumption that higher level of invest-
ment in human capital always means a lower rate of return has to be
qualified significantly once the complementarity between the two kinds
of capital is sufficiently understood. By focusing the attention only
on human capital to the exclusion of physical capital, one runs the
danger of repeating the same mistake which was made in the traditional
capital theory by way of ignoring human capital.
Chiswick and Mincer, op. cit.
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Finally, there is another incompleteness in the Beckerite
analysis. Becker tells us about the differences in the demand and
supply conditions among individuals, but, apart from making some
casual observations such as the importance of parental gifts etc.
in the financing of education, he never quite tries to relate these
differences systematically with particular income groups and endo-
genise them in a complete theoretical framework. And, this affects
his empirical analysis also. For instance, after observing a greater
inequality in the distribution of schooling in the American South,
he only speculates that this may be a consequence of less equal
opportunity,20 rather than actually pursuing it to find out in which
way these opportunities are in fact unequal for different income
classes. This is a very fundamental problem and, if one has to talk
about income distribution at all, one should rather ask and try to
answer this question than avoid it.
And, this leads us to an interesting work of Samuel Bowles21
where this problem has been posed in a very direct and straight-
forward manner. The framework of analysis is again human-capital-
theoretic and he uses it to understand the incidence of educational
policy in capitalist less-developed countries. In such countries,
he argues, the benefits from higher education tend to go to the
elite groups and the benefits from primary education to the masses.
2 0Becker and Chiswick, op. cit., p. 367.
2 1See his "Class Power and Mass Education," Harvard University
Mimeographed (1971).
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With a non-neutral government and its predictable bias, there is
likely to be overspending on higher education compared to primary
education. The evidence that he uses to support his hypothesis is
that the returns to higher education are found to be lower than the
returns to primary education indicating the suboptimality of
resource allocation. This, according to Bowles, has been a deliberate
policy decision in many less developed countries. This hypothesis of
Bowles is remarkable in the sense that it perhaps is the first
attempt within the tradition of human capital to link up educational
policy to the class structure of a country.
However, there are some areas in which his analysis leaves
scope of improvement. For instance, as has been pointed out by
22
Bhagwati, it does not exactly logically follow from the demonstra-
tion of a discrepancy between different rates of return that the
relative inequality between the two groups has necessarily to go in
a unique direction. The model has to be properly closed by a more
complete set of assumptions on the expenditure-education and the
education-income relationships. Again, on the questions of comple-
mentarity between human and physical capital and the intertemporal
behavior of income distribution, Bowles' analysis seems to be vulner-
able to the same kind of criticism which was found pertinent to the
Becker-Chiswick Theory.
22
J. Bhegwati: "Education, Class Structure and Income Inequal-
ity," World Development, Vol. 1, May 1973, p. 24.
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Another general shortcoming of the "human capital" doctrine
has been its inflexibility, its failure to recognise and accommodate
within its theoretical structure the importance of many socio-
economic factors other than education. This exclusive reliance on
education came to be increasingly disputed as the facts started
telling a different story.
The Significance of Socio-Economic Factors
That the socio-economic background of an individual is an
important determinant of his attainment of education and also of
his income has been recognised for a long time. We have already
referred to Marshall in connection with the "human capital"
doctrine. It is interesting that one can again find passages in
'Principles of Economics' where he was careful enough to qualify
and supplement his views on education as human capital with a proper
acknowledgment of the significance of socio-economic influences.2 3
One can also mention the early empirical works of Hollingshead and
others.24 But, for our purpose, a convenient starting point is the
Coleman Report25 which is usually regarded as a major source of data
on the relationship of education to other social, psychological and
23
See R. Blandy: "Marshall on Human Capital, A Note," Journal
of Political Economy, Vol. LXXVI, 1968.
24
A. Hollingshead: Elmtown's Youth: The Impact of Social
Classes on Adolescents; W. Warner, R. Havighurst, and M. Loeb: Who
Shall Be Educated? New York, Harper, 1944.
2 5J.S. Coleman, et. al.: Equality of Educational Opportunity,
Washington, Government Printing Office, 1966.
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economic variables. The Report addressed itself to the question of
inequality of educational opportunity among different racial groups
in the U.S. and, from detailed statistical studies, concluded that the
most important factor in educational attainment was the background of
fellow students rather than teaching quality, curriculum and other
fatilities. After this publication, several other studies came to
report similar findings. Hanoch,26 for instance, found that the
internal rate of return to increased schooling (except for graduate
studies) was considerably lower for blacks than for whites. The work
of Hanoch has been further extended by Harrison27 and Weiss.28 In all
these works, however, it should be noted that the underlying implica-
tion was that socio-economic background played an important role in the
determination of income indirectly through its effect on education.
Recently, Samuel Bowles in his works29 has gone one step further.
He has tried to establish that the socio-economic background variables,
apart from influencing income through education, have a separate and
direct impact on income. The specific econometric model he has used
26G. Hanoch: "An Economic Analysis of Earnings and Schooling,"
Journal of Human Resources 2 (Summer 1967).
27
B. Harrison: "Education and Earnings in the Urban Ghetto,"
Mimeo., University of Maryland, 1969.
28 R. Weiss: "The Effect of Education on the Earnings of Blacks
and Whites," Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1970.
29 S. Bowles: "Schooling and Inequality from Generation to
Generation," Journal of Political Economy, 1972 (Special Issue);
"Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor,"
The Review of Radical Political Economics, Fall/Winter 1971.
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to prove his point is a recursive one - the first relation specifies
education as a function of socio-economic variables and, then, the
second equation shows income as depending on education and the socio-
economic variables. Bowles then argues in detail how the measurement
errors with respect to the socio-economic vector were disproportion-
ately large in earlier studies30 and how a proper correction of these
errors finally gives a higher coefficient to the background variables
compared to education. He has also tried to trace down the source of
the differences in socio-economic variables in the structure of a
society and mentioned certain possible institutional arrangements
which help to perpetuate these differences and through these the
inequality in the distribution of income. Implicit in his analysis is
a suggestion that the problem can be solved only by changing the
structure of the society.
It is interesting to contrast this radical critique with a more
liberal stand taken by Jencks.31 In an extensive empirical study he
has tried to find out the relationship between variations in income
30
P. Blau and 0. Duncan: The American Occupational Structure,
New York, Wiley, 1967. 0. Duncan: "rAbility and Achievement," Eugenics
Q. (March, 1968). 0. Duncan, D. Featherman and B. Duncan: Socio-economic
Background and Occupational Achievement, U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, May 1968.
3 1Christopher Jencks, Inequality, 1972 Basic Books, Inc. In this
context also see J. Simmons, "Investment in Education: Alternative
National Strategies," IBRD, Oct. 1973.
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on the one hand and those in socio-economic background, educational
attainment, cognitive skill and occupational status on the other. The
general theme of this study is that the observed differences among
individuals in all these attributes explain very little of the varia-
tions in their incomes. Therefore, it is in the unmeasured differences
in motivation and especially in luck that the bulk of the explanation
can be found. Since these unmeasured differences can not be controlled
by policy, the best way of equalising income, Jencks concludes, is to
redistribute income directly rather than going through the observable
"explanatory" factors.
In this context it should be mentioned, however, that in a recent
work Hall32 has pointed out that there are some major statistical prob-
lems which were seemingly ignored by Jencks, but which can seriously
limit his method of estimation of the significance of the observed
attributes of the individuals in explaining the dispersion of income.
As an alternative, Hall has suggested a statistically more satisfying
method of estimation based on the mathematical theory of Tchebycheff
system.
In another empirical study relating to the Indian data,
Panchamukhi and Panchamukhi33 have approached the problem in a somewhat
3 2 R.E. Hall: "On the Statistical Theory of Unobserved Components,"
M.I.T., Dept. of Economics, Working Paper No. 117, August 20, 1973.
3 3V.R. Panchamukhi and P.R. Panchamukhi, "Socio-Economic Vari-
ables and Urban Incomes" in H.N. Pandit (ed.) Measurement of Cost Pro-
ductivity and Efficiency in Education NCERT, New Delhi 1969.
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different way. Using an ingenious statistical device they have
succeded in separating from the total concentration ratio of income
distribution, the contributions made by the different socio-economic
factors, namely, family income, occupation, education, sex and employ-
ment status. The conclusion they have reached is strikingly at
variance with Jencks'; it shows that the concentration ratio of the
total earnings can be significantly explained by the concentration
ratio of the earnings due to socio-economic factors and that the
imposition of residual factors can distort the distribution of income
towards greater inequality only slightly.
It is clear therefore that from the standpoint of empirical
confirmation, the issue about the significance of socio-economic
factors is far from being settled. And, on the question of theore-
tical analysis, one can not avoid getting the feeling that all these
studies have tended to fall short of providing a complete analytical
structure. There is in each of these works an underlying implication
of some particular theory of distribution. Unfortunately, however,
this has rarely been made explicit in terms of a complete analysis
of the interaction between income, education and other socio-economic
variables. It is indeed difficult to find out in these studies a com-
prehensive economic moiel which is first spelled out and then econo-
metrically tested to corroborate one hypothesis or other.
-18-
The Job-Access Model
Recently, a very different approach to economics of education
has been suggested by Bhagwati.34 In this approach, unlike in the
first two approaches, education does not necessarily have any connota-
tion of productivity. It is essentially a process of acquiring a
credential for getting access to higher-paid jobs. An economy, under
this hypothesis, is conceived of as consisting of a number of jobs
with different price-tags attached to them. The effect of shifting
the population from the uneducated into the educated category in such
a situation is only to filter the educated down into the top jobs of
the uneducated. Bhagwati elsewhere35 has shown that it is indeed
possible to build a general equilibrium model on the basis of such
distribution of jobs with preassigned price tags.
There are reasons to believe that this "job-access" paradigm
can be helpful in understanding the working of an actual educational
process in a less developed country like India, particularly, in
relating the educational process to the distribution of income among
34
Bhagwati, Jagdish, op. cit.
35See Bhagwati and Srinivasan: "Overqualification, Education
and Welfare: A Theoretical Analysis," 1972, Mimeo. See also Bhagwati
and Hamada, "The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets for
Professionals and Unemployment." A Theoretical Analysis, 1972. Mimeo.
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different classes.36 Bhagwati, for instance, has used this model to
analyse the class distribution of the benefits from the government
educational policy. The question raised is: which classes manage to
get their children educated, so that they get access to the better
jobs? The answer to this question depends to a great extent on the
nature of the government policy and, on that, Bhagwati suggests this
hypothesis: "For each class of education, the State (in capitalist
LDC's) will subsidise the cost of education; the benefits of these
subsidies will accrue disproportionately less to the poorer groups
at each level of education: the higher the educational level being
considered, the higher will be the average income-level of the groups
3 6This paradigm has to be carefully distinguished from two other
related paradigms. One is the so-called "screening" theory of Arrow
(cf. K. Arrow, "Higher Education as a Filter,") Stanford University,
1972, Mimeo.) where he argues that "Higher education ..... contributes
in no way to superior economic performance; it increases neither cog-
nition nor socialization. Instead, higher education serves as a screen-
ing device, in that it sorts out individuals of different abilities,
thereby conveying information to the purchasers of labor ..... The
screening or filter theory of higher education, as I shall call it,
is distinct from the productivity-adding human capital theory but is
not in total contradiction to it. From the view point of an employer,
an individual certified to be more valuable is more valuable, to an
extent which depends upon the nature of the production function."
(pp. 2-3). Arrow, however, does not link up his theory to the problems
of income distribution.
The "job-access" paradigm has also to be separated from Thurow's
"job-competition" model which, as pointed out by Bhagwati, is really
an adulterated form of the "job-access" paradigm bent in the direction
of incorporating some productivity effects. (Cf. L. Thurow: "Educa-
tion and Economic Equality," Public Interest, No. 28, Summer 1972).
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to which the students belong; and the rate of governmental subsidisa-
tion to higher education will be greater than that to primary education"
(see his Education, Class Structure and Income Equality, p. 24).
Bhagwati, in this paper, has not developed any formal model which can
be econometrically tested to prove this hypothesis. But, he has
indeed provided us with a wide variety of evidences on the basis of
which the hypothesis does look very convincing.
In reviewing the literature, it is worthwhile to mention some
individual works which do not quite fall into any one of the three
schools of thoughts described above, but are interesting as such. A
recent work by Fishlow on the size-distribution of income in Brazil
is worth mentioning in this sense. In analysing the factors responsible
for shaping the income distribution, he has worked with an inequality
index, originally developed from information theory by Theil, which is
very useful from the standpoint of disaggregation. If, for example,
it is deemed necessary to disaggregate the income classes along sectors
and educational attainment, then this inequality index can be used to
express total inequality as a sum of the differences among income
classes, plus the variation of sectors within income classes, plus the
variation of the means of the different education classes, within sector
and income cells. There are reasons to believe38 that in future
3 7A. Fishlow: "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income," The
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1972.
3 8R.S. Eckaus: "A Prospectus for the Modelling and Estimation of
Personal Income Distributions in Less Developed Countries, Mass. Inst. of
Technology, 1973, Mimeo.
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research on income distribution this kind of disaggregation will have
to be taken into account and in that context this inequality index will
be a very natural thing to use. However, the problem with Fishlow's
paper, and which we have already mentioned to be the problem with
several other well-known studies on income distribution as well, is
that there has not been enough of economic modelling. After decom-
posing the total inequality into the differences along useful categories,
no attempt has been made to relate the variables of these categories
with other economic variables or within themselves to provide an inte-
grated structure of analysis. Yet, it is this structure which alone
can provide an explanation of what we get to know through a useful
device of statistical decomposition.
Another important wrinkle in the entire issue of the interaction
between education and income distribution, and which has also become
a subject of current interest, relates to the question of incidence of
government tax-expenditure policy on education. For example, there is
399
the well-known Hansen-Weisbrod-Pechman controversy 39on the distribution
3 9W. Lee Hansen and B.A. Weisbrod: Benefits Costs, and
Finance of Public Higher Education, Chicago, 1969; "The Distribution
of Costs and Direct Benefits of Public Higher Education: The Case of
California," Journal of Human Resources, Spring 1960; J.A. Pechman:
"The Distributional Effects of Public Higher Education in California,"
Journal of Human Resources, Summer 1960. R.W. Hartman; "A Comment on
the Pechman-Hansen-Weisbrod Controversy," Journal of Human Resources,
Fall 1970. Also see, Hansen and Weisbrod: "On the Distribution of
Costs and Benefits of Public Higher Education: Reply," Journal of
Human Resources, Summer 1971.
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of costs and benefits of public higher education in California. There
is a recent World Bank research on public educational expenditure in
Colombia,40 and there are several others.41 All these studies are of
considerable interest so far as their compilation of data is concerned.
But, unfortunately, there seems to be an important lapse in their
basic analytical structure. Consider, for example, their common
methodology. In all these studies, generally speaking, the following
steps are consecutive. First, population groups are classified by
income or race (Step 1); then, tax payment by each group is estimated
(Step 2), followed by the computation of benefits arising from govern-
ment expenditure on education, e.g., subsidies received by each group
(Step 3) and, finally, the distributions of tax burden and benefits
are compared (Step 4).
The third of these four steps does not seem to be convincing,
and, for the following reason. Assuming that we want to measure the
ultimate impact of a government expenditure policy on the distribution
of income and that we want to do it by comparing tax burden with benefits,
it is clear that if this tax burden is measured by the loss of income
40J.P. Jallade: Public Expenditure on Education and Income Dis-
tribution in Colombia, (Mimeo.) World Bank, Washington.
41I4 1W. Norton Grubb: "The Distribution of Public Costs and Private
Benefits in an Urban Public School System," National Tax Journal, March
1971. D.M. Windham: "The Redistributional Effects of Public Higher
Education in Florida," Monograph Series F, No. 1, University of North
Carolina. R.W. Judy: "The Income Redistributive Effects of Public Aid
to Education in Canada," in Officer and Smith (eds.) Canadian Economic
Problem and Policies.
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through taxes, benefits should be correspondingly measured by the gain
in income from educational subsidy. However, the gain in income is
not really this immediate subsidy, as has been conveniently assumed
in these empirical studies; it is the final gain in income resulting
from a higher attainment of education made possible by the initial
subsidy. To measure benefits, therefore, what has to be computed is
a more complex thing; namely, the additional income generated for each
class from the subsidies through the education-income relationship.
A method of such computation will be developed later in this paper.42
Surprisingly enough, there is a conspicuous lack of awareness of the
significance of this education-income relationship in these empirical
studies.
And, this brings us back to a recurring theme of this review,
namely, the necessity of having a complete theoretical structure before
starting with any empirical work. It is a very well-known methodological
requirement and yet ignored in so many studies in this field. And, in
a sense, this is somewhat ironical because over the last few years -
precisely the period when these empirical studies were conducted -
there has been a sudden flurry of theoretical interest on this question,
42Please see Section 4 of this paper.
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initiated by a suggestive work of Arrow.43 But, unfortunately, these
theoretical speculations in public finance had from the very beginning
taken such an esoteric turn that they could not possibly serve the
basis of any empirical work. The result is an intersection set which
has remained nearly empty.
This, in short, is the review of the beaten track. It shows
how different doctrines and different empirical works in economics of
education have sought to tackle the problem of income distribution.
It also shows where these attempts have remained incomplete. And, in
that, it signals the direction in which our own research should go.
It is clear now, for example, that for any meaningful research in this
area, what is needed, first of all, is a comprehensive theoretical
model which can explain how education interacts with other factors of
production in shaping the distribution of income at any point of time
and also over time. Since there is a controversy over the nature of
the role of education in income distribution, attempts should be made
to represent the alternative hypotheses through some appropriate
characteristics of certain relationships of the model and then test
4 3See K.J. Arrow: "A Utilitarian Approach to the Concept of
Equality in Public Expenditures." Quarterly Journal of Economics,
August 1971. See also J.R. Green and E. Sheshinski? "A Note on the
Progressivity of Optimal Public Expenditures," Technical Report No. 65,
Institute for Mathematical Studies in Social Sciences. Stanford Univer-
sity (August 1971); A.B. Atkinson: "How Progressive should the Income
Tax Be," A.U.T.E. 1972; K. Hamada: Income Taxation and Income Subsidy,
M.I.T. (Mimeo) 1973.
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econometrically these characteristics to vindicate one hypothesis or
another. Since econometric testing has to be an essential part of
the research and there are some well-known restrictions imposed by the
present state of econometric techniques and the availability of data,
a proper care should be taken to simplify the equational structure of
the model as far as permissible by economic theory. There is hardly
any sense, at least at this stage of the game, to try to build yet
another formally elegant model which can never be tested.
With all this in mind, we turn to Section 2.
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2. The Analytical Model
fn this section, we shall develop the basic theoretical framework of our
analysis. Apropos of that, certain preliminary observations are necessary.
First, in this model, we propose to introduce education as a productive
factor but along also with physical capital. As has been pointed out in the
review, the productive role of education or physical capital, in isolation
of each other, has never been underrecognized in the literature. What has
never been clearly brought out, however, is the fact--and a very realistic
fact at that--of coexistence and interaction of these two very important fac-
tors. We believe, and this will be shown, that it is the complementarity
between education and physical capital that lies at the heart of the entire
problem of income distribution.
Secondly, we have already seen4 that certain socio-economic variables
play an important role along with, and possibly also independent of, educa-
tion in the determination of income distribution. A convenient and syste-
matic way of endogenising these factors is to have them represented through
physical capital owned by different income classes. There is evidence to
believe, for example, that in a less-developed country like India or Colombia
the relative privileges enjoyed by different income classes due to these socio-
economic factors go hand in hand with their ownership of land-capital.
U ee Section 1, pp. 13-15.
See Urban Income and Saving (1962), N.C.A.E.R., New Delhi; All India
Rural Household Survey (1965), N.C. A.E.R., New Delhi; CEDE, Encuesta de Gastos
e Ingresos Familiares, Mayo 1967-Mayo 1968.
h6It is well known that for analytical purposes capital and land can be
treated together as a composite factor.
- 27 -
Thirdly, although education is presented through a production structure,
this characterisation is not essential for our purpose. This model can be
very easily modified, and without any basic change in the conclusion, to ac-
commodate the case where education has no productive connotation, i.e., the
"job-access' paradigm. In fact, our model will turn out to be a rather
general analytical framework which can include all the relevant hypotheses--
the human-capital doctrine, the doctrine of socio-economic factors, the job-
access paradigm and even the neoclassical Stiglitz-type capital-theoretic
model--as special cases.
Winally, at some point of our analysis, we might have to make the as-
sumption of perfect competition. However, this is strictly a simplifying
and analytically inessential assumption. All the results carry over even if
market imperfections are introduced.
Consider now an economy with Y as the aggregate income, L the total popu-
lation and y = the per capita income. The total population can be par-
titioried into two groups, to be called 1 and 2, such that every member of
Group 1 has income > y and every member of Group 2 has income < y. Let Y1,
Y2 and L1, L2 be the total incomes and populations of Group 1 and Group 2
respectively. The average incomes of the respective groups therefore are
y1 ( 1 and y L - Clearly then, y .> y2. And, this leads us to de-
fine the coefficient of inequality as
_y 1(2.1) x =
Y2
The production process in this economy is characterised by a neoclassical
constant returns to scale production function
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(2.2) Y = F(K. N, L) ,
where Y is the aggregate output, K the aggregate stock of physical capital,
L the "raw" labour and N the aggregate human capital measured by the number
of school years. In an alternative production-theoretic characterisation
of education, labour is divided into several categories Lo,Li,... ,Ln where Lo
is the "raw" labour and Li corresponds to the labour force with the i-th level
of education. These two types of formulations lead to similar end-results.
However, we find it easier to capture the essence of the problem in terms of
the former approach.
Most of the time, we shall work with the intensive form of the production
function and, using the assumption of constant returns to scale, (2.2) can be
written as
(2.3) y = f(k, n)
where y is the output per man, k the physical capital per man and n the human
capital per man. Each factor is paid its marginal product. Therefore, if r
is the rental on physical capital, h the rental on human capital and w the wage
rate, we can write
( f(k,n) h f(k,n)(2.4) r =G h =
and
W f(kn)-k 6f(k,n) - f(kn).
k 61n
We assume generalized diminishing returns to factors and complementarity
between them. Therefore,
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(2.5) <r - < 0,k )n
)r >h 0w >w
->o ->0, ->o >o)n ' k k ' n
Let K1, Ni and Li be the physical capital, human capital and labour of the
i-th Group (i =1,2), so that
(2.6) K = K +K2 , N=Ni +N2  and L=Li +L2
The idea is that the factors of production owned by the two groups are brought
together and used in one production function.h7 Rewriting (2.6), we have
(2.7) k = aiki + a2 k2  and n = aini + a2 n2
where ki = F and ai = -. We assume that the rate of growth of population does
not vary significantly from one income group to another. This assumption is made
because (a) in the less developed countries, particularly in the context of
India, although there is some relationship between birth rate and income class
(to be exact, even this statement needs qualification in view of the inverse J-
shaped appearance of the birthrate-income curve), there is in fact no such
systematic relationship between income group and the rate of growth of popul-
ation, presumably because higher birth rates among the poor tend to be matched
by correspondingly higher death rates; and, (b) the incidence of intergroup
47There is an underlying assumption of full employment of every factor.
This again is a simplifying assumption. The possibility of unemployment, par-
ticularly of labour, can be incorporated in our analysis.. Since the available
data indicate that the incidence of unemployment of labour is higher among the
poor (cf. Bhagwati: "Education, Class Structure and Income Inequality," World
Development, May 1973), a more complete characterization of the problem along
this line should, as will be evident later, support our final conclusion.
48 See, National Sample Survey, Tables with Notes on Family Planning,_
(1960-61), Indian Statistical Institute.
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marriage can again be supposed not to be very significant. All these imply
that a, and a2 can be treated as approximately constant.
The average income of the i-th Group can now be written as
(2.8) yj = w+rki + hni (i= 1,2) .
We shall call this the income-generation function of Group i, making it 'distinct
from the production function. This function shows how the income of any one
group is related to its own resources and the factor prices which, in their
turn, are determined by the production technology and the accumulation of
resources by the two groups. Any difference in the average income, as defined
by (2.8), of the respective groups will be supposed to be due to a corres-
ponding difference in the average ownership of physical and human capital, i.e.,
it will be assumed that
yi > y2 ==>k > k2  and n > n2 .
How do the accumulations of two types of capital take place for the two
groups? Let Sj, the saving per man of Group i, be a fixed proportion, si, of
its income, so that
(2.9) Si = siyi and S2  s2Y2-
The extensive household surveys, conducted both in India and Colombia, clearly
show that saving-income ratio monotonically increases from lower to higher
income classes. Therefore, if per capita income is chosen to be the cutoff
point, it follows that Si > 82- Let ? and NL be the proportions of the sav-
ings of Group i used for accumulation of physical capital and expenditure on
See, Urban Income and Saving, p. cit., p. 78; Al India Rural House-
hold Survey, Vol. II, p. 96; CEDE, Encuesta de Gastos e Ingresos Familiares.
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education respectively, so that
= sly,.- yk = is y - k
(2.10) and
- s,y,-yE, = s y -VE,
where E; is the cumulated expenditure per man by Group i and overdot,
as usual, denotes derivative with respect to time. It should be noted
that since there are two kinds of capital and they are not produced
by the same production function, a notion of relative price unavoidably
comes in. Therefore, expenditure on education should be considered as
being measured in terms of the price of education relative to physical
capital, i.e., E = Pn, where P = P(n) is this relative price. We shall
ignore any "price effect" and assume P = 0, so that E = Pn. The physical
capital good in this analysis, of course, is considered the same as
the "unique" commodity (since they are produced by the same production
function) which is taken as the numeraire.
' is the rate of growth of population and, because of the reasons
50
already mentioned, is assumed to be the same for both groups. Nothing
is essentially lost, but simplicity gained, if we now put V _= 0. This
is because finally we will be interested only in the comparison between
E EM
L and Z , and in this comparison, particularly for the countries we
are interested in, the difference between s, and s Lusually overwhelming-
ly dominates the difference between the "capital-widening" terms,
50
ibid. pp. 25-26.
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The question now is: how are these and determined for
each income group? This is essentially a problem of portfolio choice
and there are some interesting issues connected with this problem.
It is known, for instance, that if the transformation frontier between
two types of investment goods is linear and if there is no uncertainty,
then either there is a "corner" solution implying that all savings
will go to only one form of investment or else there is an indeterm-
inacy with the allocation ratios lying anywhere in the closed interval
Co, 1. 52
However, these problems do not arise in our model, because, as
will be seen in Section 5, the supply price of education increases
with the level of education, i.e., P(n)>o and also P (A)>o and that
ensures the required curvature of the transformation frontier. The
equation of the transformation frontier for any Group i is
(k , n ) = + PAL - styL = o (settingy= o)
51 In the case of India, for example, it will be found that
as, 30% and a.*o (Table 6),'f = 2.5%, _L = 0.112 and !I = 0.037 (Table 5).
y5
52The problem of portfolio allocation in growth-theoretic models
with heterogeneous capital goods was first raised by Hahn and then
followed up by Shell and Stiglitz. See, Fz Hahn: "Equilibrium Dynamics
with Heterogeneous Capital Goods," Quarterly Journal of Economics,November. 1966; K. Shell and J.E. Stiglitz: "The Allocation of Invest-
ment in a Dynamic Economy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Nov. 1967.
Also see D. Foley and U. Sidrauski: Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a
Growing Economy.
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Since P'(A) >, it is clear that
dk- dig.
-- ; P and -- (0
di' d n
Therefore, the transformation frontier for both groups will have con-
cave shape from the origin. However, one curve will not be a radial
"blow-up" of the other, and for the following reason.
max (for /,= o) > imax(for ?; = o). Correspondingly,
max a max I
n,a > nm . But P (AL) > o. Therefore the relative difference
between the intercepts of the transformation frontiers of the two
income groups will not be the same on the two axes. A possible situa-
tion is shown in Fig. I where TT, and T.T2 are the transformation
frontiers of Group 1 and Group 2 respectively.
We assume that, confronted with the transformation locus, a
typical member of each group in any period allocates his savings
between the accumulation of two types of capital in such a way as to
maximize his total rental income in that period. In so doing, he treats
the rental rates, r and h, on the physical and human capital as given.
These rental rates refer to the aggregate stocks of the two kinds of
capital and can be shown to be equal to the corresponding internal
rates of return.
Of the two, however, the internal rate of return on human
capital (i.e., h) needs a more careful analysis. Although for the
economy as a whole there is in any period only one value of h referring
to the total stock of human capital, there is at the same time a differ-
ence in the value of internal rate of return on education as between
P(; 2 1) max )
Figure 1
-35-
the two income groups. Denoting the rates for Group 1 and Group 2 by
h, and h2 respectively, h should be looked upon as the weighted aver-
age of h, and ha, i.e., h = -LhI + h where N N and N are the
N * N .weeNNanNarth
total stocks of human capital for Group 1, Group 2 and the economy as
a whole. The difference between h, and h, can be explained in the
following way.
The rate of return to any educational investment is calculated
by equating the discounted sum of future returns from the additional
education with the cost of that education. A special characteristic
of this educational cost is that, in addition to the direct expenditure,
it also includes the opportunity cost which is the income foregone
while attaining this additional education. Now, since Group 1 has on
the average higher level of educational attainment and there is a
positive correlation between educational level and income earnings,
it is clear that this opportunity cost will be higher for Group 1.
Hence, there will be a corresponding difference between h, and h2.
To repeat, therefore, although for the economy as a whole there will
be in any period a unique 'h' as an average concept, the value of the
rate of return on education will be different when viewed from the
standpoint of the two income classes taken separately. And in making
the portfolie decision, the typical individual of each class will
consider its omn rate of return, h1 or h,, as the relevant parameter.
It is also clear that since there is no similar problem of
opportunity cost in the accumulation of physical capital, there will
be no inter-class difference in the value ofr.
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The portfolio problem for a typical individual of Group i then
is to choose k and n such that the rental income53
A
Y, =yki + hli is maximum
subject to
f6 , = ki + pA - s y = o
The first-order condition for the constrained maximum requires that
= r , which is the standard perfect arbitrage condition in the
absence of any Wicksellian "price-effect." The second-order condition
is ensured by the concavity of the transformation frontier. Since
h
, A ha, it is clear from the first-order condition that there will
be some difference between X's and A\s - the ratios in which
savings are allocated between two kinds of investments by the two
groups. A possible situation is shown in Fig. 1.
Denoting now the proportions of income spent by Group i on
the accumulation of physical and human capital by (; and 4j. res-
pectively, where ;: and 4 4; (i = 1,2), we can
write
(2.11) and
- e,y, il "a
We shall see that in the countries we are interested in s, is so
overwhelmingly large compared to 5 s that it tends to outweigh any
53We have ruled out any consumption benefit from these invest
ment and hence the objective function has not been characterised in
terms of utility function.
conceivable variation in the allocation ratios. As a result, the
effective proportions of income spent by Group 1 in both types of
investment tend to be larger than Group 2, i.e., P, > Pa. and
4, > ta . For instance, in the case of India it has already
been mentioned that s,& 30% and s e o, so that as long as
o0 > A, >0 and 06)T >0 , it follows that I ) .
and , 9 &
Now, the existing stock of expenditure of Group i on human
capital at any point of time can be written as
E (t) = ft E()d
The average educational attainment of the group, denoted by n i(t) for
any point of time t, is a function of this accumulated educational
investment per man over all the past years up to t. Or, in other
words, it is a function of the existing stock of (cumulated) expend-
iture per man, i.e.,
(2.12) n i(t) = n(E i(t)) i = 1,2.
This function along with other crucial relationships will be estimated
in Section 5.
The equation (2.1)-(2.12) define the model of an economy, the
framework of our analysis. The problem which is now posed within this
framework is: starting with an initial nonegalitarian situation, as
characterised by x = > 1, does this economic system converge to
Y2
an egalitarian state? To answer this question, it is necessary, first
of all, to spell out the meaning of convergence more precisely and
find out the conditions for such convergence. This is what we propose
to do in the next section.
3. Meaning and Conditions of Convergence
By convergence to an egalitarian state, we shall mean that,
starting with a value > 1, the time function x(t) should tend to
1 asymptotically and monotonically, i.e.,
(3.1) lim x(t) = 1 , with x(t) ( o for every t 4 (c ,)
t -+a*
The convergence has to be asymptotic because, given the definition
of x which is conditional upon a particular scheme of partitioning,54
x(t) can never attain the value 1 exactly, it can only approach that
asymptotically.
We also insist on the monotonicity of convergence because,
for one thing, it may be highly desirable, on very pertinent non-
economic grounds, to rule out the arbitrariness of a process which
leads to a fall in equality at one point of time and rise at another;
it is preferable to be interested in a process which assures "more
equality" at every iteration. For another, in the case of non-monotonic
convergence, it is not possible to find out a necessary or a sufficient
condition which is valid for every point of time. The conditions then
can only be of an asymptotically restrictive nature and therefore un-
interesting from the standpoint of economic policy.
54
See p. 27.
a 1.
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Given this meaning of convergence, the conditions for its
attainment can be stated in the following way:
Proposition 1: A sufficient condition for lim x(t) = 1 sub-
t __+ W
ject to x(t) 4 o for every t E (0,0 ) is that there exists a number
. ( 4o) such that
(3.2) dx(t) Z T 4 0 for every t E (0,00)dt a(t)-
~x(t)-1
Proof: Define x*(t) = x(t)-1, so that the given problem is
equivalent to finding out the sufficient condition for lim x *(t) o
with x (t) < o for every t E (e, ). Now, for any t, we can write
dx (t)
dt * = - A(t) where )(t) > 0
xt (t)
so that *
x (t) = x (0) 4
Clearly then, the necessary and sufficient condition for
lim x*(t) = o is J (t)dt= o
t -- yo
0
It would have been most desirable if this necessary and sufficient
condition could be transformed into an equivalent condition presentable
in terms of X (t) and holding for every t, because such a character-
isation is very important from the standpoint of economic interpreta-
tion. Unfertunately, however, it is possible to prove that there
does not exist any such condition which is both necessary and sufficient
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and, at the same time, capable of characterising A(t) for every t.
It is only possible to derive such an "equivalent" condition in an
asymptotic sense, i.e., valid only for t --+o . Any asymptotic
condition, however, in the context of our model does not have any
interesting economic interpretation or practical use.
We shall therefore derive one sufficient condition in terms of
X(t), valid for every t, and one necessary condition in terms of A(t),
again valid for every t. These two conditions will have to be unavoid-
ably distinct, the dichotomy being the result of an equivalence of the
basic condition of convergence to the unboundedness of an improper
integral.
t
From this requirement of unboundedness of of X (t)dt subject
to the condition of monotonicity, it follows that a sufficient condi-
tiQn for this is: X(t) (> o) should be bounded away from zero. But,
by definition,
t dx*(t) / 
_ dx(t)
dt / M*(t) dt /x(t)-l
Hence the proposition.
Remark: That this condition is only sufficient can be verified
by setting >6(t) = , where
Quite independent of this sufficient condition, it is also
possible to state a necessary condition for convergence in the
following way:
Proposition 2: A necessary condition for lim x(t) = 1
t -ye
subject to i(t) < o for every t f (o, o) is
dy 2.(t ) for every t 6 (o, W)
(3.3) dt /y1 (t) 4 dt /y 2(t)
The proposition is self-evident from the definition of monetonicity
and x(t).
Usually, one would have considered the necessity of supplement-
ing this condition by the following restriction:
,c(t) = o for t a T when x(t) = 1,
so that any danger of an inequality being opened up in the opposite
direction is ruled out. However, this is not necessary in our case
because, as pointed out earlier, x(t) can approach 1 only asymptotic-
ally and, by definition, x(t) t 1.
For our analysis, we shall only make use of the condition
stated in Proposition 2.
Now the question which naturally arises is: how can this
condition, formal as it is, be used to study the behavior of income
distribution in an actual economy? We suggest the following procedure
to answer this question.
In many economies, particularly in Colombia and India, it is
possible to obtain data on the relationship between educational attain-
ment and income earnings of the individuals. A curve can Ahenmfore
be fitted to such a scatter.
However, a curve fitted in this way will not show the (partial) relationship
between only income and education, because there are other relevant variables
which have not been controlled and which have come into this scatter. This
will be a curve showing the relationship between income and education when
all other relevant variables are changing. Although on a first thought it
may sound strange, it is precisely this curve--this total relationship between
income and education--that we really want and we will presently see why.
It should also be noted that there is not one curve but actually two
curves, one for each group, which should be fitted. This is quite clear from
the income-generation functions (2.8) which were specified separately for the
two groups. Once such curves are carefully regressed, on appropriate econometric
specification of "best-fit", it is possible to estimate the values of -
dni
dy2  'dy s
and TY corresponding to the average values of ni for each group. These
(i =1,2) should be interpreted as the total derivative of yj with respect to ni
or, alternatively, as the ratio of the total differentials, dy1 and dni. Hence
they stand for the entire following expression:
dyi 1 -,bw hw br 3r
dk + 7 dn + dk + dn ki + rdki
+(hdk + 3hdn n, + rdnil i = 1,2.
It is also possible to obtain data on the expenditure at different
levels of education. From these data, the expenditure-education function,
dni dn2ni =n (Ei), can be estimated and the values of -- and --- determined cor-
responding to the average educational expenditure of the respective groups.
In general, this expenditure-education relationship is found to be concave
from below.
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Finally, from the household surveys, the data are available on the saving-
income ratios and educational expenditure-income ratios for different income
groups. From these, one can estimate the values of el -)and e2 (= -).
Now, collect these three sets of informations and put them side by side
to obtain the values of these chain derivatives:
dyi dni dE 1  a dy2  dn2  dE2  1
- - -- - ---- - and- - - - - - .
di_ dEl- dt -yi dn92 d' d2(t Y2
Hau&'., dy1  dy2these chain derivatives are nothing but - /yi and -a-/y2 , the two crucial
expressions in terms of which the conditions of convergence have been stated.
Therefore, one can now compare the values of these two expressions to ascertain
the behaviour of the distribution of income--its egalitarian or non-egalitarian
tendency--in any economy.
This is a simple procedure and our motivation in suggesting such a pro-
cedure has been this. The distribution of income is determined by the inter-
action of several variables; this is obvious from expressions such as .
However, very often it is not possible to obtain data on the detailed inter-
relationship of all the variables. Let us therefore approach the problem in
a slightly different way. It may be possible to select carefully a few
variables on which the data are available and then it may also be possible
by using their observed relationships to extract information
about the nature of the underlying non-observable interactions. The procedure
outlined above is fundamentally based on this intuitive idea.
And, such a procedure has a remarkable advantage. Since it purports
to bring out the implications of the underlying interactions and integrate
them with the conditions of convergence, it can provide a very important insight
into the working of different kinds of opposing forces, their nature and
mutual strength, all of which taken together make the distribution of incogie
what it is at any point of time. Let us illustrate this. It is
generally found, and this will be corroborated for India and Colombia in
Section 5, that dy , the derivatives being evaluated at the averagedni dn2
level of educational attainment of the respective groups. It is also found
that el = ) > e2  = . However, on the other hand, given the usual con-
cavity (from below) of the expenditure-education relationship, it is expected
dn, dn2
that --- < -- , the derivatives being again evaluated at the average expendi-
dyi > dy2
ture points. Therefore, it is not clear whether jE-/yi < -T-/y2; it depends
on the relative magnitudes of the respective slope-characteristics and ratios.
Postponing a complete analysis of how these relative magnitudes can be known
in any particular economy for a later discussion, let us consider at the moment
a situation where it is supposed, for the purpose of illustration, that these
magnitudes are such that
dyr dyi dn, ~ 1 dy dy2 dna dE2 1
tT dni d1 d y dt dn/d2 dt y
which means that the necessary condition for convergence to an egalitarian
state is violated. Now, why can this happen? What are the forces responsible
for it?
Differentiating yi and y2 totally with respect to time, it can be found
that
dyi dy2Wt yi > :rt/Y2 means
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n, +6 k, k +y (L -1'& + h -
YIkI 7kIi~ 'Fn 1 Y3n'. y1 ynj \) , Y1 )(3.4) )kk-k; + nI - +D
It is interesting to interpret this inequality. There are two kinds of
forces working in this system - one tending to equalise incomes of the
two classes and the other having a disequalising effect. In disentangling
these forces, we shall suppose that Group 1 has more of both physical
and human capital per person relative to its average level of income,
i.e., k and - 55
y1  y2  y y2
With the accumulation of both physical and human capital per man,
the rate of return on either capital as related to its own stock tends
to fall (i.e. k o, n o ) because of generalised diminish-
ing returns. This affects Group 1 more unfavorably than Group 2 because,
by supposition, Group 1 has more of both physical and human capital per
person relative to its income level. Therefore, this is an equalising
force and its absolute value is shown by the first two terms on the
R.H.S. of (3.4). Also, as the wage rate goes up with the accumulation
of human and physical capital (note that wo = k + n and
So ), This again affects the average income of Group 1 more
55
It is possible to consider other possible situations where
this supposition is not true. However, the basic logic behind this
interpretation still remains the same, only the terms whioh come under
the equalising and disequalising forces interchange their positions.
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unfavorably relative to its previous level of income since y> Y2 ;
the last term on the R.H.S. captures this. The R.H.S., as a whole,
therefore shows the absolute value of the equalising forces in the
system.
On the other hand, as the accumulation of physical capital
goes on, it tends to increase the return on human capital through the
effect of complementarity (i.e., k 2h > o). The same is true of the
effect of the accumulation of human capital on the return on physical
capital (i.e., r >o). This complementarity effect tends to favor
Group 1 more than Group 2 because again Group 1 has more of both kinds
of capital per man relative to its income level. This is therefore a
disequalising force and is captured by the first two terms on the
L.H.S. of (3.4). In addition to this, if it is found that Group 1 is
accumulating both types of capital at a faster rate in relation to its
income (i.e., k and > !'), then, so long as r and h are
y, y3. yl yX
positive, this also has a disequalising effect as shown by the last
two terms on the L.H.S.
Now it is clear that when the L.H.S. of (3.4) exceeds the R.H.S.,
the disequalising forces in the economy are stronger in absolute value
than the equalising forces and that explains why and how " dy
implies an increase in inequality over time.
We want to emphasize the important of the coexistence of physical
and human capital and their complementarity in the explanation of this
inequality. In the absence of any one of these two kinds of capital
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(say education), diminishing returns tend to be a very dominant force56
and on the basis of that, under certain assumptions, one can indeed
visualise a built-in equalising device in an economy. It is interesting
to point out that the model of income distribution suggested by Stiglitz
turns out to be essentially a special case of our model when human
capital is ignored. Similarly, the traditional human-capital doctrine
is again another polar case when physical capital is ignored. Small
wonder that in either approach there is a suggestion of natural equal-
isation of income.57
However, the moment we introduce education along with physical
capital, a potentially disequalising force which works through the
complementarity between the two kinds of capital comes into operation.
And, now it becomes possible for any income group to postpone the
otherwise disequalising effect of diminishing returns to either form
of capital indefinitely by simultaneously investing in both of them.
This simultaneity of investment in two (or more) types of capital
which are mutually complementary in raising the productivity of each
other acts as a safety valve against the pressures of "the falling rate
of profit" due to disminishing returns. We believe that the nature of
the distribution of income in any economy is determined in this way,
56
In this case, the first two terms on the L.H.S. of (3.4) show-
ing the disequalising complementary effects disappear; only
r ( - k) remains. Similarly, the seond term on the R.H.S. disappears.
y 5 y So
~'See Stiglitz, op. cit.
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by the comparative strength of these two mutually opposing forces of
diminishing returns and complementarity, along with the relative
endowment of resources and their rates of accumulation by the res-
pective income classes. This is a simple point, but still worth
making.
We also believe that in any economy the government plays a
very significant role in this entire process, and it is time that
we accommodate this role of the government in our analysis. This
leads us to the formulation of a policy model.
- 49 -
4. The Policy Model
In this section, we propose to develop a policy model, corresponding to
our basic analytical structure by introducing taxes and government educational
expenditure.
Consider a system where incomes of both groups are taxed and then tax
proceeds are spent by the government, among other things, on education for both
classes. Let zi and z2 be the over-all tax-rates and Y1 and Y2 the total dis-
posable incomes of the rich and the poor respectively. Then, in any period,
(4.1) Y = (1-zi)Y1 , = (1 -z2 )Y2
or
d d
(4.1)' yi = (1-zi)yi , y2 = (1- z2 )y2
d d
where yi and y2 are the average disposable incomes of the two groups. The
coefficient of inequality should now be redefined as
d
(4.2) x -
Y2
The production characteristics are the same as in the analytical model
and therefore the relationships (2.2)-(2.7) simply carry over. For the same
reason, the pre-tax income-generation functions are also exactly like (2.8).
The saving per man of either group should of course be considered now as
depending on its average disposable income, so that
d(4.3) S1 = sy, dS2 = S2Y2
These private savings are used by the individuals of both groups to accumulate
physical capital and education in the same manner as before. The difference
is that now, in addition to private expenditure on education, there will be
government educational expenditure for both groups as well.51 Therefore, we
can write
(4.4) EI=El+ gjy k2 =H2+E
where ii, EP and iE are the total, private and government expenditure on edu-
cation per man of Group i (i = 1,2). The private expenditure, as has already
been mentioned, are determined in the same way as before so that
p d -p d
(4.5) 1 = eiyi , E2 = e2y2
How are $1 and kg determined? These government expenditures are related
to the total budget and, through that, to taxes. Taxes, in their turn, are
related to the incomes of the two groups and the entire system therefore can
be causally closed.
The total tax proceeds, T, in any period is
(4.6) T = ziy1 Li + z2y2L2 .
Let a be the fraction of the total budget, B, which is financed by taxes and
5 the portion of the total budget allotted to educational expenditure. Hence,
5
denoting by E* the total expenditure on education, we have 6* = 6B = T.
This total expenditure in any period is divided between Group 1 and Group 2
S In this policy model, on the expenditure side, we are interested only
in the educational expenditure policies, although the model can be easily ex-
tended to include expenditure policies on physical capital.
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in the ratio of, say, v, and v., so that government educational expend-
iture per man for each income group can be written as
(4.7) ig= v, = vi - II
and
'g E T T
2. Lv - V2.CL- =A
where Aj : VA so that 2 .(2>
Finally, there is the expenditure-education relationship:
(4.8) ni= n(Ei) (i = 1,2)
where n has the same meaning as before, but E is now the sum of the
existing stocks of private educational expenditure per man made by
Group i and also government educational expenditure made per man for
Group i.
Equations (4.1)-(4.8) and the relevant equations which are taken
unaltered from the analytical structure define the policy model. The
question is: what is the necessary requirement for tax and expenditure
policy to ensure the objective of convergence to an egalitarian state?
To be more precise, what should be the nature of z, za at any
point of time to ensure lim x(t) = 1?
t -# 0
Consider a necessary condition which has to be satisfied. By
proposition 2 of Section 3 and (4.2), it follows that a necessary condi-
tion for this convergence is
(4.9) dyl(t) dy!(t) /
dt /yS(t) - dt /y;(t)
for every t 4 (o,.). Using (4.1) , (4.4), (4.5), (4.7) and (4.8), (4.9)
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can be written as
dza dzx
(4.10) +d dy1 dn
1-+ ~ 1-zL dni d e, (1-z, ) +
- dy .dn e 1 (l-zx) + )IT o
Idna. dEL L y
This should hold for every point of time; time-subscript is skipped for
convenience.
We propose to estimate all the parameters and coefficients involved
in (4.10) for both India and Colombia and then use this condition to find
out whether at least a necessary requirement for convergence has been
satisfied in these two countries in a particular period. The purpose of
this paper is to enquire into the egalitarian or nonegalitarian character
of government policies on taxation and educational expenditure for these
two countries, andto reach a definite conclusion in this matter, we shall
see, it is only this necessary condition that we need to use.
It should be pointed out, however, that it is also possible to
derive a sufficient condition for convergence with reference to this policy
model. By using Proposition 1 of Section 3, such a sufficient condition
can be written as
(4.11) dyf(t) dya (t)(41)dt /yI(t) dt /y (t) x )
for (o) and t 4.(o, o). Using again (4.1)', (4.4), (4.5), (4.7) and
(4.8), (4.11) can be expressed as
(4.12) dt d n
+ e, (1-z, ) +
- _j 23 e,(1-z,) + 
-X1- 1dna dEL Layxt
This again should hold for every t.
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This sufficient condition can be used to find out the nature of
optimal policy instruments. With distributional objective as the only
target, this policy model is obviously underdetermined in the Tinbergenesque
sense with degrees of freedom left on the choice of policy instruments.
There are different ways of closing these degrees of freedom. We can
choose to parameterise the taxation side of the problem and then derive
the optimal structure of expenditure at a point of time and also over time,
or we can parameterise the expenditure part and in a symmetrical way find
out the optimal evolution of tax structure. Or, better still, we can use
the degree of freedom to generate the optimal trade-off equation between
the taxation and expenditure instruments. This will help us in determining
to what extent one set of policy variables can be substituted by another
at a point of time as well as over time. However, this analysis of
and the derivation of the optimal policy paths is another
important subject by itself to which we do not want to enter right now
because it is not strictly essential for the purpose of this paper and
also nothing short of another complete research work can do justice to
that subject.
Coming back to this paper, to the question which we want to answer,
it is enough, as has been mentioned before, to use only the necessary
condition and compare the actual characteristics of tax-expenditure
policies of India and Colombia with the necessary characteristics as
given by (4.10).
It is to these comparisons and empirical results that we now turn.
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5. Empirical Results
It is clear from (4.9)-(4.11) that to be able to make a definitive
statement about the equalising or disequalising tendency of an economy and
the nature of government policies in any period, it is necessary to estimate
the income-education relationship and the expenditure-education relationship
for each income group and collect information about the over-all incidence
of the tax structure as well as the educational expenditure-income ratios
(both private and government) for each class. We have done these estima-
tions and tried to obtain all the other relevant informations for both
India and Colombia. As is understandable for this kind of empirical work,
the data were not always available in a very obliging form and therefore
at times we had to make certain simplifying assumptions. Our conclusions
are valid only subject to these assumptions.
There is another point which should be clarified at the outset in
order to avoid any possible misunderstanding. Since we are asking the
question about convergence of an economic system, we are basically inter-
ested in its dynamic behavior. However, by a suitable characterisation
of the problem, as discussed in detail in Section 3, we have been able
to reduce the crucial condition for this convergence to an expression
which has to hold for any particular point of time. As a result, it is
now possible to judge the dynamic tendency of an economy just by looking
at its behavior at one point of time. We shall, therefore, estimate the
relevant relationships and collect information about the required para-
meters for the two countries only for a particular point (or, period)
t). member
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of time, because that is all what we need in order to be able to use the
necessary condition (4.10) and conclude about possible convergence, or
the lack of it, in any economy. Therefore, the data we are looking for
are the cross-section data; we do not have to use the time-series data.
This method which enables one to study the dynamic behavior of a
system by looking at its property only at one point of time is a very
useful and efficient device of extracting all the relevant informations
about the laws of motion of the system, particularly when the time-series
data are not available which, incidentally, also happens to be the case
for the two countries we are interested in. We have devoted so much time
in explaining the logic of this method because we do not want it to be
misunderstood as a static or pseudo-dynamic analysis in the Hicksian
sense.
India
The Income-Education Relationships:
Before reporting the empirical findings on these relationships, it
is appropriate to make certain observations:
1. The data from which the income-education relationships are measured
relate to individual educational attainmend and individual income for both
income groups. However, the postulated relationships such as (2.8) relate,
to the average income and the average educational attainment of the respective
groups. It is therefore important that we establish a link between the two.
Let Y be the income of the j-th member of Group i (i = 1,2 ),-yL the
average income of the group, Nii the educational attainment of its j-thember
and ni its average educational attainment. Then writing the total relation-
ship between individual income and individual educational attainment of any
Group i as Yi = 'Y (Nij), we have, upon expanding 'j (Ni j) in Taylor' s series
around Nij =ni,
(N i-ni) 2 , (Nij-ni) 3(5.1) Yjj=Tj(nj)+(N j- nj)?F (n) + 2 + 3'
We have made cubic approximation and ignored higher-order derivatives. Summing
both sides over every individual of Group i and dividing each term by the
population Li, it follows that
(5.2)
Therefor
(5.3)
yj =Tj(nj) +}var(Nj) T (nj) + I (Nij-nj)3Y//'(nj)
e,
dyi )
=Yi (n i) +I var (Ng) Y i (n i) + (;,.-f - ( ,gw g heeg
:n 1 2g kil te esOV
From the available data relating to individual income and educational attain-
ment, it is possible to estimate the R.H.S. of (5.3) and there-
dys
fore --dn
2. As it has already been explained, we seek to understand through this
estimation the total relationship between the average income and the average
education of each group when all other relevant variables have been deliberately
left uncontrolled. We want all the underlying interactions to work themselves
out and are interested only in the end result as represented by this total
relationship between income and education.
3. One limitation of the data on the income-education relationship is
that they are available in a systematic form only for urban India and therefore,
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so far this particular relationship is concerned, the estimation had to be
based on the urban data. The standard sources for such data are the Urban
59
Income Survey and the relevant issues of Technical Manpower. However, it
was not possible to obtain from these sources the "raw" data in a very de-
tailed form. The data are usually available in a summarized form as presented
in Table 1 and our analysis had, to be based on that. It should be pointed
out in this context that all the well-known estimates of the rates of return
on education in India have been made on the basis of this particular tabular
information.60
4. It should also be noted that the data on the relationship between
income and education for individuals, such as obtained from Table 1, really
refer to earners rather than to individuals as such. So far, in our theoretical
framework, we have not made any distinction between the two but, given this
restriction of the data, such a distinction may now be deemed necessary. And,
we can introduce that quite easily into our analysis and accommodate the
resulting changes in the following way.
Let us express the average income yj of Group i as
e
Yj Li e e
(5.4) y=---= Y, li
Li Li
e e e
where Lj is the total number of earners, yj the average income per earner and li
e
the proportion of earners in the population of Group i. Denoting now by N1 the
59Urban Income Survey, _. cit.; Technical Manpower (March, 1961; Dec.
1963, Aug. 1964, Oct. 1964, March 1965, June 1965, June 1966).
60
See A.M. Nall Gounden, "Investment in Education in Iidia", Journal of
Human Resources, 1967. Blaug et al., o. cit., Chs. 7, 9.
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Table 1: Average monthly earnings of workers: by education level,
Urban India, 1960/61 (Rs. per month)
Education level
Actual no. of
years to
completion
Income
Illiterate Primary
4.6
11
14
16
21
24
30
30
34
37
38
39
47
47
63
72
86
85
69
61
62
23
25
34
40
41
53
57
69
71
74
104
125
139
161
132
116
102
Engineering
Middle Matric Graduate Graduate
7.7
41
42
75
90
98
100
104
125
156
180
209
212
162
144
10.8
41
83
98
117
121
121
123
163
217
241
249
278
259
208
14.8
123
141
147
243
337
372
403
426
450
351-
16.8
309
362
497
647
782
918
1,134
1,266
Sources: Urban Income Survey N. C. A. E. R. , New Delhi.
Technical Manpower, op. cit.
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total. educational attainment of the earners, we can write
e
(5.5) Ni = 4jNj
where ii (0 < pi < 1) shows the proportion of the total education of Group i
that is renumerative. Clearly, 4i = 1 when there is no educated unemployment.
e
Dividing both sides of (5.5) by Li, we have
e n
(5.6) n = i -e
e
where ni is the average educational attainment of the earners of Group i.
Now, differentiation of (5.4) with respect to ni gives
e e e
dyi dyi dni e e dli
(5.7) = e li + y -dni dni dni
e e
dyl dpi e dli
-dn edniI i + y dn , using (5.6).
dy
This equation (5.7) provides the required link between - and the estimable
e dnIdyi
, given the other variables and derivatives.
dni
About these other variables and derivatives, it is possible to make
some qualitatively comparative statements on their values for the two income
e e
groups. For one thing, by definition, y1 > y2. For another, it is possible
to refer to some interesting evidences showing how an increase in educational
attainment can affect in very different ways the chances of getting employ-
ment for the typical individuals of the two groups, Group 1 having. nt,
a
.60-
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surprisingly,,a distinct edge over Group 2. For our purpose, this can be
e
dli i I
taken to imply that in all these magnitudes, namely, , i, Group 1
has a comparative advantage, i.e.,
e e
d1 dl 2  di dp2
-- *> ---- pi>I a and -- > -.
dni dn2 ' di 1 dn2
edpi d1i8upposing further that , > 0, and using the fact that - > , we can.K w-ritddi
e e-
(5.8) = Oi 01 and d = dG 2
di dni .dna dn2
with ei > 0 and 1i > 02
e
dyi
For the estimation of -yr from the observed data relating to individual earners,dni
of course, we shall use a relationship similar to (5.3), .i.e.
dy e
(5.9) -j = V~
dn1
With all these in mind, let us start with the data of Table 1. First of
all, we partition the observations into two sets, Set 1 and Set 2, such that
Set 1 contains all the values of income, corresponding to different educational
levels, which are > the average income per earner in urban India in 1960-61
54Cf. D.G.E. and T., Employment Survey of the Alumni of Delhi University
(1962). This survey has revealed that till 1960, the most important method
(around 40%) of obtaining employment by graduates has been "personal contacts".
A similar study with the data related to the State of Gujrat for the year 1970
has again confirmed the importance of family and class-links in the recruitment
pattern (cf. Hommes and Trivedi: "The Market for Graduates - A Field Report",
Econ. & Po1. Weekly, Dec. 11, 1971). It should not be wrong to suppose that
these personal or family contacts are more likely to be formed among people
belonging to the same income class rather than across the classes. Starting
therefore with an unequal distribution of income and concentration of economic
power among Group 1, a typical member of Group 1, with certain educational
qualification, will have an easier access to employment as compared with a
typical member of Group 2 with the same qualification.
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(which was approximately Rs. 100 per month), and Set 2 similarly contains
all the values of income < Rs. 100. Since the data relate to the earners, the
average income per earner is the appropriate cutoff point; it corresponds, with
adjustments for the earner-population ratio, to the per capita income. Therefore,
Set 1 can be supposed to represent in the sample the education-income combi-
nations of Group 1 and Set 2 those of Group 2.
Polynomials of increasing order (up to 3rd order) are fitted, first. bly
the method of ordinary least squares to both sets and the results are siumarized
in Tables 2 and 3. Consider the results for Group 2 (the poor) in Table 2.
R2 is quite low in each case, but since we have deliberately excluded the
other explanatory variables, R2 is not the thing we are interested in. Our
concern is with the values of the coefficients and their associated t-statistics.
Judging by this criterion, the linear form appears to be the best among the three.
However, because of unequal variations of the conditional distributions of
income for different values of education, the existence of heteroscedasticity
could be suspected. Therefore, we performed an F-test, suggested by Goldfeld
62
and Quandt , by arranging the observations according to an ascending order of
the levels of education and then finding out the ratio between the least squares
residuals of higher- and lower-numbered observations. Giyen the nature of the
data--particularly, its concentration at some specific levels of education--
certain middle observations had to be omitted (as permitted by the test). The
resulting F-statistic
F(12 12) =.122141E07
.113664 E07
M. Goldfeld and R. E. Quandt (1965), "Some Tests for Homoscedasticity",
JASA, 60, pp. 539-547.
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Table 2
Regressions of Income on Education for the Earners
of Group 2, Urban India, 1960-61*
e e
Y2= 503.665 + 26.6069 N2j
t,: (7.83169) (2.09521)
No. of obs. = 46 R2 = 0. 0907
Quadratic:
e e e 2
Yaj = 528.592 - 12.9481 N2 j + 4.59702 (N2j)
t: (7.78743) (-0. 345148) (1.12012)
No. of obs. = 46
Cubic:
e
Y2j = 531.6
t : (7.72401)
No. of obs. = 46
R2 = 0.1165
e e j 2 j _
61.2584 N2j + 18. 0486 (N2 )2 - 0.8631 (N2 )
(-0.546439) (0.608295) (-0.457845)
R2 = 0. 1209
Linear:
To maintain uniformity with the educational expenditure data, the income
figures in these regressions have been considered annually.
I
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is not significant to reject the null hypothesis .of homoscedasticity.
To sum up, therefore, the simple linear form
e
Y j=503.665 + 26.6069 N2J
seems to be the best fit for the income-edifcation relationship for the earners
of Group 2. This implies, by (5. 9), that
edy2 e e e
= (n2 ) = 26.6069 since 'T 0.
dn2
Consider next Group 1 (the rich). The results of ordinary least squares
regressions of income on education are shown in Table 3. It is clear that
judging by the criterion of the significance of t-statistics of the relevant
coefficients the choice of admissible functional forms is now wider, since all
the three cases -- linear, quadratic and cubic -- display acceptable t-statistics.
It should be pointed out that the t-statistics associated with the constant
terms are not particularly relevant because eventually we are interested in the
derivatives of the functions. For the same reason as before, we have carried
out the F-test for heteroscedasticity and the relevant F-statistic is found to
have the value
F -0.144447 E 09
0. 405084 E 07
which clearly falls in the critical region. A correction for heteroscedasticity
is therefore needed, and we have done that in terms of two alternative specifi-
cations, by assuming that the variance of the error term is proportional, first,
to the level of education, and then, to the square of the level of education.
The corresponding results of weighted least squares regressions are shown-by-
equations 1 and 2 for each functional form in Table 4.
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Table 3
Regressions of Income on ~ducation for the karners of Group 1.
Urban India, 1960-61 (Income: Rupees per annum)
ILinear:
= -2036.98 +
(-1.82532)
No. of obs. = 43
e
498.528 N1 j
(5.42126)
Estimated Variance-Covaxiance Matrix:
= 6473.19
(2.53157)
0.125 E 07
-0.964 E 05
e
- 1316.53 Nij
(-2.5813)
-0. 964 E 05
0. 946 E 04
e 2
+ 82.7727 (N,)
(3.60437)
No. of obs. = 43 Estimated Variance-Covariance Matris:
R2  = 0. 5603
Cubic:
e
Yij = -10995.1 +
t : (-1.69524)
0. 654 E 07
-0. 126 E 07
0. 542 E 05
e
4785.82 Nia -
(2.21239)
-0. 126 E 07
0. 260 E 06
-0. 116 E 05
e 2-
546.454(Nij)
(-2.49783)
0. 542 E 05
-0. 116 E 05
0.527 E 03
e
+ 19.7097 (Ni j )3
(2.88967)
No. of obs. = 43 Estimated Variance-Covariance Matrix:
0. 421 E 08
-0. 138 E 08
0. 136 E 07
-0. 412 E 05
-0. 138 E 08
0. 468 E 07
-0. 470 E 06
0.144 E 05
0.136 E 07
-0. 470 E 06
0. 479 E 05
-0. 149 E 04
-0. 412 E 05
0.144 E 05
-0. 149 E 04
0. 465 E 02
e
Yij
t..
R2 = 0.4175
Quadratic:
e
t ;
R = 0. 6379
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Table 4
Income-Education Relatior.ships for the Earners of Group 1,
Urban India (106-61): Weighted Least Squa'res Iegressions.
Equations Estimated Variance-Covariance Matrix
Linestr:
e
(1) -987.85 + 406. 537 e li 0. 5CE 06 -0. 495 E 05
t (-1.31458) (5. 63;03) -0. 495 E 05 0. 520 E 04
No. of obs. m 43 R2 - 0.2V55
(2) -297.387 - + 334.059 C.23 : CC -C.2C5 E05
t: (-0.591483) (5.Ce7E0) -F.2 F C! 0. 345 E 04
No. of obs. a 43 R7 = 0. c.;S
.: dr B'. CC CP7.S :
'1 1-- . 41AC2.5 - - .31. 534 .41 j + 67. 4: (NIA ' 
-. 1 , .
t : 2. 926' (-2.9 5' 116 C
No. of cbs. a 43 P2 - .4419
(2) = 3933. 37 -- - 753.157 + 56.3-CC :;* 0.133 E 07 -C. 313E06 C.152 - C5
-. !13 E 06 0.779 E 05 -0. 391 E 04
t'. 34 15) (-2.6) (3. NEU)
0. 152 E 05 -0. 391 E 04 C. 203 E 035
No. of obs. .43 R1 0.27L
ZubIc:
(1) = 690 + 3C76.76J -433e' 70( 0.225 7 C9 -. 7 E C7 0. B10 E 06 -0.254
5N. +17.0 -0. 786 E 07 0.280 E 07 -0.293 E CG 0. 926 E C
O.e10 EC6 -3.293 E06 C. 310 E05 -0.991 E 03
t (-1.850) (2.376) (-2.628) (3.C25) -O.254 E cc O. 926 E 04 -C. 51 E 03 0. 31 E 0
Xo. of obs. a 43 R2 . 0.5479
(2) -69 34 .61 -+ 3303.39 - 390.98 +4 14.77 (N)2 0.132 08 -0.483 E 07 0. 517 E 06 -0.167 E C5
l-0. 483 E 07 0.179 E 07 -0.193 E 06 0.628 E C;
t (1.879) (2.471) (-2.69) (3.09) 0.517 E 06 -0.193 E 06 0.211 E 05 -0.692 E C3
No. of obs. a 43 *a = .4280 -0.167 E 05 0.628 E U4 -0.692 E 03 0.229 E 02
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The efficiency of the estimators is indicated by the magnitude
of the principal diagonal terms of the estimated variance-eOvar4lid-
matrix. From the standpoint of efficiency, it is obvious frotn TdbIl 4'
that the second equation under each functional form gives a better fit,
dye
and therefore we have calculated, by using (5.9), the value of = for
dn,
each of these second equations. The results are summarised below.
Linear:
= 334.059
dn I
Quadratic:
e
* = e (n ) = -753.157 + 2(56.39) (11.4)
dn1  
e
= 532.535 (since ne = 11.4 approx.)
Cubic:
e
dy) =e 3303.39 + 2(-390.98) (11.4) + 3(14.77) (11.4)
dn,
= 147.573.
de
We can work in terms of any one of the three values of L,e
dn
and we have checked that the final conclusion remains the same in each
case. However, after ensuring efficiency of the estimators within
each functional form, if we now decide, as we have done before, on
the criterion of the significance of t-statistics of the relevant co-
efficients in choosing among the three functional forms, then the linear
case appears to be the most acceptable. For this reason we shall work
dy
with - = 334.059.
dn
To sum up our findings on the income-education relationships for
Group 1 and Group 2, we can write, by using (5.8), that
e .1: the
= of 9 . 9= 334.059 and
(5.10) y$ = G26.6069
dn1 dn
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As has been already mentioned, one limitation of this empirical analysis is
that, except for urban India, the data are just not available in a form"which
can serve the basis of any meaningful regression analysis, and this is in spite
of the existence of an All-India Rural Household Survey. This raises a problem,
because most of the other relevant information on the educational expenditure
and government policies are obtainable only on the national level. Therefore,
dyi dy2
we had to assume that the relative difference between d- and dY, as cal-dni dna
culated from urban data, provides a reasonable approximation for the country as
a whole. Although there is undeniably an arbitrariness associated with this
assumption, it should be emphasized that the final conclusion is "robust" with
respect to this assumption; it remains insensitive to a wide range of possible
dy1 dy2
variations of -and - . This will be clearer as we go along.dni " dna
The Education-Expenditure Relationship:
This relationship, as expressed in (4.8), shows how the different levels of
education are attainable corresponding to different amounts of educational ex-
penditure per person. In a sense, this is the counterpart of the production
function and is assumed to be the same for both groups. Educational expenditure,
as mentioned before, has two components: (a) private expenditure such as ex-
penditure on books, stationery and tuition, and (b) government expenditure in
the form of current expenditure, costs of inspection, rent on buildings, etc.
We have decided not to include opportunity cost in this expenditure, because
the relationship we are interested in is only about the expenditure actually
made and educational level correspondingly attained. It is true that opportunity
cost, along with other factors, does play an important role, but only in the
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basic portfolio decision, namely, in the determination of how much of saving
should be alloted to expenditure on education. We have discussed that problem
in Section 2. But educational expenditure, after being determined in this way,
is itself only the direct expenditure; it does no longer include opportunity
cost within itself. And, to repeat, we are now interested strictly in the
relationship between the amounts of this direct expenditure actually made and
the consequent attainment of educational levels.
Coming back to the two components of direct expenditure, the data on the
63
private component can be obtained from the Education Commission Report for
the year 1965-66. We have deflated these data by the rate of increase in the
cost level to get the corresponding figures for 1960-61, making them contem-
poraneous with the income-education data. For the data on government expenditure,
we relied on the work of Blaug and his associates.64 All these informations are
summed up in Table 5.
To estimate the expenditure-education relationship column 1 has been re-
gressed on column 4 and since, unlike in the income-education relationship, one
can avoid the zero value of the variables, the logarithmic form can be chosen
as an appropriate specification of function (4.8), that is,
n =AE
where A is some positive constant and b captures the concavity (from below) of
the function. Ordinary least squares regression gives the following estimate
of this function:
63
Report of the Education Commission, Govt. of India (1966), p. 468.
61 Blaug et al., Ch. 8.
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Table 5
Educational Expenditure and Levels of
Educational Attainment, India, 1960-61
Educational level Private Expenditure Total (Private & Govt.) Cumulative Total
(No. of school years) per student Expenditure per student Expenditure per
(Rs. per annum) (Rs. per annum) student
(Rs. per annum)
1 2 3 4
1.2 33.2 33.2
2 1.2 33.2 66.4
3 Primary 8.0 40.0 106.4
4 11.7 43.7 150.1
5 12.0 44.0 194.1
6 25.4 91.4 285.5
7 Middle 28.4 94.4 379.9
8 44.1 110.1 490.0
9 89.1 239.1 729.1
10 Secondary 93.0 243.0 972.1
11 . 92.8 242.8 1214.9
13 Intermediate 256.0 606.0 2426.9
Graduate
15 (B.A., B.Sc., 377.0 919.0 4264.9
B. Cav.)
Engineering 290.0 1564.0 8682.917 Graduate
p. 468.Sources: Report of the Education Commission, Govt. of India (1966),
Blaug et al., Ch. 8.
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log n = -1. 14198 +0.48239 log E
t (-4.03944) (10.8325)
No. of obs.- = 14 R2 = 0.9072
Noting that the average educational attainment of Group 1 is 11.4 school years
with the corresponding annual expenditure per person at Rs. 1214.9 (approx.),
the derivative of the function evaluated at the average expenditure point for
the rich is
dn1
--- = A (.012)dEi
Similarly, with the corresponding figures--the average educational attainment
equaling 3.6 school years 'and the average annual expenditure per person approxi-
mately Rs. 150.1--the relevant value of the derivative for the poor. is
dn2d-2 = A (.036)
dE2
Now, combining these estimates with the estimates of the income-education
relationships for the respective groups as shown in (5.10), we .have
dy1 dni
n, dn, = GiA(334.059)(.012) = A1 (4.008) , and
(5.11)
dy2 dn2d 2 -- = e2 A(26.6069)(.036) = A2 (0. 9578)dn2 dE2
with A, > A2
The Educational Expenditure-Income Ratios:
It is not possible to obtain directly from the Household Surveys of India
any quantitative information about the educational expenditure-income ratios of
the two income groups. However, there are some reliable data available on the
-71-
saving-income relationship as shown in Tables 6 and 7, and we can use the
analytical framework outlined in Section 2 to extract from these data the re-
quired qualitative information about the educational expenditure-income ratios
of the two groups. From Tables 6 and 7 it is abundantly clear that if the
average income is chosen to be the cutoff point with appropriate adjustments
for the average size of households in both urban and rural India, then not
only si (the saving-income ratio of Group 1) is significantly higher than S2
(the saving-income ratio of Group 2) but also s2 < 0. This implies by our
analysis of the portfolio decision problem in Section 2 that ei > e2 . Therefore,
using (5.11), it becomes obvious that
(5.12) dyi dn e dy2 dn2 e2
dni dEi dn2 dE2
Now refer back to (4.10). If there were no government intervention in
the form of allocation of educational expenditure between' the two groups or
taxation, then (5.12) could have been taken to imply that the educational
process left to the private sector was acting as a disequaliser of income in
India in the early sixties. However, as we know, we should bring the govern-
ment in the picture. A pertinent question then is: what should have been the
nature of government policies at that time to counteract the disequalising
forces of the private sector and make the Indian economy move toward a more
equal situation?
Government Policies on Educational Expenditure and Taxes:
Let us take one policy at a time. As indicated before in Section 4, let
us first parameterise the taxation side of the problem by supposing that as if
the over-all tax structure were proportional and expected to remain so over time,
dz, dz,i.e., Z,= z, and =t at .
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Table 6
Saving and Income of Urban Households
by Income Class, India
Disposable Income Weighted Average disposable Average saving Saving income
per cent income per per household ratio
of household household Rs. (per cent)
Rs.
Under 1,000 42.5 608 -125 -20.6
1,000 -1,999 32.5 1,390 - 83 - 8.0
2,000 -2,999 10.7 2,387 - 24 - 1.0
3,000- 3,999 5.8 3,476 15 0.4
4,000- 5,999 4.6 4,818 467 9.7
6,000 - 9,999 2.4 7,420 843 11.4
10,000-14,999 0.8 12,292 3,019 24.6
15,.000-24, 999 0.5 18,867 6,227 33.0
25,000 and over 0.2 40,452 18,017 44.5
All households 100.0 1,862 62 3.3
Saving, N.C.A.E.R. (1962), p. 78.Source: Urban Income an~d
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Table 7
Saving and Income of Rural. Households
by Income Class, India
Income Class* Weighted percentage Weighted average Weighted average Saving
(Rs. per annum) of households saving per income per income
household household ratio
Rs. Rs.
Up to 360 6.52 -13 222 -5.9
361-480 7.12 -36 426 -3. 4
481-600 9.67 -26 545 -4.5
601-720 9.87 -24 663 -3.6
721-900 13.42 - 4 810 0.5
901-1200 16.02 - 3 1043 0.3
1201-1800 18.94 40 1464 2.7
1801-2400 8.27 124 2078 6.0
2401-3600 5.76 252 2886 8.7
3601-4800 2.30 400 4105 9.7
4801-7200 1.23 1088 5727 19.0
Above 7200 0.88 1993 12370 16.1
All Incoame 100.00 63 1328 4.7Classes
Bource: All India
p. 96.
Rural Household Survey, Vol. II, N. C. A. E. R. (1965),
-74-
Then it follows from (4.11) that to improve the distribution of income, the
government policy on the allocation of educational expenditure, as determined
by the choice of vi and v2 and therefore of Ai and N2, should have been such
that
dyr dn, . AiT- dy2 dn 2  AT
--- -- e (1 -z) +< [e2(1 - Z)+.dni dlE, Liyi , dna dIE2 Lay2
But, given (5.12), for this inequality to hold, it was necessary to have
AiT < \2T
Liyi L2y2
We now like to refer to Table 8 65 where, choosing the per capita income again
as the cutoff point between the two groups, we have found that
100 L y1 = Rs. 1194.74 and 100 L2 y2 = Rs. 1375.36
so that Liyi < L2y2. Therefore, for the educational expenditure policy to have
any egalitarian impact it was required that A\ < ?\2 which by (4.7" wculd i:nply
(5.13) vi < v2
With this requirement in mind let us study the nature of policies of the
Indian Government on the allocation of educational expenditure between Group 1
and Group 2 during the early sixties in particul'ar and over the planning period
in general. There is, of course, a problem of obtaining data identifying any
particular kind of educational expenditure with a particular income group in a
country like India which is ostensibly committed to freedom of opportunity and'
similar democratic ideals. This information can be obtained only in indirect ways.
65
AlLthough these data refer to 1963-64, there are reasons to believe that,
for our purpose, the situation was not significantly different in 1960-61.
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Table 8
Percentage Distribution of Persons by Size-class
of Per Capita Income Per 30 Days
Source: Abmed and Bhattacharya, "Size Distribution of Per Capita Personal
Inccme in India", Econ. and Pol. Weekly, Special No., August, 1972.
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Looking, for example, at the data provided by the All-India Survey of
Graduates (presented in Table 9) relating to the family incomes of. the stu-
dents going to the university or technical education and comparing those with
the figures for the average family and per capita income (obtainable from
Tables 6, 7 and 8), it becomes clear that higher education is mostly, if not
wholly, meant for Group 1. An extreme situation is found to prevail at the
Indian Institutes of Technology where the class background of the students is
really conspicuously elitistic (Table 10). Although it has not been possible
to find these informations exactly for the year 1960-61 which is our general
reference point, we believe that it may not be too unreasonable to suppose
that the class structure of higher education did not change drastically over
the late fifties and early sixties.
In the primary and secondlary education, the correspondence between the
stage of education and any particular class is not so complete. Still, cer-
66
tain facts should be noted. From the Report of the Education Commission it
can be found that in the secondary education in 1960-61, percentage of students
paying fee was around 65% and the average annual fee per student was as high
as Rs. 55.6. Combining these data with the contemporary figure for per capita
annual income which was Rs. 360 and noting at the same time that the saving-
income ratio of Group 2 was generally nonpositive (Tables 6 and 7), one can
conclude that the majority of students in the secondary' schools would again
come. fram Group 1. It was only in the primary education where the private ex-
penditure per student was considerably low (Table 5) that a significant parti-
cipation of Group 2 could have been possible along, of course, with Group 1.
Ca. cit., p. 110.
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Distribution of Families of 1954 Graduates and of
All Families by Average Monthly Family Income (per cent)
Average monthly
income of family
Rs.
Percentage of
graduates' f'amilies
Percentage of
Call families
IUun eral
500 and above 2..3 .0
200 - 499 45. 7 LI. 7 8. 5
Below 200 29. 80. 3 90. 6
Source: Blaug t _al., . cit., p. 131.
T.ablIe 10
Parental Income of Students Entering an i.I.T., 1970
Income of parent Students entering I.I.T.
Rs. per month (Perctage)
151 - 200 2
201 - 500 18
500-1000 29
1000 and above 51
Source: A.D. King, "Elite Education and the Economy", Econ. & Pol.
Weekly, Aug. 29, 1970.
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With this approximate correspondence between the types of education and
67
the class background of the students, let us have a look at the data on tile
government expenditure on different levels of education over the period of planning
in general. It is found that the percentage of total educational expenditure on
primary education steadily dropped from 55% in the First Plan (1951-1956) to
35% in the Second Plan (1956-1961) and to 30% in the Third Plan (1961-1966).
The percentage of expenditure on secondary education rose from 13% in the Final
Plan to 18% in the Second Plan and then remained steady in the Third Plan. The
proportional increase in expenditure was most conspicuous in higher education:
from 9% in the First Plan to 17% in the Second Plan and a monotonic increase then
on. Similarly, the percentage of expenditure on technical education rose from
13% in the First Plan to 17% in the Second Plan and then to 25% in the Third
Plan. From all these data, which are mainly suggestive in nature, one has reason
to suspect that the condition (5.13) might not have been satisfied in India in
the early sixties.
This conclusion becomes stronger if we now bring taxes into the picture and
study the over-all incidence of government policies. So long, for purely
illustrative convenience, we have made a kind of "as if" hypothesis, namely,
that the over-all tax structure had remained proportional in the early sixties.
However, the actual situation was somewhat different and it is time now to turn
to the real facts, which, for our purpose, can be briefly summed up in the
following way.
1. Throughout the period of planning, the proportion of direct taxes in
the total revenues of the Central and State Governments has steadily fallen
67
For these data see Third Five-Year Plan, Govt. of India, Chs. xxxix, xxx.
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from 41% in 1951-52 to 30. 7% in the Third Plan period as shown± in Table 1.
This is remarkable because one would have expected that in a period when the
national income was rising the ratio between direct and indirect taxes would
go up.
2. It is also interesting, if not surprising, to observe that not only
there has been a diminishing importance of direct taxes, but considering the
nature of progression of direct taxes, particularly of income taxes, it is
found that the average rate of income tax as measured by income tax as a per-
centage of total assessed income of all taxpaying individuals has also declined
from 18.6% in 1950-51 to 12.1% in 1963-64.68 Of course, there have been vari-
ations in the rate of taxation for some income groups.69 But all these vari-
ations took place within those income ranges which would fall, in terms of our
classification, under Group 1. In fact, the members of Group 2 would not in
general come under income taxation at all. From the standpoint of income
taxes, the relevant group is only Group 1 and therefore the important thing
to watch is not what was happening to the tax rates within this group but the
average rate of taxation for this group as a whole. And, we have seen that
this average rate was falling.
3. How would then the members of Group 2 come under taxation at all?
This is where indirect taxes come in. From Table 11 it has already become
clear that throughout the planning period indirect taxes as compared with
direct taxes have become increasingly more important in the total revenue. In
the early sixties, in particular, indirect taxes have provided nearly two-thirds
68Cf. A. Bagchi,"Dissecting the Tax Structure", Econ. and Pol. Weekly,
Jan. 15, 1972.
69
'This has been studied in great detail by Gupta. Se his "Income Distri-
bution, Tax Yield and Income Tax", Econ. and Pol. Weekly, Oct. 14, 1972.
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Table 11
Direct Taxes as a Proportion of Centre and State Revenue
Direct taxes as Direct taxes as Direct taxes as
Year Percent of Central Percent of State Percent of total
Revenue Revenue (Centre & State)
Revenue
1951-52 36.3 47.1 41.0
First Plan Period 30.4 48.3 38.4
Second Plan Period 29.0 41.5 34.8
Third Plan Period 28.9 33.5 30.7
Sources: Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Explanatory Memorandum
on the Budget ofthe Central Government for 1967-68.
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, "Finances of State Governments,
1967-68", Aug. 1967.
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of the total revenue. Although some of these indirect taxes were on ihlxury
items, most of them were on items which were essential consumption',&-mds
for the poor, such as kerosene, sugar, cotton fabrics, etc. The unmistakably
regressive nature of such taxation in India has been pointed out in some
70
recent studies. It should also be borne in mind that at very low level
of income, consumption expenditure can be equated with income itself (see
Tables 6 and 7) and therefore most of the indirect taxes were nothing but
income tax from the poor.
The total picture which emerges out of these considerations is that in
the early sixties the over-all Indian tax-structure was regressive and was
to become more regressive. In terms of our policy model, this can be taken
to imply that
(5.14) z1 < z2  and dz< dZ2dt dt
in the period of time we are interested in.
To understand the over-all incidence of government policies, let us
bring together the policies on educational expenditure and those on taxes
which were to help finance this expenditure. The important inequality to
which we have to refer now is (4.10). Using (5.11), (5.14), the conclusion
on expenditure policies and also noting that Liyi < L2y2 and e2 ~ 0, we find
that the crucial condition for convergence as given by (4.10) was violated
in the early sixties, if not throughout the planning period, in India. We
also understand that government policies on educational expenditure and taxes
S.L. Shetty, "A Note on Distribution of Indirect Tax Burden by
Grades of Income in Farm and Non-Farm Sectors", The Indian Econ. Jour'nal
July-Sept., 1971, p. 93, Table 1.
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could have been used to make the economy move toward an egalitarian society
by counteracting the disequalising forces which were found inherent in the
private sector of the economy. However, the policies which were actually
adopted were very different. They not-only failed to counterbalance the
forces of the private sector but in fact were instrumental in deteriorating
the distribution of income further. Education, along with other factors,.
was made to serve as a disequaliser of income.
* * *
Colombia
We now want to see how far our findings on India are comparable with
the situation in Colombia. For this we shall go through the same kind of
empirical exercise, estimating the income-education and the expenditure-
education relationships and collecting the required informations on the edu-
cational expenditure-income ratios and government policies. The methodology
to be followed will be almost the same as before and therefore the corres-
ponding descriptions will not be repeated except when there is some variation.
It will be found that because of the better availability of data and possi-
bility of referring to some existing research works, the empirical analysis
this time will be easier.
The Income-Education Relationships:
These relationships will be estimated from the data on income and
educational attainment of the earners in Bogota, a major urban centre in
Colombia, for the years 1963-66. One advantage here, as compared to India,
is that these data are available in a more detailed form (Table 12) over a
sample size of 10,715 people. Following the same method as before, we
Table 12 -
Bogota, Males and Femals: Hourly Wages by Schooling, 1963-66
(In Pesos of 1966)
Illiteracy
Primary
Primary
Primary
Bachillerato
Bachillerato
Bachillerato
University
University
University
0 0.10 0.17 0.59 0.50 0.96 1.12 0.94
(8) (120) (133) (117) (112) (127) (66)
1 0.35 0.15 0.82 1.38 2.12
(18) (64) (74) (59) (47)
1.93 1.54
(46) (32)
2.5 1 0.14 0.93 1.46 1.95 2.18 2.22 2.99
(108) (573) (509) (369) (278) (254) (192)
5 0.54
(32)
6.5 0.35
(3)
8.5
12. 5
14.5
16.5
1.47
(81)
2.33
(26)
2.51
(156)
1.32
(56)
2.18
(17)
3.12-
(99)
2.36
(441
4.75
(8)
1.78
(51)
1.62 3.22 3.39 3.92 4.41 4.44 5.50 5.21 4.35
(483) (591) (518) (422) (351) (258) (197) (148) (73)
3.78 4.05 4.96 5.19 5.15 5.71 5.92 5.61 6.67
(184) (268) (204) (147) (142) (69) (51) (32) (15'
3.90 5.47 6.63 8.48 8.53 10.75 10.52 11.76 12.42
(111) (259) (221) (133) (130) (89) (65) (46) (33)
6.00 6.80 10.52 14.33 21.92 16.40 19.70 21.50 19.34
(28) (174) (163) (130) (110) (83) (59) (61) (41)
6.10 10.17 14.02 26.26 18.35 15.00 29.70 23.60
(4) (47) (41) (19) (17) (2) (8) (3)
10.00 13.95 22.65 18.78 24.09 33.00 31.20 18.60
(28) (60) (44) (28) (27) (9) (9) (5)
15.88 20.90 23.00 31.10 29.16 27.70 31.50 21.27
(35) (88) (91) (69) (31) (39) (34) (11)
Source: Muestras de Desempleo CEDE
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent number of observations.
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partition the observations into Set 1 and Set 2 such that Set 1 contains all
the values of income, corresponding to different education levels, which are
> the average income per earner, arid Set 2 similarly contains all the values
of income < the average income. Then polynomials (up to third order) are
fitted, first, by the method of ordinary least squares to both sets, and the
results are shown in Tables 13 and 14.
An interesting point to note here is that although the sample size looks
unmanageably large, the distinct pairs of income and education levels are not
e e
that many in number, and corresponding to each distinct pair (Yij, Nij) for
any Group i there exists a frequency to be denoted by fij. A convenient way
of carrying out least squares regression in such a situation is to define a
transformation on the original values such that the regression equation, say,
in the linear case, takes the form:
(5.15) Yj = a ff + N 
e e
where fij is the frequency.corresponding to a distinct pair (Y~j, N1 3). It
can be easily proved that the least squares estimators remain invariant with
respect to this transformation.
The results of such regressions for Group 2 (the poor) are summarized
in Table 13. Going again by the criterion of the significance of t-statistics
of the coefficients, the linear form seems to be the most acceptable. To
vindicate the hypothesis of homoscedasticity the Goldfeld-Quandt test was per-
71formed to yield the F-ratio
7 
'Me degrees of freedom written here are only indicative of the numbers
of distinct observations.
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Table 13
Regressions of Income on Education for the Earners
of Group 2, Bogota, Colombia, 1963-66*
f.aj. = 1603.49 jffaj + 1436. 47 Na f2j
t . (2.3016) (8.6384)
R2 = 0.8063 No. of distinct pairs = 46
dratic:
e= a e e~ + 2jf2'
Y2l r2 = 1833.68,%+ 1231.26 N2 F2 + 29.4916 (Ne2j
t (1.9992) (2.2351) (0.3911)
R2  0.8070 No. of distinct pairs = 46
ic:
Y~ = 2525.19,- 293.89 N j rff +562. 58(N2j) faj - 47-93(N 2j)2f
t . (2.5881) (-0.2905) (1.8235) (-1.77PZ3)
R2 = 0.8205 No. of distinct pairs = 46
The income figures are considered annually.
ear:
E
Lin
Qua
Cub
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F(28, 14) = 0.240537 El
0. 131696 E 11
which does not fall in the critical region. Therefore, the ordinary linear
form
e e
Y j Ff j= 1603.49/fT2, + 1436.47 N2aj j
turns out to be the best for the income-education relationship for the earners
of Group 2, and this implies by (5.9) that
e
dy2  e' ee'
-g = Y (n) = 14.36.47 since e =0,
dn2
or, by (5.8),
dy2
(5.16) dn2 = 02(1436.47) where 02 > 0dna
Going through the same routine for Set 1 we find from Table 14 that in
the case of ordinary least squares the linear form is again the only acceptable
specification among the three (using the criterion of the significance of the
t-statistic). However, as it was true for India so it is also here, the F-ratio
designed to test heteroscedasticity
0. 274112 E 12
' O0. 309921 E 11
is significant enough to warrant some corrections of heteroscedasticity. These
corrections have been introduced through weighted least squares regressions
which were to be carried out this time only for the linear case. The two
alxternative specifications of heteroscedasticity are the same as before and
the corresponding results are shown in terms of equations (1) and (2) in Table
15. Using again the usual criterion of efficiency of the estimates as indicated
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Table 14
Regressions of Income on Education for the Earners
of Group 1, Bogota, Colombia, 1963-66
(Income figures in pesos per annum)
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Table 15
Weighted Least Squares Regressions of Income on Education
for the Earners of Group 1, Bogota, Colombia, 1963-66
(Income figures in pesos per annum)
Y = -14506.5
(-2.7981)
R2 = 0. 4840
Je
Irij + 4537.42 Ni j i
(8.8064)
No. of distinct pairs = 46
Estimate of Variance-Covariance Matrix:
0.269 E 08
-0.254 E 07
(2) e = -10829. 0
Nij j
t (-2.4492)
R2 = 0. 4298
-0.254 E07
0.265 E 06
e + 4153.18 ff
N, j
(8.5188)
No. of distinct pairs = 46
Estimate of Variance-Covariance Matrix:
0.195 E 08[ -0. 204 E 07 -0.204 E 070. 238 E 06
Estimate of Variance-Covariance Matrix in the linear case
under ordinary least squares:
0. 359 E 08
L-0. 310 E 07
-0. 310 E 07
0. 293 E 06
(1)
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by the magnitudes of the principal diagonal terms of the variau'-e vra ne
matrix of the estimated coefficients, the natural choice seems to be equation
(2):
Yj l = -10829. 0 J + 4153.18
NJ j Nijj
which implies by (5.9) that
edy1  e' e
-e =' (nj) = 4153.18 since T = 0
dni
or, by (5.8),
dyi
(5.17) - 1(4153.18)
Comparing (5.17) with (5.16) and noting that 0i > 02, it immediately follows
that
dy1  dY2
dx1  dn 2
a qualitative result which was also true in the case of India.
The Expenditure-Education Relationship:
In estimating this relationship we have made the same distinction as before
between private expenditure on schooling materials and government expenditure
per student. The data on both kinds of expenditure and the corresponding levels
of education have been summarized in Table 16. For the data on private expendi-
72
ture we have relied on a study reported by .Schultz. The government expendi-
ture figures have been calculated from a research work of Selowsky 7 3 after making
72T. Schultz, Returns to Education in Bogota. Colombia. pp. 25-27.
73M. Selowsky, The Effect of Unemployment and Growth on the Rate of Return
to Education: The Case of Colombia. Harvard University.
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an adjustment for the inciderice of this expenditure between the students of the
public and private schools.
With the specification of logarithmic form of the expenditure-education
relationship (4.8), column 1 (of Table 16) was regressed on column 4, and the
regression results can be presented in the following way:
log n = -2.1796 + 0. 6623 logE
t' (-10.8672) (15.9690)
R2 = 0.9480 No. of obs. = 16
The average educational attainment of Group 1 is 10. 6 schooling years and the
average educational expenditure approximately 15015.0 pesos. Therefore, the
derivative of the expenditure-education function at the average expenditure
point of Group 1 is
= A(.026)dEi
where A is a positive constant. Similarly, the value of the derivative cor-
responding to the average expenditure of Group 2 (which is approximately 4150.5
pesos) is
dne
--- = A(.039)
dE2
Combining these informations with (5.16) and (5.17), we have
dyr. dni(5.18) = Aei(4153.18)(.026) = Ai(107.98) and
dy 2 din2d = A0 2 (1436.47)(.039) = A2 (56.022)
dyr dnddE2n
With Ai > A2, it is obvious that dy > The qualitative similarity
between this result and that implied by (5.11) should be noted.
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Table 16
Expenditure Per Student: By Schooling Years
Urban Colombia, 1965-66 (in pesos)
Years of Private Total Cumulative Total
Schooling Expenditure (Private & Public) (Private & Public)
Expenditure Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary
1 583.6 926.4 926.4
2 651.8 994.6 1921.0
3 728.5 1071.3 2992.3
4 815.4 1158.2 4150.5
5 911.4 1254.2 5404.7
Bachillerato
1 945.6 1356.2 6760.9
2 1063.4 1474.0 8234.9
3 1149.4 1560.0 9794.9
4 1240.4 1651.0 11445.9
5 1327.3 1737.9 13183.8
6 1420.6 1831.2 15015.0
University
1 1522.0 7451.0 22466.0
2 1643.0 7572.0 30038.0
3 1772.O 7701.O 37739.0
4 1914.0 7843.0 45582.0
5 .2067.0 7996.0 53578.0
Sources: T. Schultz, op. cit.; M. Selowsky, 2p. cit.
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The Educational Expenditure-Income Ratios:
For Colombia, these ratios can be directly calculated from the data of the
Household Surveys. However, before we use these data a few preliminaxy obser-
vations should be made.
1. In these calculations and also in the estimation of government policies
on taxation and expenditure to be done later, the relevant informations are
obtained from the data relating to households rather than to individuals. The
reason why we use these data, and without further adjustments, is because there
are reasons to believe that in Colombia the distribution of income among house-
holds is not at all significantly different from the distribution of income
among individuals, presumably due to the absence of any systematic variation
of the household size over income groups.
2. The data on educational expenditure-income ratios refer to the year
1967-68 and those on the incidence of government policies are available only
for 1970, and therefore they are not exactly contemporaneous with the data from
which the income-education relationships (1963-66) and the expenditure-education
relationship (1965) were estimated. However, it should be noted that these
income-education and expenditure-education relationships are basically structural
relationships and are not likely to change appreciably within a period of four
or five years. Therefore, an assumption of structural invariance may not be
very unrealistic in this context, and we also derive comfort from the fact that
our final conclusions are not sensitive to minor variations in these structural
relationships.
3. We should also mention that since these structural relationships could
be estimated only for urban Colombia and since all the other relevant informations
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are available separately for the urban and the rural sector (which was
not true in the case of India), we have decided to restrict our analysis
to the urban sector of the economy.
Let us now return to the calculation of the educational expenditure-
income ratios for both Group 1 and Group 2. From Table 18 it can be found
that the average household income in urban Colombia is near the midpoint
of the income bracket 36000-48000 (pesos). Using this as the cutoff point
in Table 17 and then weighting the educational expenditure-income ratio of
every income bracket by the corresponding number of households (see Table
18), we have claculated that el, the value of this ratio for Group 1 as a
whole, is .05. The value of e2 similarly calculated is .0225. Combining
these values with (5.18), it follows that
dy1 dn1  dy2 dn2(5.19) d ei > - edni dEj dna dE2
Comparing this result with (5.12) we can come to a conclusion which
seems to be remarkably similar between India and at least urban Colombia
that the educational process left to the private sector acts as a dis-
equaliser of income. The question which we had raised at this point in the
case of India and which we shall now ask. of Colombia is: what has, been the
role of government policies in counteracting these disequalising forces of
the private sector?.
Government Policies on Educational Expenditure and Taxes:
For Colombia it is much easier to get the relevant data on the inci-
dence of government policies due to some reliable empirical works by
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Table 17
Educational Expenditure and Income of
Urban Households, Colombia, 1967-68
Income Bracket Educational expenditure
Billions of pesos/year as proportion of income
(in %)
0-12000 2.9
12000-24000 1.4
24000-36000 2.4
36000- 48000 3.7
48000-6000 4.1
60000-84000 4.5
84000-108000 5.5
108000-180000 5.6
180000-240000 6.4
240000- 7.2
Familiares,Source: CEDE, Encuesta de Gastos e Ingressos
Mayo 1967 - May 1968.
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Table 18
Distribution of Income Among Urban Households, Colombia 1970
(Number of households in thousands, income in billions of Pesos)
Sources: DANE, Special Tabulations of Household Survey
Charles McLure, o2. cit., Table 2.
J. P. Jallade, o2. cit. , Table 5.
(E2) and
- nI~
Income bracket Number of Total Cumulative percentage of
(Pesos/Year) Households Income Households Income
0- 6000 43.3 0.20 2.1 0.2
6000-12000 257.8 2.38 14.7 2.9
12000 -18000 308.9 4.56 29.9 8.0
18000-24000 309.2 6.39 45.0 15.1
24000-30000 204.9 5.44 55.0 21.2
30000-36000 153.6 5.03 62.5 26.8
36000- 48000 193.1 7.91 72.0 35.6
48000-60000 148.3 7.87 79.3 44.4
60000-72000 89.7 5.87 83.6 51.0
72000-84000 74.9 5.76 87.2 57.4
84000-120000 121.0 12.10 93.1 70.9
120000-180000 75.2 10.65 96.8 82.8
180000-240000 38.1 6.51 98.7 90.1
Over 240,000 24.6 8.81 100.0 100.0
Total 2,042.6
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Jallade and McLure. To make better use of these dat.a. we shall rewri.e thei'
crucial condition for convergence (4.10) in an alternative form:
dzi dz 2
dt dt dyi dni -(4.10)' - - Zei(1-zi) e(j+
dy2 dn2  V2*
- -- ;- e2 ( 1- za) + - < Edn2 dE2 y2 L2  =
where E* is the total government expenditure on education and vi and V2 are
the ratios in which this expenditure is allocated between Group 1 and Group 2.
Now using the average household income as the cutoff point we have cal-
culated from Table 19 the total public educational expenditure for the two
groups and found that
viE* = 1390 (million pesos) and v 2E* = 2423 (million pesos)
With the same kind of partitioning it is found from Table 10 that
y1 Li = 57.57 (billion pesos) and y2L2 = 31.91 (billion pesos)
so that
v1 E vak*
y1 L - .024 and Y2 L2  .076.
We can also calculate from Table 19 the values of zi and z2 , the average rates
of over-all taxation for Group 1 and Group 2 respectively, by weighting the tax
rates of the respective income brackets by the corresponding number of house-
holds, and the results are
. J. P. Jallade, o2. cit.; Charles McLure, "The Incidence of Colombian
Taxes: 1970", (mimeo).
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Table 19
Allocation of Taxes and Public Subsidies for Education
Among Urban Households, Colombia, 1S70
Income bracket Effective rates of Total subsidies for
Billions of Pesos/year taxation education
(Direct & Indirect) (Millions of Pesos)
0- 6000 11.5 71
6000-12000 7.7 217
12000 -18000 9.6 370
18000 -24000 10.3 530
24000 - 30000 10.3 413
30000- 36000 10.9 345
36000 -48000 12.0 477
48000-60000 10.5 410
60000-72000 11.5 301
72000-84000 10.7 163
84000-120000 12.4 196
120000-180000 12.2 189
180000-240000 14.2 62
240000- 27.5 69
Source: J. P. Jallade, op. cit., Tables 8 and 16.
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zi = 12.28 (%) and z2 = 10.02%
From the available informations there are reasons to believe that the over-all
tax structure with its mildly progressive nature was not changing significantly
in the late sixties so that we can roughly assume
dzi dz2
- =- d 0.dt ~dt -0
Feeding all these informations along with (5.18) and the values of el and e2
into (4.10)', it is found that
dyi dni viE*~dyl , ei(1- zi) + = A, (7.325)dni dE.i yiLj
and
dY2 dn e2(- Z) + = A2 (5.392)
dn2 dE2  Y2L2
which means that the crucial condition of convergence has not been satisfied.
Although this final result indicating the failure of government policies to
counteract the disequalizing forces inherent in the private educational system
is the same for both India and Colombia. there is at the same time an important
difference. In the case of India, government policies not only failed to counter-
act the forces of the private sector but in effect also supported and reinforced
viE*
them, whereas in the case of Colombia, as evident from the values of and zi,
yiL-I
there was at least an attempt made by the Government to go against these disequal-
ising forces, but it was evidently not strong enough. Still the fact remains that
of the two the latter is a less unfortunate situation.
75
For reasons already mentioned, we restricted this empirical analysis to
urban Colombia. However, if the basic structural relationships--the income-
education and the expenditure-education relationships--which were estimable only
for the urban sector could- be used for the entire economy, then -it is possible
to study the incidence of government policies in rural Colombia. We have checked
this and found that the conclusion with respect to (4.10)' remains invariant.
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Before closing this section on empirical analysis, we want
to mention again that the data which were used in carrying out these
numerous calculations were not always available (and this was part-
icularly true of India) in a suitable form and therefore we were
forced to make some drastically simplifying assumptions which we
have always tried to make explicit. However, with a full awareness
of these unavoidable limitations, we believe that the major quali-
tative thrust of the conclusions is quite independent of all these
restrictions of data.
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6. Generalisations
In this final section we want to mention some of the possible
generalisations of our analysis.
1. It should be pointed out that the development of our analytical
structure in terms of a two-class economy was a descriptive simplifica-
tion; an extension to any finite number of classes, on some appropriate
criterion for classifying the population, can be made without much
difficulty and with a definite gain of insight into the complex movements
of all the income brackets relative to one another. It may be useful,
for example, to divide the population by the quartile values of income.
2. Human capital in our analysis has been presented as an
aggregate stock and, as such, it has the same heuristic justification
as provided by the concept of homogeneous physical capital in the
literature on capital theory. The assumption of homogeneity, however,
is not essential for our analysis. It is possible to disaggregate
labor into different categories according to the embodiment of different
levels of education and write the production function as
y = f(k, Lo, Li, .... Ln) where Li is the labor with i-th level of
education. Lo is the "raw" labor; it corresponds to L of our previous
characterisation. The portfolio theory which will show how different
classes will allocate their savings in accumulating physical capital and
augmenting supplies of different categories of educated labor will now
be more complex. But so long as one income class has an overwhelming
advantage in terms of ability to save, its educational expenditure-income
ratio will tend to dominate pointwise that of the other class. And, if
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it is assumed that different categories of labor are imperfect
substitutes of one another, and that higher is the level of education
embodied in any category of labor higher is its marginal productivity
as well as its "complementarity effect" with physical capital, then it
can be proved that our previous conclusion about the disequalising
tendency in an economy gets only stronger. This is a generalisation
which can be completed without much difficulty.
3. Technical progress was ignored in the original analysis, but
it can be accommodated. Considering technical progress to be of an
endogenous variety, an appropriate way of characterising it is to have
it included as another factor of production (e.g., the biochemical
inputs in agriculture) which is accumulable and complementary to both
physical and human capital. If therefore one class has, by virtue of
its higher saving propensity, a relative advantage in the accumulation
of this factor along with the two other kinds of capital, the conclusion
of our original model will again be reinforced. This extension in fact
is a natural corollary of the second generalisation mentioned above.
4. We had suggested towards the end of Section 4 a possibility
of characterising the optimal policy paths, and that needs elaboration.
The scope of this essay was, first, to develop an analytical structure
and, then, use that structure with appropriate econometric estimations
to comment on a specific question, namely, whether the policies on
taxation and educational expenditure adopted by the governments of two
particular countries were to help equalise incomes or not. In answering
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that question, it was found adequate to use only a necessary condition
as given by (4.10) and conclude on the basis of that. However, once
this question has been answered, it is quite natural to be interested
in another closely related question. Supposing that the actual
policies in an economy are found to violate the necessary condition for
convergence, what, then, are the alternative optimal policies that an
economist can recommend?
To answer this question, one has to use the sufficient condition
as given by (4.12), and on the basis of that two kinds of attempts can
be made. In the first place, it may be worthwhile to find out the
qualitative properties of the optimal policies on taxation and expend-
iture and the nature of the trade-off between the two, at a point of
time and also over time. Choosing the absolute differences, namely,
(z 1 -z 2 ) and (A2 -X 1) as the indicators of the degree of progression in
the tax and expenditure structure, one convenient way of attacking this
problem will be to verify certain pertinent conjectures, e.g., whether
both (z -z 2 ) and ( 2 -X) are quadratic functions of time, increasing
initially to a finite maximum and then declining monotonically and
asymptotically. Secondly, it is also possible on the basis of the
estimated values of the crucial parameters involved in (4.12) to generate
numerical solutions for the optimal policies. These econometric
estimations, we have seen, are not very complex and, therefore, depending
on the availability of data, it is at least possible to indicate the
range of values that the policy instruments should take for a particular
economy over, say, the next five years.
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5. Another important generalisation will be to introduce the
consideration of economic growth along with that of income distribution
and see to what extent the previous qualitative conclusions on the
policy paths will change because of this additional objective. This
problem can be analysed in the following way. Supposing that there
is a shift in the education policy, say, a shift in the government
educational expenditure in favor of Group 1 and against Group 2 (with
T unchanged), one can find out, on the one hand, its effect on equality
as indicated by 1/x and, on the other, given the curvature property
of ni - n(E i) , its effect on the aggregate a and through that on
Y , the total output, and its rate growth, i/Y . From these two
changes (considered in relative sense) it is possible to derive the
elasticity of t/Y with respect to 1/x . If this elasticity turns
out to be positive, then there is of course no problem of choice
involved and the previous results on the policy paths will remain
unaltered. If, however, this elasticity is negative, then there is a
tradeoff between growth and equality, and to resolve that a social
welfare function with t/Y and 1/x as the arguments will have to be
brought in to introduce the appropriate ordering. The nature of the
optimal policy in this case will depend on the magnitude of the elasticity
of i/Y with respect to 1/x and on the specification of relative
weights of i/Y and l/x in the social welfare function. If , for
example, the elasticity of Y/Y with respect to 1/x is found to be less
than 1 and if an equal weight is given to i/Y and l/x in the social
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welfare function (e.g., a Cobb-Douglas specification of the utility
function with the same exponent for both Y/Y and 1/x), then clearly
the previous results on the optimal policy paths will carry over.
6. The analytical structure in this paper had a distinct neo-
classical character, with its reliance on the well-behaved production
function and marginal productivity theory. This was a deliberate
choice because we wanted to prove certain results staying within the
neoclassical framework. However, the neoclassical framework is by no
means essential for our results. It is possible to snap any systematic
link between the production function and the rates of return to factors
and start instead with the income-generation functions as the primitive
concept and build the entire structure from that. It may be noted
that an advantage in this kind of approach is that here it is much
easier to accommodate different types of market imperfections and
other institutional characteristics. And, if there are reasons to believe
that these institutional characteristics are themselves conditioned by
the distribution of income, then it can be shown that the conclusion
on disequalising tendencies of income distribution which were derived
within a neoclassical framework will follow a fortiori once these
institutional considerations are brought into the picture.
Essay 2: Income Distribution, Market Imperfections
and Capital Accumulation in a
Developing Economy
Asim K. Dasgupta
2CONTENTS
Page
Introduction 3
Characteristics of the Economy 5
The Model 19
Behavior of the System Over Time 57
Significance of the Distribution of Income and
the Structure of Credit Market 74
Different Ways of Resolving the Crisis 86
Some Other Results in the Literature 98
Generalizations 102
Income Distribution, Market Imperfections and
Capital Accumulation in a Developing Economy
Asim K. Dasgupta
1. Introduction
There are different ways in which one can try to explain the
problem of insufficient capital accumulation in a less developed
country. In the conventional analyses this explanation is often
found exogenized in terms of factors such as socio-cultural attitudes
towards saving and investment, irrationality of peasant behavior,
technological facts of externalities on demographic parameters.
In this essay I intend to offer an alternative explanation in terms
of the distribution of income. It will be shown that given the
existing distribution of income and the resulting market imperfections,
especially credit market imperfection, in many developing countries,
the income groups which can and in fact do save may not use their
saving for capital accumulation, not necessarily because of any
esoteric cultural reasons, technological or demographic obstacles, but
simply because that will go against the maximization of their, very
rational, objective function relating to net income or utility. One
advantage of this kind of explanation is that it goes a longer way in
endogenizing the problem of capital accumulation in terms of economic
variables. It also draws our attention to a different kind of
constraints on economic development, different from the ones suggested
by the conventional analyses.
I shall develop the main thesis within the agricultural sector
of a less developed country and then point out how this can be
extended to cover the industrial sector as well. In Section 2 the
major characteristics of such an agriculture are described, stressing
particularly the dualism that exists between the family and the
capitalist farms, the distribution of income between them and the
implication of that distribution on the structure of rural credit
market. Given these characteristics, a model is developed in Section
3 by deriving the decision rules that the family and the capitalist
farms will adopt about the use of inputs and allocation of wealth on
the basis of some well defined maximizing objective. In Section 4
this model is then used to analyze the special problem of capital
accumulation of this agriculture. It is found that given an unequal
initial distribution of income and the associated imperfection of
credit market, such an agriculture can show a tendency to approach a
state of zero rate of capital accumulation under very plausible
conditions, and this can be accompanied by a process of immiserization
of family farms. The importance of the distribution of income and the
structure of credit market as factors responsible for this crisis is
brought out more precisely in Section'5 where the results of this model
are compared with those of a hypothetical situation involving a more
equal distribution of income and a perfect credit market. In Section 6
several ways of resolving this crisis are discussed, including
particularly the solution that is offered by technical progress.
Here, it is found that the issues connected with a special kind of
technical progress, namely, the Green Revolution, as well as those
connected with some other solutions based on institutional changes, can
be given an interesting interpretation. In Section 7 the conclusions
of this model are compared with other existing results in the
literature. Finally, several ways of generalizing the basic model
are suggested (Section 8).
It needs also to be pointed out at the outset that certain
assumptions of our model, made particularly about the nature of market
imperfections, are based primarily on the characteristics prevailing
in the Indian agriculture. But, in these respects, the Indian
situation may not be very atypical of peasant agriculture of many
other less developed countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
2. Characteristics of the Economy
Consider an economy with an agricultural and an industrial sector.
Although the primary concern of this paper is with the agricultural
sector, it is worthwhile in the beginning to comment very briefly on
the structure of industrial sector as well, particularly its links with
the agricultural sector, so that results derived within the agricultural
sector can be viewed from the perspective of-the entire economy.
The industrial sector is partitioned into a private sector
producing a luxury consumption good, to be consumed partly in the
industrial sector and partly in the agricultural sector, and a
government sector producing a capital good to be used again in both
sectors. The agricultural sector, in its turn, produces a
necessary consumption good - a part of it is consumed within
agriculture and another part goes to industry. The other link
between the two sectors is through the labor market. The credit
markets of the two sectors, however, are mutually isolated and there
is no significant intersectoral exchange of saving.2) This relation-
ship between agriculture and industry - their links as well as
isolation - is a characteristic common to many developing countries.
Given this structure of the entire economy, we shall, as
indicated before, concentrate on the agricultural sector. In order to
be able to do that, we choose, for most of this paper, not to go into
the problems of interaction between agriculture and industry. It will
1) One can also consider the government sector as providing other inter-
mediate goods, like fertilizers. This additional category of inputs
can be included in our analysis without much difficulty.
2) For empirical evidence on the structure of these markets in India,
gee R.K. Hazari, The Structure of the Corporate Private Sector
(1966), pp. 308-322; T.N. Krishnan, "Taxation of Property and Net
Wealth in India: A Note", Econ. and Pol. Weekly, Jan. 1, 1972;
All India Rural Debt and Investment Survey, Reserve Bank of India
Bulletin, June 1965.
be assumed that the agricultural output can be sold at a fixed (money)
price within the sector and also to industry, and so can be the luxury
consumption good produced by industry. Capital goods are also avail-
able to the agricultural sector at a fixed price from the industrial
sector and migration of labor from agriculture to industry is not
significant. It will be mentioned later on how all these assumptions
can be relaxed and results generalized, but to start with they help us
to focus our attention on the agricultural sector.
Within the agricultural sector, an important feature observed in
many less developed countries is the coexistence of the family and the
capitalist farms. The distinction between the two is based on the
significance of hired labor in the total labor force used in the
respective farms. The family farm: uses labor mostly of its family
members whereas the capitalist farm is dependent primarily on the
wage-labor coming from the family farms.3) For the sake of simplicity,
we will assume in our analysis that the family farm uses only the
family labor and the capitalist farm only the wage-labor from the
family farms.
3) In agriculture, in addition to these two classes, there is also a
class of landless labor. In India, for example, according to the
National Sample Survey (19th Round) data, landless agricultural
labor households constituted 12.2 per cent of the total number of
rural households in 1964-65. To begin with, this landless labor
will not be considered in our analysis, but it will be shown later
how its existence can be naturally accommodated into the basic
model without causing any change in analysis.
The distribution of land between these two types of farms is
given at any point of time, and there does not exist any significant
market for land. By this it is meant that there does not exist any
market for voluntary exchange of land. One important reason for this
is that in a society exposed to various kinds of risk, and with few
means of insurance known, land is a highly attractive asset to hold.
In particular, to a farmer on the margin of subsistence, who is most
likely to be the potential seller of land, the risk of parting with
land is often one of starvation and land prices rarely fully reflect
this risk as evaluated by the farmer.4),5) However, although there
does not exist any voluntary exchange of land, "distress sale" of
land does take place. In fact, it will be shown later that it is
through such a mechanism that the capitalist farm can take over the
ownership of land from the family farms in some special situations,
such as default of loan by the latter. But until a family farm is
driven to such an extreme situation, the total amount of land owned
by a family does not get voluntarily exchanged.
4) See P.K. Bardhan, "Size, Productivity and Returns to Scale: An
Analysis of Farm Level Data in Indian Agriculture", Journal of
Pol. Ec. Vol. 81, No. 6, 1973; K.N. Raj, "Ownership and Distribution
of Land", Indian Econ. Rev., April, 1970.
5) In this context, one should also mention that the factors which are
considered important in preventing any substantial leasing out of
land by the big farmer are the tenancy and rent control legislations
in vogue in many less developed countries.
Now, the size of this land holding of a family farm is usually
quite small compared to that of a capitalist farm.6) Not only is its
size of land holding small, its average income, the inverse relation-
ship between size of land holding and productivity of land notwithstand-
ing,7 ) is also very low in absolute magnitude and in comparison with
that of the capitalist farm. 8 )
6) In India, for instance, it is found from the 1961 Census data that
the farms with 93.8 per cent of family labor in the total labor
force have less than one acre of land holding; those with 87.4
per cent of family labor have 5 acres or less; and then the size
of land holding gets larger as the proportion of hiredlabor in
total labor force increases and it is found that the farms which
use 80 per cent or more of hired labor in their labor force have
land holdings of 30 acres or more.
7) This inverse relationship has been widely observed in many less
developed countries. See, in particular, Government of India,
Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Farm Management Studies.
8) If, for example, the figure of 87.4 per cent of family labor in
labor force, and therefore 5 acres of holding size, is taken as an
approximate cutoff point between the family and the capitalist farms,
then by the NCAER estimate of the distribution of agricultural
income by the size of land holding, the median figure for the annual
income of a family farm is around Rs 747 which is one-fourth of the
corresponding figure for a capitalist farm. To give a more complete
description of this distribution of income, it has a Lorenz ratio =
0.35, with the bottom 20 per cent of the population, consisting of
the family farms, having 7 per cent of total income while the top
20 per cent, consisting of the capitalist farms, having 44 per cent
of the share. It is also interesting to note that the income share
rises relatively slowly as one goes from the bottom deciles upwards,
but from the ninth to the topmost decile there is a sudden increase
of nearly 150 per cent, pointing to the extreme concentration at the
top. This seems to be a characteristic common to many poor countries.
See, National Council of Applied Economic Research: All India Consumer
Expenditure Survey, 1966, 1967. '
This distribution of income between the family and the capitalist
farms - the significant disparity between their average incomes as
well as the low absolute value of the family farm's income - is- to
be taken as the description of the initial state in our analysis. And,
as we shall presently see, this has an important implication on the
structure of agricultural credit market. For that, one has to look
into, among other things, the nature of the production process in
agriculture.
The production process in agriculture can be best described by
the Bohm-Bawerkian continuous input-point output technology. The
entire process takes place over an interval of time which can be called
an agricultural "year" and can be taken to be equal to a "period" in
our analysis. Within each such period, starting from the beginning
point and spread over the entire interval, labor and capital are
applied by both the family and the capitalist farms to their given
amounts of land, and then output is obtained at the end point of the
period. The production function is assumed to be neoclassical showing
constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to factors, and is
the same for both the farms. However, the decisions they have to take
on the use of labor and capital, though related, are not exactly the
same.
Consider, first, the family farm. It starts any period with a
certain amount of family labor and a net income obtained from the
previous period. Of this family labor, a part is to be used in its
own production and the rest to be sent away to work on the capitalist
farm for wage which, we assume, is paid post facto. By the net income
of the previous period is meant the gross income of that period which,
because of the nature of agricultural production and of wage payment,
was obtained at the end point of the period, less the amount of loan
that was taken in that period and had to be paid back. AA already
documented, the average gross income of the family farm is very low and
hence its average net income is even lower. From the available
empirical evidence, we find it reasonable to assume that from this
level of average income it is not possible for the family farm to
9)
save anything . The family farm, therefore, does not own any stock
of capital; it has to take production loan for using capital. Not
only is the average net income of the family farm low to rule out
saving, very often it is also inadequate to meet the per head consumption
needs of the family over the entire production period. Since wage is
paid at the end of the period, this implies that the family farm has
9) Strictly speaking, for our analysis, it is not necessary for the
saving to be zero, it is only necessary to have a situation where
the family farm can not save enough so that it has to take loans.
Still, we choose to stick to the assumption of zero saving by the
family farm, because given the empirical evidence, at least in the
case of India, and our choice of the cutoff point between the family
and the capitalist farms (see, footnote 8), we believe that this is
a more accurate description of the actual saving behavior of a
typical family farm. See, the NCAER Rural Household Survey (1965),
Tables 33 and 36.
10)
to take loan also for consumption purposes .
All these loans are taken from the capitalist farm and under
conditions of an imperfect credit market. The cause and the nature of
this imperfection will be explained shortly. What needs to be carefully
mentioned here is that after a certain amount of loan has been taken
at a given rate of interest by the family farm, it has to allocate
this loan between the uses for consumption and production, and this
allocation can only be done with respect to a well defined objective
function. This will be precisely shown in Section 3.
Using these loans, the family farm produces its output at the
end of the period. This output, evaluated at the fixed market price,
together with the wage earned from the capitalist farm determines the
gross income of the family farm for this period. The net income is
then obtained by deducting from the gross incoirm the loans which have
been taken in this period and which, in our analysis, are always
supposed to be paid back at the end of the period. It is with this
net income, the total and the corresponding average, that the family
farm starts the next period. Along with the ne-t income, there is also
a different size of labor force supplied in the next period, and the
10) The analysis does not change in any essential way if wage is
considered to be paid in advance. Then am interest is charged
on this wage and therefore, in effect, wage becomes a part of the
consumption loan. It can be checked that the conclusions of this
paper are invariant with respect to the nature of wage payment.
rate of growth of this labor force is to be considered as exogenously
given.
We like to point out now that, to begin with, it is helpful to
suppose that the average net income of the family farm, though small,
is positive. This means that although the family farm could not
save and had to take loans because its average net income at the
beginning point of the period was small, and the output and wage
earnings were not to be available until the end of the period, and
during this period the family had to take care of its consumption needs
as well as keep the production going with rented capital, yet when the
output is finally obtained and wage income received, it can indeed pay
back those loans and is left with some positive average net income
with which it can start the next period. That is, in the beginning,
11) Nothing is altered in our basic analysis or in the final conclusion
if the net income of the family farm is nonpositive to start with.
It will be demonstrated in Section 4 that, under certain plausible
conditions, a dualistic agriculture can show an inherent tendency
to approach a limiting state with respect to capital accumulation
and impoverishment of the family farm. A situation of nonpositive
net income of the family farm simply means, as will be evident
later on, that the agriculture in question is at an advanced stage
of this tendency. From the standpoint of analysis, this situation
is even simpler to tackle since in this case one can skip certain
intermediate steps. We think, however, that it is not enough to
analyze only this terminal stage as it may relate to a dualistic
agriculture, it is also necessary to understand and explain the
historical process by which such an agriculture is actually brought
to this terminal stage. That is why we have decided to start with
an initial situation which is somewhat away from this terminal
stage, being characterized by a positive net income for the family
farm. The situation with a nonpositive net income of the family
farm will then come to be analyzed incidentally as a part of the
more complete analysis of the evolutionary process.
there is no problem of defaulting to worry about. The interesting
question, then, is: what happens over time? Does this average net
income increase or stay constant, and therefore remain positive? Or,
does it fall over time, threatening a bankruptcy of the family farm?
How does the capitalist farm react to that situation? The purpose
of this paper is precisely to answer these questions, by analyzing the
intertemporal behavior of the average net income of the family farm
vis-a-vis the capitalist farm and then relating that to the entire
question of capital accumulation.
Let us now turn to the capitalist farm. Like the family farm,
the capitalist farm also starts any period with a given number of
family members and a net income from the previous period. But, there
are two important differences. First, the members of the capitalist
family do not work and labor is hired for production from the family
farm. Secondly, the average net income of the capitalist farm is much
higher than that of the family farm, and with this higher level of
income the capitalist farm can both consume and save. Its consumption
is on the agricultural product as well as on the luxury consumption good
from industry, both of which are assumed to be available at fixed prices.
More important than consumption is the fact that the capitalist farm
can save, something which the family farm could not do, and this
saving when added to the pre-existing stock of wealth gives the total
wealth of the capitalist farm for the present period. The capitalist
farm can keep this wealth in two forms: (a) capital to be used in its
own production, and (b) loan to be given to the family farm 12
This choice of portfolio, of course, has to be made with respect to
a well defined objective function, and this will be shown in Section
3.
The capitalist farm, thus, combines two operations at the same
time - production and lending, and it is to be noted that in the
market for the latter there exists an imperfection. This imperfection
in the credit market arises primarily because of the special nature
of the distribution of income and wealth already mentioned, whereby
there are numerous family farms with a low level of average income and
wealth, and therefore in need of credit, and a relatively few capitalist
farms with a much higher level of average income and wealth, and in a
position to supply that credit. These relatively few capitalist farms,
again, are found to be spread over the entire agricultural sector with
the result that within a local credit market there exists a typical
situation of many family farms facing one (or very few, but homogeneous
13)
enough to be considered one) capitalist farm as the money lender
12) It should be noted that the capitalist farm has control only over
the amount of loan to be given to the family farm at a certain
rate of interest. Beyond that, it does not have any control on the
final allocation of that loan between production and consumption.
That allocation is done only by the family farm and in accordance
with its own objective function, as has already been mentioned.
13) It is an interesting exercise to prove how starting with an initial
distribution of income such as has been considered here, the
relatively few capitalist farms will find it most profitable to
have themselves spread over the entire sector so that each one can
enjoy a monopolistic hedge in its local credit operation.
This monopolistic position of the capitalist farm in the credit
market is also reinforced by the lack of any serious competition from
the conventional commercial banks. This is because there are some
special problems connected with assessing the credit worthiness of
the family farms, arising mainly from their low income and wealth
position, and the commmercial banks, located as they are in the urban
areas, are at a serious disadvantage in handling these problems. Very
often, therefore, it is found that the participation of the commercial
banks in the agricultural credit market is practically negligible14 .
This is a job which the local capitalist farmer, due to his intimate
knowledge of the economic positions of the family farmers, is uniquely
suited to perform, and, here, he can outcompete not only the urbanized
commercial banks but also the other capitalist farmers who are not
strictly local.
An appropriate stylized way of characterizing the agricultural
credit market is therefore to describe it in terms of a representative
set which is sufficiently localized and consists of several family farms
and one capitalist farm, with the latter enjoying a virtual monopoly in
the local lending activity. And, the agricultural sector can then be
visualized as the union of numerous such sets which are not only
14) In India, for instance, it is found that in the year 1961-72 the
commercial banks had accounted for only 0.4 per cent of the total
credit received by the agricultural households. See, All India
Rural Debt and Investment Survey, 1961-62, Reserve Bank of India
Bulletin, Sept. 1965, pp. 1299-1301.
significantly insulated from the credit market of the industrialized
urban sector, but are also nonintersecting among themselves so far as
credit operations are concerned. It should be noted, however, that
this nonintersection is meant to apply only to the credit market. With
respect to the labor market, for example, there is no such isolation,
the relevant market being the entire agricultural sector itself 15)
Given this structure, the capitalist farm has, at the end of
the period, two sources of income - one is the value of output
produced with its own capital and hired labor, and the other is the
interest earnings from loan. These two kinds of income can be added
up to get the gross income of the capitalist farm, and its net income
is then obtained by deducting from this the wages to be paid to the
hired family farmers. The capitalist farm begins the next period with
this net income, the total and the corresponding average. Meanwhile,
the size of its family has grown over the period, the rate of growth,
as in the case of the family farm, being determined exogenously.
This is a description of a dualistic agriculture with the family
and the capitalist farms, their initial distribution of income, the
implication of that distribution on the structure of credit market and
the general nature of the decisions they have to take on the use of
15) Later on, in Section 8, we shall-discuss briefly the possibility
where imperfection of the credit market may also imply a monopsony
in the labor market whereby the family farmers may be forced to
work only for the local capitalist-cum-money lender.
inputs and allocation of wealth. The purpose of this essay is to
derive these decision rules in a precise form and analyze them in
relation to the particular question of capital accumulation. For that,
the objectives of the two farms are to be stated precisely, and, in this
context, we assume that both the farms in making their allocation
decisions are guided by the objective of maximizing the happiness of
their respective family members, not only within one period, but also
over a certain span of periods, and express this objective as a
discounted sum of utility defined over a stipulated time horizon and
relating to consumption per head of the.family members of the respective
farms. This intertemporal characterization of the objective, it should
be noted, is essential if the decision rules with respect to saving and
accumulation of wealth are to be accounted for. It should also be
noted that although on grounds of analytical completeness we shall work
with this Ramsey-type intertemporal objective functional and derive the
decision rules subject to that, most of these rules can also be derived,
as will be shown later in Section 3, from a somewhat simpler specifica-
tion of the objective, namely, that the family and the capitalist farms
try to maximize their net income (i.e., profit) in any period with an
additional intertemporal requirement that the net income of any period
should not fall below that of the previous period.
Decision making with reference to an objective function, specified
in either of these two forms, can be regarded as the usual expression of
rational behavior in economic analysis. And, as pointed out at the very
outset, our intention in this essay is to offer an alternative
explanation of the agricultural stagnation of a less developed
economy on the basis of such a framework of rational behavior on the
part of both the family and the capitalist farms,.but as applied to
the very special objective circumstances of a dualistic agriculture
which arise primarily from its state of distribution of income and
the related structure of the credit market.
0
3. The Model
As indicated in the last section, the agricultural sector can
be considered as divided into numerous sets consisting of the family
and the capitalist farms and these sets can be regarded as non-
intersecting in their credit operations. Suppose, for the sake of
simplicity, that there are m such identical sets (m is sufficiently
large, but finite) and within each set there are n identical family
farms and one capitalist farm (or, a few of them, homogeneous enough
to be regarded as one unit). With this notion of aggregation, we
now proceed to derive the allocational decision rules, first for the
family farm and then for the capitalist farm, taking into account all
the structural characteristics as already mentioned. It is these
rules that will define the model of our analysis.
The Family Farm:
Given the nature of agricultural production and the relationship
between the processes of income generation for the two types of farms,
as outlined in the last section, the total income of a family farm
belonging to such a representative set in any period t can be
written as
(3.1) Y 1 (t) FF(T1 9K 1 (t),L (t)) + w(t) L2 (t) i(t)PkK (t)
- (1 + i(t))FC (t),
where Y 1 (t) is the total net income of the family farm in period t ,
F is the fixed money price of the agricultural output which is produced
subject to a neoclassical production function F showing constant
returns to scale and diminishing returns to factors, T is the given
amount of land which remains unchanged except in the case of default
of loan, Ki(t) is the amount of capital rented from the capitalist
farm, L 1 (t) is the labor of family members used in its own production,
L2 (t) is the family labor sent away for work in the capitalist farm and
w(t) is the money wage rate thereof. The first two terms on the
R.H.S. of (3.1) add up to give the total gross income of the family
farm. k is the fixed price of capital, PC (t) the money value of
the consumption loan and i(t) the rate of interest for period t , so
that the last two terms of (3.1) are the rental payment on the production
loan and interest-plus-principal payment on the consumption loan
respectively.
There are certain issues in connection with the production and
the consumption loan which are worth clarifying at the outset. In
the first place, there is a difference in the way the two loans are
paid back in each period. Since the services of capital can be
rented per period, the payment of production loan in any period in
the absence of depreciation, is just the payment of rental. The
consumption loan, on the other hand, is like wages fund; it can not
be used without its being exhausted and hence the payment of
consumption loan includes both principal and interest. Secondly,
given the continuous input-point output technology, capital needs to
be rented in the beginning of the period and used in production over
the entire period. The consumption loan, on the other hand, need not
be taken right in the beginning of a period. Depending on the amount
of net income available from the previous period, it can be taken at
any time within the period, but naturally before the end point when
the output is again available. Since we have used the same rate of
interest for both kinds of loan, it should be understood that an initial
adjustment has been made for the rate of interest on the consumption
loan, so that it can refer to the entire period. Finally, it should be
noted that we shall very often add up PkK1(t) and FC (t) to define
the total loan of the family farm in any period t , and there is no
stock-flow contradiction involved. Note that the total loan of the
family farm in any period t is:
'Tt T-t-1
SFC 1 (T) + kAK1(T)
But, in our analysis, it is assumed that loans are paid back at the
end of each year, so that
T-t-1
I C (T) - 0
Therefore with K1 (t) denoting the capital stock covering the entire
period t , the total loan of the family farm in any period t can
be written as: Pk Kl(t) + P C (t)
Given the total net income of the family farm, as defined in
(3.1), its average net income in period t is:
Y1 (t) P F(T,KI(t)q,L1(t)) + w(t)L2(t)(3.2) y1 (t) - L()it
L (t) L 1(t)
i(t)FPKl(t) + (1+i(t))T C (t)
L(t)
where L1 (t) is the size of the family and, for the sake of simplicity,
16)
is also taken to be its total labor force
(3.3) L1 (t) + L2 (t) 1 (t)
16) Alternatively, one can assume that the labor force is a certain
fixed proportion 0 < a < 1 of LI(t).
It is assumed that L1 (t) grows at an exogenously fixed rate g
(3.4) W(t) - E1(O)( + g) , g > 0
As already explained in detail, the net income with which the family
farm starts any period is low so that it cannot save and has to rent
capital and also take consumption loan to meet the consumption
requirement1 7 I. Therefore, denoting by c (t) the consumption per
head of the family in real terms, we can write
y (t-1) C (t
(3.5) c1(t) - +
P(1+g) LW(t)
17) We have already mentioned it before (cf. p. lln), and we repeat it
here, that for our analysis and final conclusions it is not
essential that saving of the family farm be zero and the amount
of its consumption loan positive. What we need is a situation
where, because of the existing distribution of income, the family
farm cannot save enough and it has to take some loan from the
capitalist farm, be it consumption loan or renting of capital (in
other words, the credit market should be allowed to remain in
the picture). Given such an upperbound on saving on the part of
the family farm properly defined, it can be shown just by using the
property of imperfection of the credit market and the stated objectives
of the farms that, under very plausible conditions, the system will
evolve over time in such a way that after a certain period of time
the saving of the family farm will in fact drop to a negligible
amount and that it will also have to take consumption loan. And,
the present analysis applies from then on. Therefore, the assumptions
of zero saving and positive consumption loan on the part of the
family farm are not analytically essential. We assume it only
because there is evidence to believe that it is a more empirically
appropriate way of describing the reality in a less developed
country. In the context of India, for example, it is clear from
the NCAER Rural Household Survey (1965), Tables 33 and 36, that,
given our choice of the cutoff point between the family and the
capitalist farms in terms of land holding, the saving of the median
family farm is indeed negligible. It is also evident from the All
CONT'D.......
These are the definitions of the relevant variables as applied
to the family farm and the definitional equations involving them.
The question, now, is: how does the family farm make its choice about
the value of these variables, Ll, K, and C1 , when its objective,
as mentioned at the end of the last section, is to maximize a
discounted sum of utility relating to per capita consumption of its
family members over some stipulated time horizon, i.e., to maximize
T
(3.6) t U(c(t))
0
where T is the length of time horizon for the family farm, X(>l)
is the discount factor for its time preference, U is its instantaneous
utility function with required concavity and cI(t) is defined by (3.5).
This is essentially a discrete analogue of the generalized Ramsey
problem, and the Euler conditions for maximum1 8) in this discrete-time
case are obtained by constructing the following sum of two adjacent
terms of the utility functional,
17) CONT'D. India Rural Debt and Investment Survey (op.cit.), and on
the same choice of the cut off point, that nearly 70 per cent of the
total loan taken by the family farms in the year 1961-62 has been
for consumption purposes.
18) The second-order Legendre condition is satisfied by the concavity
of utility function.
-t y 1 (t-1) CI(t) -(t 1) uZ AyU[ + ]+ A U[
P (1+g) L ()
u(t)(i4(t) - L (t))
P i (t+l)
F(Tl'9,(t) ,L1 (t))
L (t+l)
i (t)kK(t)
PL(t+1)
(1+i(t)) C (t+1)
Li (t+1) Li (t+1)
and then setting the partial derivatives of Z
relevant arguments, L (t) , K1 (t), and C (t)
with respect to the
equal to zero 1 9 '
= i(t)
Uy(t-1)
1 P(1+g)
+C (t)
L (t)
W(t)(El(t) - L (t))
L1 (t)(1+g)
1+i(t)
1+g
U'( F(T1 ,K1 (t),L 1 (t))
LI(t)(1+g)
i (t) PkK (t)
P_ L(t)(1+g)
(1 + i(t))C (t) C (t)
+ ] I
L (t)(1+g) L (t)(1+g)
19) For a discussion of the Euler conditions in the discrete-time case,
see P.A. Samuelson, "A Turnpike Refutation of the Golden Rule in
a Welfare-Maximizing Many-Year Plan" in (R.C. Metron ed.) The
Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Vol. 3, pp.
108-110.
(3.7)
(3.8)
(3.9) F ( , K(t), L (t))
(3.10)
f FL101'j 1 t), Ll(t)) = w(t)
where
aF() F() d U (c1 ( ))F an U
Li L , 1(1 aK and U( ) - dc( )
Note that (3.8) and (3.9) are the static optimality conditions
which give the family farm's decision rules with respect to the use
of labor and capital respectively. In making these decisions, the
family farm takes w and i as parameters. The wage rate is
determined by the aggregate supply of labor from all the family farms
and the aggregate demand for labor from all the capitalist farms of
the agricultural sector taken together, while the rate of interest
is set within a representative set monopolistically by the capitalist
farm. An individual family farm acting alone can not affect either w
or .
The condition (3.10), on the other hand, is the dynamic optimality
condition (an analogue of the Ramsey rule for the problem of the family
farm) which has to hold for any pair of adjacent periods (t, t+l), and
it gives us the demand function of the family farm for the consumption
loan, PC 1 . It is a second-order difference equation embedded in the
optimal time profile of PC and it is known that such a profile is
uniquely fixed by the initial and the terminal condition relating to
C1 . We choose to specify these conditions by two constants, to be
denoted by B1 and B2
Given these specifications, for any period t , the value of
PC obtained from the previous period (which, incidentally, is zero
because of the assumption that the loan of any period is to be paid
back in that period) as well as that related to the next period,
PC (t+l), can be taken as predetermined, and it is then possible to
characterize the demand function for PC for any period t as:
(3.11) FC (t $i~t) w(t), yl(t-1), LWt; X1, g, Bl, B2
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where the variables, K1 (t) and L1 (t) , are eliminated by virtue of
(3.8) and (3.9), and X1, g, B1  and B2 are the given constants.
Now, by using the implicit function rule with respect to (3.10), it
can be easily seen, as is also intuitively expected, that
3C i(t) C1 (t) a WC1 (t)
St 0 *>2t 0* < 0
a2 C (t)
and * = > 0
3L(t)
In the same way, it can also be verified that the elasticities of PC (t)
with respect to i(t) and w(t), to be denoted by e9,i and e ,w
are inversely related with the value of the discount factor, X1 , and
those with respect to yl(t-1) and L1 (t) , to be denoted by e
and e , are directly related with X
Of particular importance for our later analysis is the comparison
between e * 1  and e * At a low level of income, when the
consumption is more of a necessity than luxury, it is reasonable to
expect that in any period the elasticity of PC with respect to the
net income available in that period is significantly higher than that
with respect to the rate of interest to be paid on the loan 20). A good
way of presenting this phenomenon in terms of our analytical framework
is through an appropriate valuation of X Since at a very low level
of income, an individual is expected to be specially concerned about
its immediate, rather than future, consumption, one can consider X
of the family farm as having a significantly high value. And, given
the qualitative nature of the relationship of e and e with
as just mentioned, such a high value of 1 can then be taken to
imply a correspondingly high value of e compared to epi
We now want to make a short digression on a related issue, which
is of some concern in the literature on development, bearing on the
decision of the family farm with respect to L1 (and, therefore, also
L2) and a possible imperfection of the labor market. It is often
mentioned that there exists a positive gap between the wage rate at
20) For similar reason, e *y will also dominate e since wage
is supposed to be receivel at the end of the period.
which labor can be hired from the family farm and the marginal
product of labor in the family farm21 ). It is interesting to see
that this situation can be easily accommodated in terms of our
framework of analysis. One important reason behind the existence of
this wage gap, it is believed, is the fact that when the members of
the family farm, particularly the women, work in their own farm they
can coordinate and combine farm work with domestic chores, something
which they are unable to do when at work as a hired labor on the
capitalist farm22 ). What this means in terms of our analytical
framework is that there is an opportunity cost associated with L2
being sent away to work at the capitalist farm. If P(t) is taken to
denote this opportunity cost per unit of L2 (t) , then (3.2) can be
rewritten as
( F(T1 ,Kl(t),Ll(t)) + (w(t)-yP(t))L 2(3.2) ' yl(t) (t
L1 (t)L WL
i(t)pkK(t) (1+i(t))C t)W
L 1 (t) L1 (t)
21) See, J. Bhagwati and S. Chakravarty, "Contributions to Indian Economic
Analysis: A Survey", Am. Ec. Review, 59, No. 2, Suppl. (Sept. 1969);
D. Majumdar; "Size of Farm and Productivity: A Problem of Indian
Peasant Agriculture", Economica, 32, May 1965; A.K. Sen: "Peasants
and Dualism with or without Surplus Labor", Jr. of Pol. Ec., Oct., 1966.
22) See P.K. Bardhan, Loc. cit. pp. 1379-1381. For empirical evidence
in the Indian context, see P. Visaria, "The Farmers' Preference for
Work on Family Farms", in Report of the Committee of Experts on
Unemployment Estimates, New Delhi, Govt. of India, 1970.
and (3.8) as
(3.8)' E FL, 1,l K (t), L (t)) = w(t) - P(t)
There will be a similar modification of (3.10) so that (3.11) can be
rewritten by including p(t) as another argument:
(3.11)' C (t) - $i(t), W(t), y (t-1), L0 (tP(t); X 9gBlB2
with PC (t)/3y(t) < 0 . It is now clear from (3.8)' that so long as
23)
y(t) > 0 , w(t) > f F L and therefore the wage gap
23) There is an alternative explanation of the wage gap, due to Lewis
(cf. his "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour",
Manchester School of Econ. and Soc. Studies, May 1954), which
suggests that the peasant leaving his family to work outside loses
his income from the farm, equal to the average product per person,
and the wage rate outside must compensate for this. This explanation
can also be accommodated in our analytical framework. Note that for
this argument to be valid, it is necessary to assume that the out-
going peasant cannot rent out or sell his share in the land held by
the joint family, the family refuses to subsidize him with remittances
and that he does not remit back his wages. What all this means is
that when the peasant goes out in this way, he, in effect, ceases
to be a member of the family. To capture this situation, therefore,
the wage term in the expression of net income of the family should be
dropped, and then the wage rate of the outgoing peasant indeed becomes
equal to the average net income of the family farm. It should be
emphasized, however, that this explanation of the wage gap, based as
it is on a particular kind of relationship between the outgoing
peasant and the family, is more appropriate for the rural-urban
migration than for the allocation of family labor between its own
farm and the capitalist farm within agriculture. In this context
see also, J. Stiglitz: "Rural-Urban Migration, Surplus Labour and
the Relationship between Urban and Rural Wages", East African Economic
Review, Dec. 1969, and "Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'S"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1974.
The value of p(t) can be considered as depending on L2 (t) and
L1 (t):
where ay(t)/aL2 (t) > 0 , since the opportunity cost increases as more
of family labor goes out to work in the capitalist farm, and
ay(t)/3Ll(t) < 0 , since there are economics of scale associated with
a larger size of the family. But, dL1 /dt > 0 and, also generally,
dL2 /dt > 0 . Hence the sign of dp/dt is ambiguous. We start by
assuming that the two effects tend to cancel out each other so that y
can be taken not to change over time, and then see later on how the
results will have to be qualified if yV is considered to change in one
way or other. For the purpose of our immediate analysis, therefore,
(3.11)' will be written as:
(3.11)" PC (t) = $(i(t),w(t),y (t-1),L1 (t); y,A 1,g,B,B 2  *
with )A treated as a constant.
It should be carefully noted in this context that the existence of
a wage gap, as described above, is quite consistent with the imperfections
of both the land market and the capital market which we have previously
specified24 ). With the imperfection of labor market thus accommodated
24) For an analysis of this question, see R.S. Eckaus: The Market
Structure and Performance of Traditional Agriculture, Mass. Inst.
Of Technology, 1969, Mimeo.
and the Equations (3.2), (3.8) and (3.11) accordingly modified by
(3.2)', (3.8)' and (3.11)", the optimal decision rules for the family
farm are given by (3.8)', (3.9) and (3.11)".
Let us now turn to the capitalist farm to find out its corresponding
optimal decision rules.
The Capitalist Farm:
Recollecting that there are n identical family farms and one
capitalist farm within a representative set (of the family and the
capitalist farms), the total net income of the capitalist farm in any
period t can be written as:
(3.12) Y2 (t) P F(T2,K2 (t) ,n L2 (t)) - w(t) nL2 (t) + i(t)M(t)
where Y2 is the total net income, P is the fixed money price at
which the agricultural product can be sold by both the capitalist and
the family farm, F is the production function available to both of
them, T2 is the given amount of land which again remains unaltered
until the capitalist farm takes over the land of the family farm in
the event of a default of loans, K2 (t) is the capital stock owned by
the capitalist farm and used in its own production, and M(t) is the
total loan given by the capitalist faim to n identical family farms, i.e.,
(3.13) M(t) - nk 1(t) + n P C (t)
Note that while the family farm's repayment of the consumption loan,
for reasons already mentioned, has to include both the principal and
interest and therefore the amount to be deducted from its gross income
on this account is (1 + i(t))P C (t) , the definition of the capitalist
farm's flow of income in any period, on the other hand, can include
only the interest earnings on the loan, whether the loan is for
consumption or production.
The average net income of the capitalist farm can then be written
as:
Y2(t) P F(T2,K2 (t),nL2 (t)) - w(t)nL2(t)
(3.14) y2(t) - -
L2 (t) L2(t)
+ i(t) M(t)
where L2 (t) is the size of the capitalist family which, like that of
the family farm, grows at an exogenously fixed rate g
(3.15) L2 (t) - L2 (0) (l + g) , g > 0
Unlike the family farm, however, the capitalist farm can save and this
saving in period t , when added to its wealth already existing from
the previous period, A2 (t-1), defines the total wealth of the
capitalist farm in period t , A2 (t) . Therefore, consumption per head
of its family members in real terms for period t can be written as:
y2(t-l) A2(t) A2(3.16) c 2(t - _M +
P(l+g) P L(t) P L2(t)
Now, we know that for any value of A2 (t) , however determined, the
capitalist farm can hold this wealth in terms of two kinds of assets:
capital to be owned and used in its own production and loans to be
given to the family farms, so that
(3.17) A2(t) Fk K2 (t) + M(t)
These are the definitions of the relevant variables for the
capitalist farm and the definitional equations involving them. Given
these, the problem of the capitalist farm is to choose the values of
the variables L2 (t) , K2 (t) and M(t) (and, given (3.17), also
A2 (t)) so as to maximize the discounted sum of utility relating to the
per head consumption of its family members over a stipulated time
horizon, i.e., maximize
T2
(3.18) 2 t U(c2(t))
0
where T2 and A2 are the time horizon and the discount factor for the
capitalist farm, and c2 (t) , its real per head consumption, is defined
by (3.16). Note that the instantaneous utility function, U, has been
considered to be the same (with required concavity) for both the family
and the capitalist farm.
The Euler conditions for maximum are then obtained by setting
the partial derivatives of the sum of typical adjacent terms of the
series25)
-t y2 (t) kK2 (t) + M(t) A2(t-1)(3.19) Z2 X 2 U[ + ]
P(1+g) P L 2(t) P L2 (t)
+ X_-(t+l) Uj
2
F(T2,K2 (t) ,nL2 (t)
L2 (t) (1+g)
w(t)nL2 W
PZ2(t)(1+g)
+ (t) M(t) A2 (t+1)
P L 2(t) (1+g) P L 2(t)(1+g)
kK2(t) + M(t)
P L 2(t)(1+g)
with respect to
(3.20)
(3.21)
L2 (t), K2 (t) and M(t) respectively equal to zero:
P FL(T 2, K2 (t), nL2(t)) w(t)
2 U'(c 2 (t){- _ k + X2(t+l) U'(c2(t+1)
P 2t
Fk(T 2 ,K2 (t),nL2 (t)) + Pk 0
L2(t)(1+g) P L2Ct)(1+g)
25) The second-order conditions are again taken care of by the concavity
of U.
(3.22) x-t ,(c2(t)) - - + (t+1) U'(c2(t+1)
P L2 (t)
t)(1 - )+ 1
L2 (t)(1+g)
where F aF( aF Fn e am( ) 1FL2 3nL2 Fk2 K and e- --
is the elasticity of the aggregate demand for loan with respect to the
rate of interest, the aggregate demand being obtained by adding up the
demand for consumption and production loan over all the family farms
in the representative set.
Clearly, (3.20) is the optimal rule for choosing L2 (t) , while
(3.21) and (3.22) can be combined to yield:
(3.23) "k22' 2 (t), nL 2 (t)) = i(t)(1 -et)
P k
or,
0(t) Fk2 2 , k2 (t), nL2 (t)) = i(t)
where e(t) , and this gives the capitalist farm's rule of
1 -(t)
allocating any given amount of A2 (t) between M(t) and PkK2(t)*
The optimal rule for choosing the amount of A2 (t) can then
be derived in the following way. Given (3.17), az2/3A2  can be
expressed as a linear combination of az2/3k2  and az2 /m
az 2 az 2a
(3.24) + 2
2 Pk 2
Now, substituting the values of z 2/aM and az2 /ak2  from (3.21)
and (3.22), az2 /aA2  can be set equal to zero to obtain:
(3.252 (t-1) A2(t) A2 (t-1)(3.25) 2 
- +
P(1+g) P L2 (t) P L2(t)
- ~ t+ 1 F(T2 ,K2 (t),nL2(t)) w(t)nL2(t)
1+g 2 (t)(1+g) P L2 (t)(1+g)
i(t)M(t) - 2 (t+l) A2(t)= 0
P L2 (t)(1+g) P L2 (t)(1+g) P L 2(t)(1+g)
which is a second-order difference equation embedded in the optimal
time profile of 26) It is known that this profile is uniquely
fixed by the initial and the terminal condition relating to A2 , and
we shall specify these by two constants, to be denoted by D1 and
26) The Equation (3.25) can be regarded as the analogue of the Ramsey
rule for the problem of the capitalist farm.
D2 * With these specifications, for any period t , the values of
A2 (t-1) and A2 (t+l) can be taken as given, subsumed in these
specifications, and then (3.25) can be used to characterize the capitalist
farm's holding of A2 in the period t as:
(3.26) A2 (t) - f( (t,) y2 2 , D2e(t) 3' 2(t)2 X2, , 1  D2
where the other variables in (3.25) are eliminated by virtue of (3.20)
and (3.23), and X2, g, D, and D2 are the given constants. Note
that because of the monopolistic position of the capitalist farm in
the credit market, its decision to hold A2(t) depends, among others,
on the marginal rate of return, t , rather than on the average
rate of return, i(t) . Clearly, under a competitive situation,
8(t) = 1 and these two rates of return would be the same.
By using the implicit function rule to (3.25), one can verify
what one intuitively expects about the signs of the partial derivatives
of f , i.e.,
aA 2(t) aA 2(t)
1 a 3 it) > 0 , 2 a y2 (t-) > 0
0(t)
and aA2 (t)
3 32L 2 (t)
In the same way it can also be found that the elasticity of A2 (t)
with respect to i(t)/0(t) , e f ~i0 is inversely related with
A and those with respect to y2(t-) and L(t) , e 2 and e 2are22 2fy 2 2
directly related to A2 . Of particular importance for our later
analysis is the comparison between the difference of the income and
the rate of return elasticities of A2 for the capitalist farm,
(ef - efi/o ), and the difference of the corresponding elasticities
of PC for the family farm, (e - e*,i). Since the average
level of income of the capitalist farm is significantly higher than
that of the family farm, and accordingly the consumption of the
capitalist farm is less determined by the consideration of necessity,
it is reasonable to expect that the difference between ef9'2 and
e i/e for the capitalist farm will be significantly smaller than the
corresponding difference between e and e for the family farm.
A good way of presenting this phenomenon in terms of our analytical
framework is again through an appropriate stipulation of X2 in
relation to X . Since y2 (t-1) is significantly higher than yl(t-1)
and the standard of living of the capitalist farm is way above the state
of existence of the family farm, the preference pattern of the capitalist
farm ill be significantly less biased for the needs of immediate
consumption than what it was for the family farm. In other words, one
can st ulate 1 > A2 and, given the relationship of e and
e w h X and that of e and e f with X2 and the
structural similarity between $ and -f , this difference between
X 1and X2 can be taken to imply a corresponding difference between
(ey - e ) and (e - e ), i.e.
(3.27) (e - e i) > (ef - e f
We find therefore that the capitalist farm's decision to hold its
total wealth, A2 (t) , is given by (3.26), and its decision to allocate
that wealth between M(t) and kK2 (t) , which is taken simultaneously
with the decision to hold A2 (t) , is given, as already mentioned, by
(3.23). This allocation of A2 (t) between M(t) and PkK2 (t) along
with the consequent determination of the rate of interest and, given
that rate of interest, the final allocation of this loan, M(t) , by
each family farm between the uses of consumption and production - all
are shown in Figures 1(a), 1(b) and 1(c).
(PC 1) F kl /Tk 1/P Fk.j i
PC P 0 M - 2 o'
A2
1(c)1 (a) 1(b)
In going through these figures, it should be kept in mind that
this is a depiction of the working of only the asset-cum-credit market
of a dualistic agriculture. This is not a full general equilibrium
picture, because, to keep the diagrams simple, we have not shown the
interactions with the labor market explicitly. From (3.11)" it is
clear that, given other arguments, the demand of a typical farm for
the consumption loan can be related with the rate of interest as shown
in terms of the i(P C1 ) curve in Figure 1(a). Similarly, the demand
for production loan can be obtained from (3.9) and, given other
variables, its relationship with the rate of interest can be depicted
as shown by the P Fk2 /Pk curve in Figure 1(b). Horizontally adding
up the curves i(P C ) andP Fk2 k and multiplying the sum by
n , the market demand curve for loan, M, is obtained, and it is shown,
as mapped against the rate of interest, by the curve i in Figure 1(c)
where M is measured along 00' with 0 as the origin and the rate
of interest is measured along the vertical axis. Note that given the
monopolistic position of the capitalist farm in the credit market, the
aggregate demand curve for loan facing the capitalist farm has to be
necessarily downward sloping. The curve 1/ is then obtained from
this aggregate demand curve by using the average-marginal relationship.
The demand of the capitalist farm for PkK2 can be derived from
(3.23) and its relationship to the rate of interest is shown in terms
of the curve P/k F k2 in Figure 1(c), where Pk K2 is measured along
O'O with 0' as the origin and i is measured along the corresponding
vertical axis. The length of 00' is equal to the total amount of
wealth, A2 (t) , that the capitalist farm has chosen to hold in this
period. From the intersection of the curves 1/8 and kFk2/Pk in
Figure 1(c), the equilibrium rate of interest is determined along with
the allocation of A2 between M and kFk2 /k by the capitalist farm.
Given this rate of interest, each family farm decides on the amounts of
consumption loan and production loan it will take, as shown in Figures
1(a) and 1(b).
It is clear from (3.23) that for an interior solution to this
problem of allocation between M and k k2 Fk it is necessary to have
e > 1 . If e < 1 , then the solution, as known from the standard
theory of monopoly, tends to be in the neighborhood of a corner with
the capitalist farm trying to charge an infinitely high rate of
interest for an infinitesimally small amount of loan. We are therefore
led to distinguish between two possible situations:
(1) The level of the average net income of the family farm is
low and it is taking loans for both consumption and production, but
the income is still above that level at which the family farm has to
take consumption loan to meet the biologically minimum subsistence needs.
In other words, the consumption needs can still be made flexible in the
event of a sufficiently high rate of interest, implying thereby that
e 1 for the entire range of the aggregate demand curve for loan.
(2) The other possibility is that the level of the average net
income of the family farm is in fact so low that consumption loan is
taken by the family farm for subsistence needs. Then the value of e
may very well be below 1 over the entire range of the aggregate demand
curve for loan26 ) with the result that the capitalist farm can really
charge a high enough rate of interest until the family farm becomes
totally impoverished and is forced to sell his land and join the ranks
26a)
of landless labor at a subsistence wagea. In this case, the
solution is self evident and we have nothing more to say about it by
way of analysis, apart from mentioning that this situation actually
represents the terminal state of a process relating to the behavior
of capital accumulation and the impoverishment of the family farm in
a dualistic agriculture, and when the system comes to this state then
the complete impoverishment of the family farm becomes imminent.
We shall come back to this situation (2) later on. But it needs
to be pointed out here, as was also mentioned once in Section 2, that
the purpose of this essay is not simply to describe this terminal
state, although it may very well be the case with some of the present-
day dualistic agriculture, but also to try to explain and understand the
historical process by which a dualistic agriculture is actually brought
to this terminal state, the tendencies which are inherent in this sytem
and make it move in a particular direction. To be able to do that, it
26) This special situation is likely to arise particularly in the
event of some unpredictable needs in consumption or production,
and then the family farm can indeed find itself placed in a
vulnerable position.
26a) The process can not go beyond this point, because it is to the
obvious interest of the capitalist farm to keep the family farmer
alive in order to get the supply of labor.
is important to start from a situation which is somewhat away from
the terminal state, and therefore we choose the situation (1) as the
description of the initial state and develop an analysis of the entire
process of evolution from that point onward. It will be seen in the
course of this analysis that the situation (2) will in fact come to
appear as a part of that evolutionary process.
As an offshoot of this discussion, one can consider the value
of e(t) in any period t as directly related to the level of average
net income available to the family farm in that period, i.e., y1 (t-1)
and, since e(t) 1 , one can also write,
e(t)
(3.28) 0(t) = (y(t-1) with d ydr-) = < 0
* * *
To sum up, given the objective of maximizing the sum of
discounted utility relating to per head consumption of the family members
over a stipulated time horizon, the optimum decision rules for the
family farms with respect to the relevant variables are given by
(3.8)', (3.9), (3.11)", and those of the capitalist farm by (3.20),
(3.23) and.(3.26). These rules, taken together with the definitional
equations, define the basic equational structure of our model of the
dualistic agriculture for any particular period. For convenience of
later reference, let us collect the equations in one place:
The Family Farm:
Y1 (t) m
F F(T,K (t)9Lt)) + (w(t)-y) L 2 (
L(t)
'(t) PkKl(t) + (1 + i(t))P C(t)
L 1 (t)
L ()+ L 2 (t) - i LMt
F u(T ,K1(t),Li(t)) - w(t) - y
F (T jq Kl(t), Ll(t))
c t (t) = (i(t), w(t), yl~-) L Pt) , xy, g, B1, B2)
The Capitalist Farm:
y2 (t) =
P F(T 2 , K2 (t), nL2 (t) - w(t) nL2 (t)
L2 (t)
M(t) = n ik K((t) + n P C (t)
P FT 2 2, K2 (t), nL2 (t)) = w(t)
+ i(t) M(t)
S(t)
(3.2)'
(3.3)
(3.8)'
(3.9)
(3.11)"
(3.14)
(3.13)
(3.20)
(3.23) 0(y 1(t-l) Fk2 2 , K2(t), nL2(t)) i(t)
P k
(3.26) A2 (t) k K2 t) + M(t) ~ f (t) ,2 2  2'g, 1  2
Clearly, given B1 , B2 , D, D2' 1 and X2 as constants
and y (t-1), y 2 (t-l), 1 (t) and L2 (t) as parameters, we have, in
any period t , as unknowns: y 1 (t), K 1 (t), L 1 (t), w(t), L2 (t), i(0)
C (t), K 2(t), M(t) and A2 (t) , and the number of unknowns equals the
number of equations. Another way of looking at this structure of
equations is that, given the initial and the terminal condition as
captured by the constants B1 , B2 , D, and D2 , and given other
structural constants, g, y, x1  and X2 , the optimal time profiles
of P C (t) and A2 ( ) and, associated with them, the profiles of all
other variables are uniquely defined (except of the singular cases).
The set of equations mentioned above is nothing but the characterization
of these profiles in a particular period of time. And, in this
characterization, the parameters clearly are y (t-1), y2 (t-1) 1 1 (t)
and L2 (t); they change over time driving the system to the next period.
To know the intertemporal behavior of the system, which is the next step
of our analysis, it is therefore essential to know the direction of
changes in these four parameters.
It needs to be mentioned here that in finding out the qualita-
tive nature of these parametric changes as well as in deriving many other
subsequent results, for the manoeuverability of a differential operator,
we shall work in terms of time derivatives rather than in terms of time
differences. However, the underlying period analytic structure of our
model, which was described in Section 2 and formalized in this section,
will always be implied and, once the derivations are over, we shall
interpret the results by coming back to this framework of period analysis.
With this in mind, our problem now is to find out the signs of
the time derivatives of Li, L2 ' y1  and y2 . Of these four
parameters, the signs of L and L2 are already known to be positive
by (3.4) and (3.15). The signs of the remaining two, dy1 /dt and
dy2/dt , will be given by the following propositions.
Proposition 1: Given the objective (3.18) if the rate of
capital accumulation in the capitalist farm does not exceed the golden
rule value, then dy2/dt = 0 , except for the case when the system is
self-destructive.
Proof: Given the objective (3.18), it is clear from (3.21)
that if
(3.29) Fk2 2, K2(t), nL2 (t)) X2 (1+g)
k
i.e., if the rate of capital accumulation in the capitalist farm of
the underdeveloped dualistic agriculture does not exceed the golden
rule - catenary turnpike level (an assumption which can be made without
straining any credibility, at least in the beginning of the process),
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then it follows from the concavity of U that
A C 1 (t) > 0
The same result can be stated in continuous time with the
objective (3.18) expressed as
T
Max j e-P2t U(c2 (t))dt
0
where p2 is the rate of time preference of the capitalist farm and
c2 is to be written as
'2 P
y 2 2  dMY2 k dt dt
The continuous analogue of (3.21) is:
d 2
= (e
or,
dU'
-dt
P F
-
_ 
k2 _
Pt k
PL 2
2 + g)
which shows that if P Fk2 /k !2 + g , the continuous counterpart of
(3.29), then
, by the concavity of U.
d c 2  >
dt = 0
(3.30)
(3.18)'
(3.16)'
(3.21)'
P L 2
e-p2 t T[Fk2
L 2
(3. 30)1'
Next, treating A2 kK2 + M) as one variable, we derive
the corresponding Euler equation and then, multiplying both sides of
the equation by dA2/dt , express it in the following alternative
form27)
d ~ 2t d2 ~P2t -- p2td33 [e -tU + e U] -p2 e U(331t dt2
or,
(3.32) U + d2A2  U' - 2dt dt2  P L2  dt L
dA2  1 dc
[U" dt 2 -
P L2
We can now distinguish between the two cases depending on
whether (1) dA2 /dt ! 0 or (2) dA2/dt < 0
Case 1 ( dA2/dt = 0): In this case, given (3.30)' and the
concavity of U , it follows from (3.32) that
(3.33) dc d _l__2 A 1 g _ 0
dt dt2 2L dt2 2
which, by (3.16)', is equivalent to
dy2 >
(3.34) 0
27) See I.M. Gelfand and S.V. Forrin, Calculus of Variations, Prentice-
Hall (1963), pp 18-19.
Case 2 (dA2/dt < 0): Here, one can again have two possibilities:
dc
(i) the absolute value of [U' - U'p2 ] in (3.32) is not high enough
so that (3.33) continues to hold and we have the same result as (3.34),
or (ii) the absolute value of [U" dc2  U' is high enough to make
2t P2
dc2  dA 2  1 dA
(3.33)' + 2< 0 or
dt2  dt
PL2 PL2
(3.4)1 dY2< 0y2
But, given dc 2/dt > 0 , this also means that d2A2/dt2 < 0 along
with dA2 /dt < 0 , implying that the system is self-destructive over a
finite time horizon. T
Comment: Given the objective of maximizing f e U(c2(t))dt,
the last situation, the possibility (ii) under the 0
case 2, is naturally ruled out if either the stipulated time horizon
is considered to be sufficiently long or the terminal rate of growth
of wealth is required not to fall below a certain positive number. Thus
one can conclude that under quite general conditions, (3.18) can be
taken to imply dy2 /dt ! 0
Proposition 2: Given the objective (3.6) and that the rate
of capital accumulation in the family farm does not exceed the golden
rule value, dy/dt > 0 if d C /dt =0 , and dy2/dt 0 implies
d P C /dt > 0
Proof: Given the objective (3.6), it is clear from (3.10)
that if
(3.35) 1 + i(t) X1(1+g)
i.e., noting from (3.9) that i(t) W P Fkl k , if the rate of
growth of capital accumulation in the family farm does not exceed the
golden rule level, then
Ac1 (t) 1 0
Formulating the problem in continuous time, it can again be
shown, exactly in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1, that
dc >
= 0 if 
_ > p + gk,
Pk
where p1  is the rate of time preference of the family farm and cl
is to be written as:
1
- + -
P L
From this expression of c1 it is immediate that
dy de dC
(3.37) 
-dt dt dt
p
1C
+ L -
L L
(3.36)
(3.36)'
(3.5)'
so that by using (3.36)' it follows that if d P C /dt = 0 then
dy /dt > 0 , and dyl/dt - 0 implies d P C /dt > 0
Proposition 3: If the weighted average of the rates of capital
accumulation in the family and the capitalist farms, weights being the
rentals on capital used in the respective farms, is not high enough
to exceed the rate of growth of labor force by an amount, defined by
the rate of growth of labor force, the amount and the rate of change
of the consumption loan and the shares of land and capital, then
dy2 /dt 0 implies dyl/dt < 0 , and dyl/dt ! 0 
implies
dy2/dt < 0.
Proof: From (3.2) and (3.14) the expressions of dyl/dt and
dy2/dt can be derived as:
(3.38) PF F + (w-y)g L+ L2
dt L ~kldt- .d
1
- {i? K + (1+i) PC } g Y
dt k 1 1 g 1]
and,
dy2  1 - dK dw d
(3.39) - - - [P 2 d nL dtA (i M) - Yd k2dt dt 2 + (i)g 2]
L2
Now, quite generally, it is true that
dK2 dK dPC1(3.40) g Y2 - Fk 2 - > n[P Fkl t + (w-y) gL - dt g Y 1
if,
g[n Fkl K1 Fk2K2) + (n& FTl + P FT2T2
dFC dK dK
+ n dt > nP F kl t1+ P Fk2 dt *
(where FTi = F( )/aT , i = 1,2 , and use has been made of
> 0 and the homogeneity property of F)
i.e., if,
(3.41) g + [g n +PFT2 T2
nP FklKl + P FkK 2
dPC1
dt nP Cydt1
+ C nPF K +PF K1 k1 1 Fk2 2
) P Fk1Gk + P Fk2K2Gk2
nP Fkil + P Fk2K2
where G = dKi/dt/Ki , i = 1,2 . Clearly, (3.41) is the statement
of the condition that the weighted average of the rates of capital
accumulation in the family and the capitalist farms, weights being
the rentals on capital used in the respective farms, does not exceed
the rate of growth of labor force by an amount defined by the rate of
growth of labor force, the rate of change in the consumption loan and
the ratio between the shares of land and capital, and that between the
value of consumption loan and share of capital.
From (3.39) it is evident that dy2 /dt = 0 implies
(3.42) (i M) dwnL2 Fk2 g Y2dt dt2 kdt+Y
Now, if (3.41) holds, then by using (3.40) and (3.42), it further
follows that
d >n(lF+dK w
(3.43) (1 M) > n[F Fkl + _(w-) gL + dwL2 1
or, by transferring d/dt (iM) on the R.H.S. and then dividing both
sides by n , we have
dy1
(3.44) dt < 0
In a symmetric manner it can be proved that, given (3.41),
dyl/dt 0 implies dy2/dt < 0
Comment: We shall henceforth assume that the agricultural
sector of a less developed economy, such as we are interested in, cannot,
to begin with, accumulate capital at a rate so much faster than the
rate of growth of labor force that (3.41) gets violated. Since in such
an agriculture the share of land is generally more dominant than the
share of capital on the amount of consumption loan, and the value of g
is significantly high, this is indeed a reasonable assumption to make
about the initial state of this agriculture.
The import of Proposition 3 is that in an underdeveloped dualistic
agriculture when the rate of capital accumulation is not taking place
at a sufficiently fast rate, it is not possible for the capitalist farm
to have dy2/dt Z 0 and the family farm to have dy1/dt Z 0 at the
same time. Only one of the two groups can make it. And, in a situation
where, given the distribution of income, the capitalist farm enjoys a
monopolistic position in the credit market, it has a prior advantage
of choosing its plan of saving and accumulation of A2 (t) in an optimal
fashion (i.e., satisfying (3.26)), so that i is made to change over
time in a way that d/dt (iM), the increase in earnings from loan, and
P Fk2 2/dt , the increase in earnings from capital 
accumulation in its
own farm, taken together becomes larger than dw/dt nL2 + gY2 implying
by (3.39) that dy2/dt = . The family farm, so long as it operates
atomistically in the labor and in the credit market and therefore takes
w and i as parameters, has no such prior advantage. It acts as a
follower after the decision has been taken by the capitalist farm with
respect to the savings plan. And, when such a decision is taken by the
capitalist farm so that dy2/dt ! 0 , and the situation is not one of a
sufficiently fast rate of accumulation, then, as shown in Proposition 3,
the family farm ends up with dyl/dt < 0 . We are thus led to this
following proposition:
Proposition 4: Given the bias in the distribution of income in
favor of the capitalist farm and its consequent monopolistic position in
the credit market, it has the advantage over the family farm in ensuring
dy 2/dt - 0 , and as the rate of capital accumulation to begin with satis-
fies (3.41), this implies, by Proposition 3, that dy,/dt < 0
56
dy1  dy2  28
With the signs of - and - thus known, and the signs
dL dL 2dt
of and already given, we shall now proceed to derive, by
totally differentiating the system of equations with respect to time,
the qualitative properties of the time derivatives of all the relevant
variables, and then, by analyzing these derivatives, condlude about
the intertemporal behavior of the system.
At this point, a comment on methodology seems pertinent. In
following this method of solution, what we are doing, in effect, is
that we are observing the equations of motion of the system over a short
range and, from such an observation of the local qualitative character of
the phase space, inferring about the global tendencies of the system. We
are deliberately choosing this method as against the usual method of global
28As pointed out at the end of Section 2, most of the decision rules of the
family and the capitalist farms as well as the signs of the time deriva-
tions of the parameters could have been derived from a simpler specifica-
tion of the objective, where both the farms are trying to maximize their
respective net income (i.e., profit) in any period with an additional
intertemporal requirement that this net income of any period should not
fall below that of the last period. In the case of the family farm, for
example, the maximization of yl subject to (3.5) with a given value of
ci yields the decision rules with respect to the use of Li and Ki which
are the same as (3.8) and (3.9). Similarly, for the capitalist farm,
the maximization of y2 subject to (3.7) with a given value of A2 gives
the decision rules with respect to the use of L2 and the allocation of
A2 between M and PkK2 which-are again the same as (3.20) and (3.23). The
only problem about this kind of specification of the objective function
however, is connected with the derivation of the demand function for PC1
and A2 . The question of the demand function for PC can still be settled
at least in our case, by specifying the level of per-head consumption,
cl, to some predetermined minimum level although that is not always the
best way of explaining the consumption decision. But the problem is more
serious with respect to the determination of the capitalist farm's deci-
sion on A2. W an open-ended specification of the inter-temporal objec-
tive, such as =t- 0, the decision on A2 also gets characterized by
inequality and thus remains somewhat ill defined. And, to dodge the
issue by saying that A2 is a certain fixed proportion of, say, y2 is
not really explaining an important dimension of the choice problem of the
capitalist farm with respect to A2 . This choice problem can be analyzed
only in terms of the type specification of the objective function such as
we have been working with.
phase construction, because if the system is known to have sufficient
monotonicity, this is indeed a valid and at the same time a simpler
substitute for the global technique. And, in the case of our model,
we shall see that, because of the nature of the time functions of
y1 , y2 ' E1 , and L2, there exists enough monotonicity in the system to
warrent such a global qualitative inference from a local analysis.
4. Behavior of the System Over Time
From the standpoint of intertemporal analysis, the equations of
the model, mentioned in the last section, can be further condensed as
(4.1) FL (T, K 1 (t), L (t)) + - FL2 (T2, K2 (t), nL2 (t)) = _
(3.3) L 1 (t) + L2 (t) - L, (t)
(3.11) PC (t) - $Mt), w(t), y(t -1), L(t); P , X, g, Gl, B2
$1 < 0, *$2 > 0, $3 < 0, *4 > 0.
(4.2) F (Ti, K 1 (t), L (t)) = 0(t) FK2 (T2 , 2(t), nL2(t)) = i
L 2 (t)K2 2  2 1  2)
(3.36) A2(t) f(t) y2 (t - 1), L2(t); A2, g, D , 2
C(t) + nPkK (t) + PkK2
f > 0, f2 > 0, f3 >0.
In calculating the changes of the variables over time, for
reasons of convenience of working with time derivatives as mentioned
before, we shall continue to work in the framework of continuous time,
58
although the underlying period analytic structure should again be kept
in mind, and we shall refer back to it for the purposes of interpreting
the results. For simplifying calculations, in the beginning we shall
also hold 6 constant and relax it later on. Now, totally differentiating
these five equations with respect to time, and then eliminating d and
dvt
we get
3FL1 dK 3FL2 dK2 3F 3F 2 dL F dL(4.3) 3K d 3Kdt+ ( + in -nL) - = 2
1 2 1 2 2nL dt
DF dK 3Fk2 dK2 F 3F k2 dL 3F 2 dL(4.4) K+ ( + k2 1 k2 13K Tt A dt 3L a-) dt DnL 2dt
f -3F 3F dk dk
(4.5) {(n$b -lP k+ n2 L+ +n}-~ 2- 1A 2 3K kdt +k dt
+ W(n1 -f
e
dx dy2
) t - f2dt +
Jacobian:
3F Ll
3K 1
3Kl
("1 -f a
-
3Fkl + 3F di 
_
1 L 2 3L  dt dt
dL2 dy dL1
f3 d -n3 dt - n$
3FL2
3K2
3F
3K
2
+ + Llk
L l 1 + n k
3FL 3FL3FLl 9FL2( +n -)3L + 2
3Fk 3Fk2(- + n 2
f n 3F1 )lP U1
0 - aL
Pk1
- aFLl
+*2 P3L 1
wher
(4. 6
The
A=
f -aDF k2a F L aF LF 3F kl F
{k + ( + L2 kl L1 l L1
Pk 2 2 1 1 1 1
2f- nl-f -FL aF k2aF L2 aF k2aFL- 1 1+FPUFk2 L2 k23L2}
+ {Pk + n$ - T + $ aK 2  anL2  an 2  aK2
aF aFL2 aF aF 2 3F aFk2 aF L Fk2
kaK anL2 DL aK + n L K2 Kl anL2
by grouping the terms appropriately. On inspecting this expression, it
follows that
(4.7) A > 0
given the usual properties of the partial derivations of a neoclassical
production function, the signs of the partial derivatives of the func-
tions $ and f, the second-order conditions of maximum of (3.6) and (3.18),
and assumidig that the forces of diminishing returns are stronger than
those of complementarity; i.e.,
> etc.
Using Cramer's rule, we then have
d 1F L2 3F L2 3F 3F 2(4.8) - =- n-j- dt --dt 2 d K2 L + anL2
aFk2 dL F 3F Fk
nO anL2 dt O 2 3L + n anL2
dx (n l P - L + n L2
P'k 11
6o
1 dx 1 -
-3F dL 3F dL 3F F 3F FP DL da n2 L aKk2 3L2 - k2 L2
"k1 1 2 2 aL2 3K2
3Fkl 3FL2 
-
1 K2
dL 3F 3Fk2 3F 3F 2
it~ 3L 3nL 3L 3nL1 2 1 2
3F Ll
3K
3Fkl
3 - -
f -3F
k
3F2 d7L
anL2 1
3Fk2 dL
nL dt
dx
cit
FLl 3FL2
3F 3Fk2
( L + nO anL 2
f 1- DF
6iP DLki
k
+ n$ 2 3 Li
1 d 
- 3F dL 2 _ 3F 2dL 3F1 ~i k2 1d n n L2 __
S1[{ - nn - anL2 t - anL2 d 3K
. 3F aF 3F 3F di 3F 3F3 kl L2 g Ll k2 2- __1 kl L2
+ K nL 2 3K 2 }+nkdt 3L 3nL2
aFLl 3Fkl
3L 3L
)F 3FLl k2
)L nL2
Hence, the aggregate capital accumulation of this dualistic agriculture
can be expressed as:
dK1  dK f - 3F 3L dL 3F 3L diL 3F 3F
n--+-- =[n2 dx- 1P_ U. 1 1 - Li 1 1 k2 L2
dt dt A dt P I Y~ 3L dt 2 KL L dt W 2 3L2k 1 1L
3F k2 FL
(4.10) k2 L2
2 2f - 3F k nL dL 1 3F anL 2dL 3F 3FS1P k2 2 _1 L2 2 _1 U. Li _ 3 F. 3FL1
d 2 1 1 3L 3L 3K
dx aFL1 3F 3FL1 3Fk2 3Fkl 3F 3Fkl 3F 2+ + (k1L~k1L2) 
+ n 3L K2 3K 3nL2 3L 3K2
using L + L 2' L .
dx tFL
dt "3L 1
3 k2
3K2
and
d
(4. 9) ;i-t-1
F
Given, again, the second-order conditions of maximum and that the forces
of diminishing returns are stronger than those of complementarity,
it follows by using (4.1) and (4.2) that
dK1 _ dK2
dt <0 if
dx31d1 f1 ai dL 1a dL d1
(4.11) dt e dt n$23L 3L3L
which obviously also implies
(4.12) dx< 0
By using the definition of 1E, given by (4.6), the condition (4.11)
can be written as
fJ 31 dL f dy2 dL2  i dL1 aw 1 dy1  dL1(4.13) If 3d++t(41) 3- dje_ + 2 dt- + f 3 1 -[ dt + 2 -de + 3dt + 4dO
11 1
It is clear from (3.11)" and (3.36) that the L.H.S. of (4.13) shows nothing
but the total change in A2 overtime following the changes in the relevant
parameters and the R.H.S. the total change in PC of all the family farms,
taken together following similar changes in its relevant parameters.
So long, for the sake of simplification, e has been held constant.
dO
It is known, however, from (3.28) that G = 6(yl) with -6- < 0 and accordingly
0 is expected to change over time due to changes in y1 . It is appropriate
now to incorporate this change into our analysis.
There will be essentially two additional changes in the system
following this variation in 6.
(1) There will be a change in and, through that, an additional varia-
tion in A2, to be captured by f 1 i) ae dy I needs to be
pointed out that this change in is inversely related with 0.
To see this, consider a situation where e has fallen, and, for
convenience of illustration, consider it where 0 has fallen all
the way to the value 1; i.e., the interest elasticity of the
aggregate demand for Loan, M, has increased to infinity imply-
29ing thereby a change from imperfect to perfect credit market.
Then,
i F k2/k
E01/
MO M M
Figure 2
referring to Fig. 2, it is clear that as 0 falls to the value 1
and the curve becomes horizontal at i,, the system moves from
its old equilibrium E to the new equilibrium E and the value
01
of increases from E H to E M It should be noted here that0 0 11l
although the value of increases, and the inverse relationship
between 0 and is thus demonstrated, the value of i actually falls
from i in the old equilibrium to i in the new equilibrium.
This case will come to be very relevant for our discussion in
Section 5.
(2) This variation in i, consequent upon a change in 6, will now
produce the second change in the system by generating an addi-
- 1a21 ae dy
tional variation in PC . This can be expressed as $1 N ayl dt
where >o0> .ae
Accomodating these two changes, in A2 andP , caused by
the change in 6, the condition (4.13) can be generalized as
i -i dLd
3( ) dL a (D dy1  dy2  2 31 1L
(4.14) f1 - - + f - + f 2 +f 3  - <n[i 1 - - - +
3L 1
2-iae dy1 +' aw d 1+I dy1  dL 11 ~ ~ $ea, 2 +- $t 3 It+ 4 et
With a little effort, this condition can also be expressed in an alterna-
tive way, in terms of the elasticities of the relevant variables:
dyf dy2(4.15) A2 [e g + e e e , 1 + ef ' t2 2 + e 2
' OT -6*, 1 'f IT T'
-CL dy1  dy1
nPC1[- eie g + eie,0 e -y - $,wVwl - e - el , -/yl+e*1yg]
where e - -- e __2 _2 and e - 32 2
fe e A 2 f2 y2 A2 2  - A2
'0 0 2
are the elasticities of A2 with respect to , y2 and L2 '
-ct -2' -2RI'w C a c wC a iC 1  Y .
e -9- , ea 
-1 C 1 and
3PC L-2
e == 1 are the elasticities of PC1 with respect to i, w, y
* 9 T1 1
and L1 , e -0 1- ande - - TT6an i 1/0 eare the elasticities
of wiad e31 e
of w respect to and 0, e and e1 , D
T'l 3L1
are the elasticities of i with respect to L and e, and finally,
e - e - . and ew - are the elasticity of 6
with respect to y1 and that of w with respect to L, respectively. All
these elasticities are defined, as usual, in terms of their absolute
magnitudes.
Now, for the purpose of final interpretation, we like to express
this condition, (4.14) or (4.15), by going back, as suggested at the out-
set, to our original framework of period analysis. Then, (4.14), for
example, will have to be written as
(4.14)' f1 --- AL1 (t) + f1 6 dy1  Ay1(t-l) + f2Ay2(t-1) + f 3A 2 (t)
1
+ $ aL (t)]
where all the partial derivatives, by the mean value theorem, are to be
considered as evaluated at some interior points of the relevant intervals.
In a similar way, (4.15) will be expressed as
Ay (t-1) Ay2 (t-1)
(4.15)' A2 (t)[e 1e g + e e fe y (t-) + e 2 2t-) + e g]
< P t[ Lg + e e~e6y( yl (t-1 +e w2w
Ay(t-)
e 1  , g + e e e -e e gP 1(t[ *" 'it 1 9 iveeoy 1 y1 (t-l) 4,w w,L 1
Ay1 (t-l)
where all the elasticities are to be considered as arc, rather than
point, elasticities.
This condition, (4.14)' or (4.15)', can now be interpreted
in the following way. There are, as we know, four parameters, L 1 (t),
L2 (t), yl(t - 1), and y2 (t - 1), the changes in which make the system
move. The direction of changes in these parameters are also known to
us-- L1 (t), L2 (t) and y2 (t - 1) increase, while yl(t - 1) falls, over
time. As all of these parameters change at the same time, and in these
directions, they produce a combined effect on each variable of the system.
The condition, (4.14)' or (4.15)' is nothing but a description and a
comparison of such combined effects or total changes in two crucial varia-
bles, the wealth of the capitalist farm, A2 (t), and the aggregate con-
sumption loan of all the family farms, nPC 1(t). It is important to
focus one's attention, among others, on these two variables, because by
looking at their changes it is possible to conclude about the direction
of aggregate capital accumulation.
Consider, first, the L.H.S. of (4.14)'. It shows the total
change in A2 (t) when all the parameters are changing. An increase in L (t),
going through the complementarity between K1 (t) and L1 (t), and between
K2 ( ) and nL2 (t), increases the value of i(t) and therefore also of
i(t) and with f > 0 that increases A (t) (the first term). On the
e(t) 1 2
other hand, as yl(t - 1) falls over time, the value of eW(t) increases
and, therefore, for reasons already considered, the value of fai(t)
et)f
producing a dampening effect on A2 t) (the second term). Then, the
third and the fourth term of the L.H.S. show the positive effect on
A2 (t) of the changes in y2 (t - 1) and L2 (t), respectively.
The R.H.S. of (4.14)' shows the total change in RC(t) due
to the variations in all the relevant parameters. Such parameters for
WC (t) are 1 (t) and yl(t - 1). The increase in L (t) affects PC (t)
in three different ways: (a) by going through the complementarity
between capital and labor and increasing thereby the value of i(t), it
tends to lower FC ( (the first term); (b) by reducing the value of
w(t) because of diminishing returns, it tends to reduce PC (t) (the
third term); and finally (c) by itself, given that *4 > 0, it increases
FC (t) (the last term). The fall in y1 (t - 1), the other parameter,
affects PC1(t) in two opposite directions. On the one hand, such a fall
is known to increase the demand for consumption loan (the fourth term);
on the other, because of a consequent increase in e(t) and i(t), a reduc-
tion in C 1 (t) is also expected (the second term). Adding up all these,
I-twe get on the R.H.S. of (4.14)' the net total change in FC (t).
Now, (4.14)', or its equivalent formulation in terms of elastici-
ties, (4.15)', describes a special situation where the elasticities of f
and * with respect to the relevant variables are such that, following a
simultaneous change in all the parameters, the total increase in PC (t)
is greater than the total increase A2 t). But, since AA2 t) - nPc W(t)
nAPkKl (t) + APkK2 (t), that immediately means that in such a situation the
total capital accumulation in agriculture will be negative. Referring
back to the Figures 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c), this situation will be depicted
by the i(PC1 ) curve in 1(a) shifting at a rate faster than the rate of
expansion of the length 00' in 1(c), forcing thereby a shrinking back
of the demand curve for PkK (of all the family farms) and P kK2 taken
together.
The purpose of emphasizing this particular condition, this
apparently special situation, is really to draw attention to an important,
and a very generally plausible, tendency of the path of capital accumula-
tion in a dualistic agriculture. For this type of agriculture, we have
seen that the initial state can be taken to be characterized as one
where the average income of the family farm is very low and, relative
to that, the average income of the capitalist farm is significantly
high. Given this distribution of income, the income elasticity of the
family farm's demand for is likely to be much higher than its
interest elasticity, and then the gap between these elasticities,
(e - e ) is also likely to be much wider than the gap between
the corresponding elasticities, (ef - ef ) for the capitalist
farm. We have established all this in Section 3, through an appropriate
characterization of the values of the discount factors, X and X2. Now,
if we inspect the terms on the R.H.S. and the L.H.S. of (4.15)' and
recollect what we have known, again from our analysis in Section 3, about
the relative significance of the elasticities of PO and A with respect1 2
to their different arguments (for example, the dominance of e over
e or e4 ), and then judge the relative weights of the different terms
$,9w TP,1
on both sides of (4.15)', it becomes clear that given the values of
Ay1 (t - 1) Ay2 (t - 1)(> 0), (> 0), g and other elasticities, if the
yl(t -1) y2(t 1
difference between (e - e9i ) and (e*y * )/0 is sufficiently
high, then the condition (4.15)' will always come to hold. Therefore,
in a dualistic economy where the distribution of income is known to be
unequal and therefore the difference between (ey - e*) and
(ef' - e ) is known to be significant, the situation, implied
by (4.15)' is not a special situation, but a pointer towards a very
general and indeed a real, possibility.
Here, we can distinguish between two types of situations: (1) It
may happen that in the case of a particular dualistic agriculture, the
initial state itself is characterized by a value of y1 which is so
low both in absolute value and in relation to y2  and therefore the
difference between (e ,y - e*91 ) and (ef'2 - e f~i,) is so great that
(4.15)' comes to hold right in the beginning. This has the implication
that this agriculture will never be able to come out of the initial
stagnation. This is a case essentially similar to the one we have
touched upon before3 0 ). (2) Alternatively, and perhaps more typically,
the value of y1 , to start with, may not be that low and the value of y2
that high so that (4.15)' may not hold in the beginning, and therefore
there may be some capital accumulation going on. But, then, referring
back to (4.10) it is clear that although nAKI(t) + AK2 (t) may be
positive to start with, its algebraic value is related inversely with
the difference [(e ,l-ei) - (e fy-e ))i/ . Therefore, what
happens over time is that as the value of y1 , for reasons already
mentioned, falls and that of y 2 increases monotonically, (e pY,-e 4)
keeps on increasing relative to (ef' -e )ie and as a result the
30) See the discussion of the case where the elasticity of M with
respect to i is less than one, pp 41-43.
rate of capital accumulation starts falling, and there is again a
definite tendency for the system to approach a state described by
(4.15)'.
We thus find that in a dualistic agriculture with an unequal
distribution of income, there may exist, under very plausible conditions,
an inherent tendency, either in the beginning or eventually, for capital
accumulation to slow down, stop, or even become negative in the net
sense. Given this tendency, the question which then naturally arises
is: What are the ultimate limits of this capital path and, associated
with it, the path of average income of the family farm?
Consider, first, the limit of the path of capital. If the
production function in agriculture can be supposed to be such that a
certain minimum amount of every factor, and in particular of capital,
is essential for producing positive output; i.e.,
F(T , K Li) = 0 for Ki < K*
> 0 for K ? K*
where K* is the essential requirement of capital and it is assumed that
the essential quantities of other factors are available, then, given
the general tendency of capital accumulation as mentioned before, the
limit of the capital path is to end up with this minimum amount, and
nothing more.
For the limit of yl(t), given that Ayl(t-1) . 0 foN all t
(by Proposition 4), there are two possibilities:
1 im(1) 1 y 1(t) = A, where A(> 0) is some constant. In this
case, with the asymptote of y1 (t) defined by a nonnegative constant,
although the net income of the family farm falls monotonically over
time, there is no defaulting of loans. The relationship between the
processes of income generation for the two types of farms, therefore,
remains unchanged, and so also is the qualitative behavior of the
system over time. Only the family farm gets increasingly immiserized,
and the inequality between the incomes of the capitalist and the family
farm widens.
(2) If, on the other hand, y,(t) = 0 for some finite t, say,
t*, then there is a problem, because at the next period of time, as the
capitalist farm, in trying to fulfill its objective (3.18), wants to
ensure Ay 2 (t*) - 0 (Proposition 1), yl(t* + 1) becomes negative.
Given that
PF(Tl, K 1 (t) , Ll (t)) + (w(t) - y)L 2 (t) iPkKl(t) + (1 + i(t))PC,(t)
y(t) - -- - _
L (t) L (t)
this implies that the loan cannot be totally repaid from the family
farm's gross income coming from wages and the value of output. Some-
thing has to give, and the way the system accommodates this situation
is through the mechanism of "distress sale" of land by the family
farm to the capitalist farm. Such a transfer of land is supposed to
take place in the event of any failure on the part of the family farm
to repay its loan. However, since in the next period the capitalist
farm will again want to ensure Ay2(t* + 1) 0, the "distress sale
31)
of land" continues3. And, as it continues, a time may eventually
come when all the land originally owned by the family farm will be
taken over by the capitalist farm, and the family farmer will be
reduced to the position of landless labor with wages earned from working
in the capitalist farm as its only source of income.
But the process need not stop here if this wage is found to be
above the subsistence level. Writing down the expressions of
Ay(t-1) and Ay2(t-1) which are just the discrete counterparts of
(3.38) and (3.39),
(3.38)' Ay1 (t-1) 1 [P Fkl Kl(t-1) + (w(t-l) - y) gL1 (t-l)
L1 (t-1)
+ Aw(t-1) L2 (t-1) Ali(t-l) PkK1(t-1)
+ (1 + i(t-1) PC (t-1)) -y g(t-1)]
(3.39)' Ay2(t-1) [P _ F Fk2 AK2(t-1) - w(t-1) nL 2(t-1)
2
+ A{i(t-1) M(t-1)} - gY2 (t-l)]
31) It should be noted that as a result of any increase in T2 and fall
Tl , there is an increase in the marginal product of labor in the
capitalist farm and a fall of it -in the family farm, implying a
reallocation of Ll and L2 - Similarly, there is also an increase
in the marginal product of capital in the capitalist farm and a fall
of it in the family farm, again implying a reallocation of KI and
K2 . But, although there is a change in the composition of the demand,
the behavior of the total amount of the demand for capital,
nPkKl + PkK2 , relative to the demand for PC, does not change,
following the usual decrease in yj .
and knowing that when the family farm is dispossessed of its land,
K (t -1) - 0, AK (t - 1) - 0, M(t - 1) - nC (t -1) and L (t) - L2
and that also, with (4.15)' holding, AK2 (t - 1) g 0, we can see that
the capitalist farm in trying to ensure, as a part of his objective,
Ay2 (t - 1) ? 0, will still find it possible to increase 
the value of
A{i(t - 1) M(t - 1)} and then ensure its repayment by deducting the
corresponding amount from the payment of wage at the end of the period.
The process finally stops when the wage rate in this way is reduced to
the subsistence level.
We are therefore led to the following conclusion. If the
agricultural sector of a less-developed country is found to have the
characteristics mentioned in Section 2, most importantly, if it is
characterized by an unequal distribution of income between the family and
the capitalist farms, with the capitalist farms combining the operations
of production and lending at the same time, and enjoying a monopolistic
position in the latter, then, in the absence of any other exogenous factor,
it is possible for the system to have an inherent tendency to remain in
or approach a state of stagnation in capital accumulation. And, this is
also likely to be accompanied by a process of immiserization of the
family farms with the possibility of an eventual polarization between
the capitalist farmers on the one hand and the family farmers, dispossessed
of their land and reduced to the level of landless laborers at the sub-
sistence level, on the other. Whether these inherent tendencies will in
fact be realized in a particular situation will, of course, depend on
the relative significance of other exogenous factors present in that
situation and also on how closely the characteristics of the situation
conform to the ones assumed in our analysis. We shall return to this
question later on, in Section 6, when we shall consider the existence
of such exogenous factors in terms of various types of technical progress
and also the possibility of some variation in institutional characteris-
tics, and see to what extent they may or may not prevent these tenden-
cies from being realized in some real-life situations.
But, before that, we like to point out in a more precise form
the significance of the distribution of income and the structure of
credit market in generating these tendencies in a dualistic agriculture.
The arguments to this effect have already been given in general terms,
but, because of their importance to the central hypothesis of this essay,
we like to put these arguments in a more precise manner.
5. Significance Of The Distribution Of Income And
The Structure Of Credit Market
To understand the importance of the unequal distribution of
income and the imperfection of credit market as the factors
responsible for these tendencies toward stagnation in capital
accumulation and immiserization of the family farms in a dualistic
agriculture, it is important to single out the implications of these
two factors from those of other forces in the system. We therefore
propose to carry out a comparative analysis where the situation so
long assumed in our model will be compared, from the standpoint of the
question of capital accumulation, with another situation which will
have all other characteristics, particularly, the per capita income
of the entire agricultural sector and the rate of growth of population
the same as before, with the only exceptions that it will have a more
equal distribution of income and a perfect credit market.
It should be pointed out here that we are considering these two
crucial variations, equalization of incomes and perfection of the
credit market, as essentially interconnected. This is because we have
seen in Section 2 that the factor crucially responsible for the
imperfection of the credit market is the initial distribution of income
whereby there are numerous family faris with a very low level of
average income and therefore in need of credit, and a relatively few
capitalist farms with a significantly higher level of average income
and in a position to supply that credit. It is not possible to remove
this imperfection without at the same time improving the distribution
32)
of income The two issues of equalization of incomes and perfection
of credit market are therefore to be considered together and their
implications studied jointly.
Consider, first, the existing situation in a dualistic
agriculture with unequal distribution of income and imperfect credit
market. Let yi(t-1) be the net per capita income of this agriculture
in the beginning of period t
(5.1) y(t-1) - t(t-1) yl(t-1) + Y2t-1) y2(t-1)
32) We have noted in this connection that there are certain adminis-
trative problems connected with credit operation in the rural
areas which help preserve the monopoly power of the local
capitalist farm as the money lender. But, we have also seen that
these administrative problems are again fundamentally due to the
family farms having a low level of income and small amount of asset
(land). Hence, any attempt to perfect the rural credit market by
focusing attention only on the administrative problems and without
any regard to the fundamental cause of these problems is likely to
be self-defeating. In India, for example, the attempts to solve
the problem by creating the cooperative banks, unaccompanied by any
change in the basic income and asset position of the family farms,
have often ended up diverting funds in favor of the capitalist
farms. To solve the problem, therefore, it is essential to think
in terms of improving the average income (and asset holding) of
the family farm. But improving the average income of the family
farm will also imply, in a situation of not sufficiently high rate
of capital accumulation and in the absence of any significant
exogenous change, a reduction in the average income of the capitalist
farm (by Proposition 3) and therefore a redistribution of income,
at least in the beginning of the process.
where Z1 (t-1) and 2 (t-1) are the proportions of the family and
the capitalist farms in the total rural population. Let
x(t-1) = yl(t-1)/y 2 (t-1) be the index of inequality in the
distribution of income and g , as before, the rate of growth of
population in both the family and the capitalist farm.
Consider, next, a new situation where the values of y1 (t-1)
and g are the same as before, but where instead of letting
y1 (t-1) and y2(t-1) change according to the previous mannera
policy intervention is made, through, say, a measure of land reform
or an agricultural income tax-cum-subsidy, which has the effect of
redistributing a definite amount of income from the capitalist to the
family farm over the period t . This is a case of pure income re-
distribution without any overall change in y(t-1), so that
(5.2) Ay (t-1) L2 (t-l)l >
(5.2) 1 - L1 (t-) 2(t-1) > 0
In this new situation, following the increase in yl(t-1) there
will also be a reduction, for reasons already mentioned, in the value
of 0(t) implying a lessening of imperfection in the credit market.
In fact, if the equalization of income is sufficiently complete, the
value of 0(t) will tend to fall to 1 which is the state of perfect
credit market.
The question, now, is: what is the effect of this move from the
original to the new situation, of this redistribution of income and
perfection of credit market, on the rate of capital accumulation? To
be noted that so far the changes in the parameters in the new situation
are concerned, the changes in 1 (t) and L2 t) are the same as
before, but the changes in y 1 (t-1) and y 2 (t-1) are now exactly in
the opposite direction, with A yi(t-l)/y1 (t-1) > 0 and
Ay2 (t-l)/y2 (t-l) < 0 . To analyze the effect of these new qualitative
changes in y 1 (t-1) and y2 (t-1), as brought about by the redistribution
of income, on the rate of aggregate capital accumulation we have to
refer to the crucial condition (4.15)'.
On observing the terms in (4.15)', it becomes clear that
following these changes in yl(t-1) and y2 (t-1) and a consequent
fall in 6(t) there will be changes in both sides of (4.15)' as
compared to the original situation. On the R.H.S., as a result of an
increase in y1 (t-1) , there will be, on the one hand, a fall in
PC (t) and hence a change in the fourth term; on the other hand, due to
a consequent fall in e(t) and i(t) , there will be an increase in
PC ( and therefore a change in the second term. Summing up these two
changes, we get the total change in PC (t): n PC (t)(ei e e
Ay1 (t-l)/yl(t-1) - e41Y Ayl(t-l)/yl(t-1)], as a result of moving
to the new situation.
Similarly, on the L.H.S. there will be two kinds of changes as
compared to the original situation. Since there is a fall in y2
this by itself, will mean a fall in A 2(t) (a change in the third term).
At the same time, because of a fall in yl(t-1) and a fall in 6(t) ,
and therefore a rise in i(t)/6(t) , there will also be a positive
effect on A2 (t) (a change in the first term). Adding these two
changes, we get
A2(t) [ef ti/e eil,6e,y 1Ay(t-)/y 1(t-1) + e 'y2AY2 (t-l)/Y 2(t-) ]
Now, if the resulting total change in the L.H.S. exceeds the
corresponding total change in the R.H.S., i.e., if
(5.3) A2 (t)ef,i/e i,,OeG,y 1Ay(t-l)/yl(t-1) + ef 9 2 AY2 (t-1)/y 2(t-l)]
> n PC' (t) [e *ie9 ieY A (t-1) /y (t-1)
-e A(t-1)/y (t-1
(t-1)
i.e. by using (5.2) so that Ay 2 (t-) Ay (t-1) and also
the definition of x(t-l), if
(5.4) A2(t)[e e eeeey
> P C (t)[e e ge.1
fY 2  (t-)
V1 - e *Y
then we can conclude that, as a result of the redistribution of income
and consequent lessening of imperfection in the credit market,
A2 (t) in the new situation will tend to increase faster than FC (t)
in algebraic value implying thereby that there will be a definite
increase in the rate of capital accumulation.
Now, we already know from our analysis in Section 3 that when
the distribution of income between the family and the capitalist farm
is such that the family farm has a level of average income which is
very low both in absolute amount and in relation to the capitalist
farm, then the difference between the income and the interest
elasticity of the demand of the family farm for consumption loan is
always significantly greater than the corresponding difference between
the income and the rate of return elasticity of holding of wealth by
the capitalist farm. Therefore, in the context of the present comparison
when the distribution of income is known to be unequal to start with,
i.e., given the value of 1 (t-l)/12 (t-1), x(t-1) is known to be
sufficiently low, the difference (e ,y - e ) is expected to be
significantly greater than the difference (e f2 - efi,) and there-
fore, given the ratio between A2(t) and EC (t) and other elastici-
ties, it is clear that in such a situation (5.4) is very likely to hold.
In other words, if the distribution of income is significantly unequal
and the credit market imperfect, it is quite possible to promote capital
accumulation by redistributing that income and breaking the imperfection
in the credit market.
It is of some importance to compare this conclusion with a
well known traditional wisdom which has always tended to uphold
inequality as an argument for promoting capital accumulation. For
the purpose of this comparison it is useful to rewrite (5.4) as
(5.4)' 2 ai3/ D6 n 1  ai aeS e- a y-1  a i Do ay1
A2  1t-1) anC
2 + 
n
which is obtained by substituting the definitions of the elasticities
and transferring the terms between the two sides. By the mean value
theorem once again, the derivatives in this expression are to be
considered as evaluated at some appropriate interior points of the
respective intervals.
The crux of the traditional argument is that the marginal
propensity to save of the poorer income group can be taken to be lower
than that of the richer group, and therefore any equalization of incomes
will lower the amount of aggregate saving and reduce the rate of capital
accumulation. Now, translating this argument in terms of our analytical
framework, where the wealth holding of the capitalist farm is to be
taken as the equivalent of the saving of the rich and the consumption
loan of the family farm the (negative) saving of the poor, we find that
the basic contention of this traditional hypothesis has the effect of
rendering the R.H.S. of (5.4)' positive and, by implication, since
the interaction between income and interest has not been considered
in this hypothesis, the L.H.S. zero. With the R.H.S. thus exceed-
ing the L.H.S., it is clear from (5.4)', or its equivalent formulation
(5.4), that one can then get a conclusion by which any equAlization
of incomes will appear as detrimental to capital accumulation.
There is, however, a crucial assumption relating to the effect
of the process of income redistribution that underlies the core of
this traditional argument. The assumption, it seems, is that the
redistribution of income is a neutral phenomenon so far its effects
on the institutional structure of the economy is concerned; apart
from immediately affecting the income terms in the saving function,
it does not affect the structure of the economy at all, it does not
for example, affect the structure of any market.
This assumption of neutrality, however, need not always be
true, and it is particularly not true for a dualistic agriculture
of a less developed country. In such an agriculture we have seen that
the structure of the credit market is crucially connected with the
existing state of the distribution of income between the family and
the capitalist farms, with the result that a redistribution of income
in favor of the former always has the effect of lessening the
imperfection of this structure. Under this situation, therefore, any
equalization of incomes, in addition to having an "income effect" which
may tend to reduce the supply of aggregate wealth (the R.H.S. of (5.4)')
and which alone was considered in the traditional argument, will also
have, through the perfection of credit market, an important "interest
effect" which will be seen in terms of a fall in the rate of interest
and a rise in the marginal rate of return on wealth (the L.H.S. of
(5.4)'), and which will tend to increase the availability of wealth
for capital accumulation. And, if this interest effect of income
redistribution dominates its income effect, and we have explained
that there are plausible conditions under which it very well may, then
the final effect on capital accumulation will be very different from
what was suggested in the traditional argument.
Finally, there is an important dynamic implication of this
perfection of credit market. We have seen that although both the
family and the capitalist farm want to ensure, as a part of their
objective, that Ay (t-1) ! 0 , under imperfect credit- market, it is
only the capitalist farm which succeeds in achieving it because then it
has a prior advantage of choosing the amount of saving through which
it can affect the value of the rate of interest. However, once the
imperfection of credit market is removed, the capitalist farm will no
longer have any advantage to ensure Ay2 (t-1) = 0 . As a result, it
can now be equally possible for Ay1 (t-1) = 0 , and should that happen,
it will also become possible, because of the nature of the elasticities
of PC (t) and A2 (t) , for capital accumulation to keep on increasing.
Thus, the effect of equalization of incomes and perfection of credit
market initiated in any particular period need not be restricted to
that period only, it can indeed open up the possibility of increase in
capital accumulation on a permanent basis.
When capital accumulation keeps taking place in this way, a
time may eventually come when it will be possible for the system to
cross that threshold value of capital accumulation subject to which
Proposition 3 was found valid. And if Proposition 3 is rendered
ineffective, it will then be possible for both y1  and y2 to increase
over time and we will have a situation where not only the blocks on
capital accumulation will be removed, but the tendency toward the
immiserization of the family farm will also be reversed.
Thus in a dualistic agriculture comparing the existing
situation of unequal distribution of income and imperfection of the
credit market with a situation of more equalized incomes and perfected
credit market, and observing how the possibilities of significant
increase in capital accumulation can be opened up by moving toward the
latter situation, one can come to understand the crucial importance of
the existing state of income distribution and the structure of credit
market as the factors responsible for aborting these possibilities and
perpetuating instead a tendency toward stagnation.
* * * * * * * * * *
The central idea of this paper, that the insufficiency of
capital accumulation in a dualistic agriculture can be explained in
terms of the existing distribution of income and the imperfection of
credit market, needs to be carefully distinguished from some other
hypotheses in the literature. It has to be distinguished, for example,
from the usual "vicious circle of poverty" hypothesis which, in
essence, suggests that an underdeveloped country tends to remain
underdeveloped because, given its small per capita income, it can
hardly generate any significant amount of saving at the aggregate
level. And, ruling out the possibility of any large-scale inflow of
foreign capital except in some special situations, this limitation
on the aggregate saving also implies a corresponding limitation on
the accumulation of capital, and hence the economy is trapped in a
kind of low level equilibrium. The problem is further compounded, it
is added, by the fact that most of these underdeveloped countries are
also in their second phase of demographic evolution, experiencing a
high rate of population growth.
What we have shown, on the other hand, is that it is possible
to offer an alternative explanation of the phenomenon of under-
development by shifting the focus of analysis, which in these
traditional hypotheses has only been on the central tendency of the
distribution of income, to the dispersion of the distribution and the
structure of credit market that results from this dispersion. We have
shown that given the existing per capita income and the rate of growth
of population as they are in a less developed country, it may be
possible, just by redistributing income more equally and breaking down
imperfection of the credit market, to generate enough saving from which
capital accumulation can be initiated. One can then further argue
that if this capital accumulation and therefore the growth of income
is sustained long enough, that by itself may lead to a demographic
reversal.
Our argument needs also to be contrasted with a sociological
hypothesis according to which the failure of a less developed country
to generate capital accumulation is to be explained in terms of the
lack of appropriate socio-cultural factors. We think, however, that
one may not necessarily have to go for this kind of exogenization
of explanation. It is possible, as we have shown in the context of
a dualistic agriculture, to explain this phenomenon of stagnation in
basic economic terms, in terms of the decisions taken by the family
and the capitalist farm to satisfy their economic objective under
the special circumstances produced by the unequal distribution of
income and the imperfection of credit market. It is shown that with
the distribution of income and the structure of credit market as they
are, the capitalist farmer will always find it worthwhile to restrict
the amount of saving as well as its allocation to productive use to a
certain level, determined, among others, by the interest elasticity of
the market demand for loan, not necessarily because of any cultural
inhibition but because given his economic objective, that is the most
profitable thing to do.
~3.~~ -
6. Different Ways of Resolving the Crisis
Given the tendency of a dualistic agriculture to approach a
state of stagnation in capital accumulation, the question which naturally
arises is: Are there ways in which this tendency can be reversed and
the system lifted out of this impasse? The following possibilities are
suggested.
1. Suppose that the agricultural sector has reached the state
of stagnation where (4.15)' holds and where all land of the family farms
has been taken over by the capitalist farm and the wage rate has been
reduced to the subsistence level. When the system is actually pushed to
this extreme situation, interestingly enough, it also acquires a poten-
tially redeeming feature. This is because, with all land of the family
farms taken over and the wage at the subsistence level, it is no longer
possible for the capitalist farm to ensure Ay2 (t - 1) ! 0 (which, as we
know from Proposition 1, is necessary to fulfill its basic objective (3.18)),
by either increasing the interest earnings or reducing the wage payment.
In other words, with these two channels closed, there is no way for the
capitalist farm to increase, or hold constant, its per capita net income
at the expense of the other group. To ensure Ay2 (t - 1) 0 in this
situation, it is clear from (3.39)' (since the second and the third
term on the R.H.S. are reduced to zero), that the capitalist farm will
now have to start accumulating capital. As a result, we can have two
possibilities:
(a) This rate of accumulation of capital in the very first
iteration may be so high and therefore, given the complementarity with
labor, the increase in the wage rate and through that the increase in
y1 (t - 1) so significant that, with the elasticities of PCI(t) and
A2 (t) with respect to different arguments as they are, there may be
a reversal in the direction of inequality in (4.15)'. If this happens,
then, of course, a breakthrough will be initiated, and the stagnation
will turn out to be self-correcting.
(b) More typically, however, the rate of capital accumulation
in the very first instance may not be that high and the increase in the
wage rate and yl(t - 1) not that significant so that (4.15)' may continue
to hold. This implies that, with the initial capital accumulation, as
the wage rate is only increased from its previous subsistence level, the
capitalist farm at the next iteration will find it again most profitable
to be able to ensure Ay2(t) 0 by increasing the value of interest earn-
ings, and then getting it repaid by substracting the correspondig amount
from the wage payment, until the wage rate again falls back to the sub-
sistence level. In other words, stagnation of a dualistic agriculture
can be stable in the small and unstable only in the large. It is interest-
33)
ing that we come to this well-known result in the development literature,
but for very different reasons.
If, therefore, there are reasons to believe that from a state
of stagnation the system may not always self-initiate capital accumula-
tion at a rate high enough to disturb the local stability, then one has
to think in terms of some change in the institutional structure or in
terms of exogenous factors to dislodge the system from its low-level
equilibrium and bring about global instability in the right direction.
33)
H. Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness (1957), Chs. 1-4.
2. We shall first take up the question of institutional
change, and here we shall start by considering the possibility of such
a change in the structure of the labor market. Suppose that we think of
a different situation in the labor market where, unlike what has been
assumed so far, the family farmers or, in the extreme case, the land-
less laborers organize themselves in each set and act- as a group rather
than as atomistic individuals in supplying labor to the capitalist farm.
The implication of this institutional change is that corresponding to
the monopolistic situation on the supply side of the credit market,
there is now a monopoly also on the supply side of the labor market. In
our analysis, so far, only the capitalist farm had the power to ensure
Ay2(t - 1) ? 0, because, given its monopolistic control in the credit
market, it had a prior advantage of choosing the amount of saving and,
through that, adjusting the interest earnings appropriately. But, now,
with a corresponding monopoly power in the labor market, the family
farms or landless laborers, as the case may be, have a similar advantage
in their choice of the amount of labor to be supplied by which they can
control the wage earnings and thus also ensure Ayl(t - 1) ? 0 (cf. the
equation (3.38)'). Therefore, depending on the balance of monopoly
power in the two markets, it is now quite possible to have a situation
where Ayl(t - 1) 0. And, once that happens, we have seen in Section
5 that it also becomes possible, given the elasticities of PC (t) and
A2 ( t) with respect to the relevant arguments, for capital accumulation
to be initiated on a permanent basis. This is an intersting example
of how the stagnation in agriculture can be resolved through an institu-
tional change in the labor market. However, since this solution implies
that at least in the initial stage of capital accumulation Ay2 (t - 1) < 0,
in suggesting this solution one should also be aware of the type of resis-
tance that is to come from the capitalist farms against the implementa-
tion of this kind of change.
3. Another kind of institutional change which is more usually
considered, and we also have mentioned it in Section 5, is a policy of
land reforms which can change the ownership of land in favor of the
family farms. To the extent that such a policy can be implemented at a
significant scale, it has the same qualitative effect on y1 as is obtained
from a change in the structure of labor market mentioned above, and, there-
fore, it has the same kind of potential for breaking the stagnation in
capital accumulation. But, here too, one should keep in mind the implica-
tion of a decline in the average income of the capitalist farm that is
inevitable in the initial periods of this change.
4. From these considerations of internal institutional changes
let us now pass on to the question of the so-called exogenous changes in
the system and see how the crisis in capital accumulation can be resolved
through them. Of all the vehicles of such changes, the one which is most
commonly considered is technological progress. Conceived exogenously,
this technological progress can be represented as a function of time:
(6.1) X - X(t)
where A is the indicator of technological progress. Here, for the con-
venience of working with differential operator, we are again working in
terms of continuous time. Reinterpretation of the results in terms of
period analysis should be immediate.
Assuming that the incidence of this technological progress is
the same on both the family and the capitalist farms, X can be intro-
34)
duced as another factor in the production function of both the farms,
and (3.2)' and (3.14) be rewritten as
-PF(T1,K ,L;X) + (w - V)L2  iPkKl + (1 + 1)PC(6.2) yj -
L L
and
PF(T2,K2 ,nL2 ; A) - wnL2 iM + nPC
(6.3) y2 - L 1 +
L2 - 2
where w and i will now depend also on X; i.e.,
(6.4) w = PFu(T ,K ,L1 ; X) + y - PFL2 (T2,K2 nL2; A) , and
(6.5) i W F (T11 KlL,; X) e 0 F (T2 K2 ' 2
Pk Pk
Clearly, then,
dw dw - FL1 dA dw - FL2 dA(6.6) + 
- +dt Xt DX d t
where is the total change in the wage rate with respect to time
taking into account the effect of technological progress and is the
change in the same in the absence of technological progress, i.e., the
kind of change we had so long been considering. Similarly,
Al di PaF~d di-9-F-~ -
dij diA P k X=d k2 dX(6.7) t - axdt dt + DX dtA Pk 
- k
34)
Note that we are representing technical progress in- its most general form,
avoiding, for example, its representation in terms of the factor-aug-
menting form which is essentially a restrictive case. See, E. Burmeister
and A. Dobell, Mathematical Theories of Economic Growth, pp. 67-77.
Furthermore, using the property of homogeneity of degree one of F in
Ti, K, and Li and, therefore, homogeneity of degree zero of the par-
tial derivatives of F, and also the property of continuity of the second-
order partial derivatives of F, we have 35)
3F - - Tl dX DFkl dX DF 1 dX(6.8) T (T ,K1,L,; = 3X T + K1 n- d + L1  3X dt
and
3F 3F _ T2 dX aFk X3FL2d
(6.9) T (T ,K2,L2; X) =T 2 - 3X dt+ K2  2 + nL2  2 aX d
so that, taking into account technological progress in this most general
form, i.e., allowing for the possibility of technological progress affect-
ing the marginal product of every factor, the original expressions for
dy, dy 2
and  , given by (3.22) and (3.23), can be rewritten asdt
dy, dKL aF 
_ aF kldLaF ld( 0 - [PF +T P - + K P + L P - - t w g 1dt - 1 Idt +1 a t X dt 1 a1d
Li
dw - 3F L X d P DF 1d 2
+( + 2 )L2 -i-kK- + (1+i)PC1)- C - g Y1 ]
k
35)
Proof: By the property of homogeneity of degree one of F with respect
to Ti, Ki and Li, we have, for example, in the case of the family farms
F(T,K 1 ,Li; A) = T1 FTI(Tl,Kl,Ll; X) + KlF,(Tl,Kl,Ll; X) + LlFLl(TlKlfLl; X)
Now, totally differentiating both sides with respect to t, we get, upon
cancelling out the common terms and regrouping the terms,
3F dA dk F DF Tl aF dL 1 F Tl Fkl aFLl
-[I -+K -7 + L -,] + -T--+ K -+L -dt dtK 1 3Ka + dt l1 L + 3L + 1 3L
- aFl aF aFL
+[T + K 3L + L LI
1 1 1
By the property of continuity of the second-order partial derivatives and
homogeneity of degree zero of the partial derivatives, the first two terms
of the R.H.S. are zero. Hence the required result.
and,
dY2  1 - dk2F T2 a F k2 dX DFL2 dX
(6.11) - [PFk +TY 2 + K P + nL2 L2dt - kEt 2P aX dt 2P ax dt' n2P aX dt'
dw ~aL2 dX d P k1ldx( + axd t) 2 + (iM) + - itM g Y2
P k
For the purpose of our analysis, we now make a distinction
between (a) labor-using technological progress which will be defined
by
3F Li dl apFki dl -i 'Ti dX(6.12) n L i >K +K X T idii x d i x t iaX dt
and (b) non-labor using technological progress which will be defined as
aFLi dX a ki dX aT dX(6.13) nL -- < K - - + T-
i = 1, 2, andn n1 for i = 1
(a) In the case of labor-using technological progress, if
the increase in the productivity of labor is sufficiently significant,
particularly, relative to the increase in the productivity of capital,
so that
3F Ll aFL2 dX P akl dX- 
-, IF T1ldX dw(6.14) P( L + L 2 ) > PC -T T -Td
k
dPC
w-Pg di - -Lk 1n,+g
- (w-)gL1 + (PkK + PC1 ) + (l+i) dt + gY1
then, as evident from (6.10, it is possible for y1 of the family farm
to increase over time. And, so far the capitalist farm is concerned,
in the beginning it is also possible for them to ensure the nonnegativity
dy2
of - as before, because no matter how significant the bias of technologi-
cal progress in favor of labor is, any increase in w due to technologi-
cal progress is compensated by an equivalent increase in the productivity
of labor (see (6.11)). Now, with y1 increasing and y2 nondecreasing,
there will be both a downward pull on C' and an upward pull on A2 (since12
i
there will be an additional positive effect through the increase in )
and it is clear from (5.3 ) that in such a situation there is bound to be
an increase in capital accumulation. And, if this situation is maintained,
the stagnation in agriculture can indeed be overcome.
However, there is a different problem which is likely to arise
in this case from the standpoint- of the capitalist farm and for the follow-
ing reason. As capital keeps accumulating and y1 increasing, a time may
eventually come when it will be possible for the family farm to self-finance
its consumption as well as production needs, thus getting rid of the imper-
fect credit market altogether. But, this will also mean a total loss of
one source of income for the capitalist farm, as will be shown by the dis-
i 3F kl dX
appearance of the two terms, g (iM) and - Ml d , on the R.H.S. of
(6.11). And, in a situation where
- 3Fk2 d, - - DFT2 dA
2 a + T 2 aX dt
dy
2is not significant, this may indeed imply - < 0 eventually. Thus, the
capitalist farms may have more to lose than to gain from a labor-using
technological progress. And, therefore, to the extent that they, as a
group have any control over the introduction of this technological progress,
it is possible that they will effectively resist that introdction, although
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it is clear that this kind of technological progress, if introduced,
can indeed solve the problem of agricultural stagnation.
In real life, technological progress of this kind is best
illustrated by education, particularly, by a productivity-oriented
primary education in the rural areas. And, it may be interesting to
explain and interpret, in the light of the analysis just made, the
kind of bias that is found to exist in the government policy against
primary education in some of the less-developed countries which have
agricultural situation similar to the one being discussed here. 36)
(b) Turning now to non-labor using technological progress,
we find that even here it is possible for yl to keep increasing because,
as is clear from (6.13), there can always be some increase in the marginal
product of labor, and therefore there is again a danger of an eventual
loss of credit market and interest earnings from the standpoint of the
capitalist farm. However, it is now possible to distinguish between
two types of situations depending on whether
- Fk2 dX - FTZ dX dw .- FL2 dX - 2(6.15) K 2 P F +T P < _ nL2  P Fk2  + gY2
aF 3 F aF dK
- k2 dX -- T2 dX dw L 2 dX 2(6.16) K - +TP--k + gY2K2 3X dt 2 a X dt~ dt aX dt 2 k
at a time t* where the source of interest income may have been totally lost.
36)
In the context of India, for example, one finds that the government
policy has in fact been systematically biased against primary educa-
tion throughout the period of planning. See, J. Bhagwati: "Education,
Class Structure and Income Inequality," World Development, Vol. 1, May
1973, p. 24; A. Dasgupta: "Income Distribution, Education and Capital
Accumulation, World Bank Working Paper, May 1974. For similar phenomenon
in other less-developed countries, see S. Bowels: "Class Power and Mass
Education," Harvard University, 1971,
In the first case, it is possible for y1 and, in the beginning,
also for y 2  to increase and therefore, for reasons already mentioned,
there will be again a good possibility of achieving a breakthrough in
capital accumulation. But, once again, this situation will not be
acceptable to the capitalist farm, because although it is a case of
technological progress which is biased in favor of land and capital, it
is still possible for y1 to increase sufficiently to cause a loss of
interest earnings for the capitalist farm without the increases in the
marginal products of capital and land being significant enough to
compensate for that loss. It is only when the bias in technological
progress for capital and land is sufficiently high to assure the
capitalist farm an overcompensating gain through the increases in the
marginal products of capital and land in the event of a possible loss
of credit market that the capitalist farm will be found motivated to
adopt the technological progress. This situation is shown by the
second case (6.16).
There are two interesting implications that come out of this
analysis. In the first place, it is clear that in a dualistic agriculture,
where the capitalist farm, because of the existing distribution of
income, is more likely to have the effective power in adopting any
technological change, the existence of knowledge of a technological
progress, by itself, is not enough for'its implementation, no matter how
powerful it may be to dislodge the agriculture from its stagnation.
Technological progress has to be of a particular type, specially biased
in favor of capital and land in order to be adopted in the system. The
type of technological progress which in real life comes close to this
description is the so-called Green Revolution, which is supposed to
increase productivity of every factor, but proportionately more of land
37)
and capital
Secondly, even with the knowledge of a non-labor using technological
progress like the Green Revolution, its acceptance will be easier when
the opportunity cost of adopting such a change is not significant for
the capitalist farm, where the opportunity cost is measured by the
interest earnings to be foregone in the event of a loss of the credit
market. This opportunity cost, in its turn, depends on the degree of
jointness with which the two operations - capitalist farming and money
lending - are performed by a single group. Therefore, the less
identified these activities are with one economic group, the less is
the opportunity cost and higher is the prospect for adoption of any
given kind of non-labor using technological progress.
It is of some importance to mention this last point, because it
may help to explain the differential impact that the Green Revolution is
found to have on different parts of the dualistic agriculture of a
country like India. Apart from the fact that the knowledge of this
technological progress is itself more developed in certain crop pattern
37) For an empirical confirmation of this point, in the context of India,
see D.P. Chaudhri, 'Factors Affecting Productivity On Different
Size Class of Farm Holdings in India', May 1974 (mimeo).
than others (which in terms of our model, means that different values
of ( 3F /aX dX/dt + DF /A dX/dt ) are available for differentTi K~i
regions specializing in particular crops), it should also be carefully
noted that the success of the Green Revolution has been found to be
weakest in those parts of India (the eastern region) where the operations
of money lending and capitalist farming are closely identified with
one single group, and found to be strongest in those parts (the northern
region) where, for some interesting historical and institutional reasons,
this identification is far less complete38)
We conclude, therefore, by observing that there do exist quite
a few potential solutions to the problem of agricultural stagnation in
a less developed country. However, it is also found that unless the
institutional structure happens to be particularly propitious (with an
appropriate separation between the money lending and the farming
activities) or technological progress of a specially biased nature (a
sufficiently high value of 3F / X dX/dt + aF /A dX/dt), many ofTi Ki
these solutions (such as the possibilities (2), (3) and 4(a)) call for a
change which is likely to go against the interest of the capitalist
farmers. And, in the context of a society where the political power may
exist in the hands of these farmers, this analysis draws our attention
to a kind of constraints on economic development, very different from
the ones suggested in the conventionalanalyses.
38) See, A. Bhaduri, 'A Study in Agricultural Backwardness under Semi-
Feudalism', Economic Journal, March 1973, pp. 120-122.
7. Some Other Results In The Literature
Although much has been written about the dualism between the
agricultural and the industrial sector of an underdeveloped economy,
the literature on the dualism that exists within the agricultural
sector is not very extensive. The existence of a dualistic agriculture
39)
was mentioned by Sen , but a more complete analysis of the problem
of resource allocation within this structure came to be developed in
40) 41)
the writings of Eckaus and also of Anderson. On the questions of
income distribution and capital accumulation in such agriculture, the
issues which are of more immediate concern to us, the two important
works are by Bardhan42) and Bhaduri .
Bardhan has considered a model of dualistic agriculture by
taking into account the imperfections of the labor and the credit
market. Imperfection of the labor market in his analysis arises due to
39) A.K. Sen, 'Peasants and Dualism with or without Surplus Labor',
Journal of Pol. Ec., Vol. 74, Oct. 1966.
40) R.S. Eckaus, The Market Structure and Performance of Traditional
Agriculture, August 1969 (Mimeo).
41) K.P. Anderson, Peasant and Capitalist Agriculture in the Developing
Country, MIT Thesis (1968).
42) P.K. Bardhan, 'A Model of Growth of Capitalism in a Dual Agrarian
Economy' in Bhagnati & Eckaus (eds): Essays in Honour of Rosenstein-
Rodan' (1972).
43) A. Bhaduri, op. cit.
the gap that exists between the wage rate at the capitalist farm and
the marginal product of labor at the family farm, and this imperfection
can be regarded as working in favor of the family farm. Imperfection
of the credit market, on the other hand, is reflected in the fact that
it is possible to get cheaper credit with the increase in the wealth
position of the borrower, and wealth here is identified with a
composite factor of production, called land-capital. The source of this
credit has been left exogenous in this model, but it is clear that the
capitalist farm has a comparative advantage in the credit market because,
unlike the family farm, it can save and this saving is always turned
into the accumulation of land-capital (a consequence of the assumption
that land-capital is the only asset), thus increasing the base for
cheaper credit. This credit is then used by the capitalist farm to buy
a category of inputs which is the vehicle of land-augmenting technological
progress, so that the imperfection of credit market is finally reflected
in the capitalist farm having a cheaper access to technological progress.
This advantage of imperfect credit market, because of the continuous
accumulation of land-capital, is essentially a dynamic one and it is
shown how, under certain assumptions on the production function and
the nature of technical progress, this dynamic advantage can dominate the
purely static advantage of the labor market imperfection over time and
thus make the income of the capitalist farm grow relatively faster than
the income of the family farm.
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This model of Bardhan is remarkably elegant in its formal
structure, but it leaves certain questions unanswered. Apart from
certain minor points, such as, the apparent sensitivity of the
conclusions to the particular form (namely, Cobb-Douglas) of the
production function considered, the more serious question relates to the
assumption of the existence of only one asset in the form of land-capital.
Since the implication of this assumption is that whatever is saved is
automatically turned into accumulation of capital, one can not, under
such assumption, pose any problem of capital accumulation. What
Bardhan has done, therefore, really amounts to sidetracting the question
of stagnation in capital accumulation in a dualistic agriculture and
considering instead the question of the distribution of income in the
context of a hypothetical growth process of such an agriculture. However,
in view of the persisting problem of insufficiency of capital accumula-
tion in many dualistic agriculture, of evidence to the effect that
saving by certain groups of farmers has not automatically been trans-
formed into capital accumulation , we have found it more important to
address ourselves to this existing problem of stagnation and see to what
extent it is related to the question of income distribution.
44) In the context of India, for example, see, the NCAER Rural House-
hold Survey (1965), Tables 33 and 36; All-India Rural Debt and
Investment Survey, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, June 1965.
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In posing this problem we have developed a comprehensive
model of dualistic agriculture by taking into account all its major
characteristics relating, among others, to the state of its distribution
of income and the structure of markets, and including, in particular,
the possibility of existence of two forms of holding wealth in terms
of capital and loan. We have seen that in terms of this model it is
possible to provide an explanation of the problem of inadequate capital
accumulation of this kind of agriculture, an explanation which also
brings out the crucial importance of income distribution in this matter.
Turning to Bhaduri's paper, one should note first of all, that
it does not strictly relate to the problem of a dualistic agriculture
in the sense we have defined it. It relates to what he calls 'a semi-
feudal' agriculture which is characterized in his analysis by the
existence of two income groups - the sharecroppers and the landowners.
The sharecropper works on the land owned by the landowner for a fixed
share of the harvest, and he also takes consumption loan from the same
landowner. The problem of portfolio choice that is inherent in such a
situation has not been clearly stated in the model, but, through the
specification of technical progress, Bhaduri has made the landowner face
a problem of conflict between the two sources of income, interest
earnings and the income from harvest, which is similar in spirit to the
problem encountered by the capitalist farm in the presence of technical
progress in our model. This concept of conflict is then used by Bhaduri
to interpret in a very interesting and insightful way the historical
forces that may be taking shape in certain parts of India.
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The difficulty which we have found with Bhaduri's paper, however,
is that there are certain crucial issues which are never explained in
economic terms. It is not clear, for example, why the sharecropper
will never go for production loan even if his income is above the
subsistence level and the productivity of land-capital is increasing
due to technical progress. It should be noted that the final conclusion
of the paper about the inevitability of a conflict between the two
sources of income of the landowner is not quite independent of the way
this issue is resolved. To say that such issues are settled politically
is perhaps to leave them economically underexplained. The more
interesting line of enquiry may be to try to find out whether there are
any basic economic forces at work which make such supposedly political
solutions what they are. In fact, in the case of this corner solution
involving the consumption loan, we have seen that it is indeed possible
to give an explanation on the basis of rational economic decision making
on the part of the family and the capitalist farms.
8. Generalizations
It is possible to generalize our basic analytical model in two
directions, by relaxing (a) the simplifying assumptions that were made
about the agricultural sector itself and (b) the ones made about the
relationship between the agricultural and the industrial sector. We
shall mention some of these possibilities very briefly.
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1. The landless laborers were not included in the description
of the initial state of the model. This, however, is not a restrictive
assumption, because it has been shown that the model, starting with an
initial state involving the family and the capitalist farms, will itself
evolve in a way that the family farms, through a process of immiseriza-
tion, will be found converted into the landless laborers. In other
words, the landless laborer can always be accommodated into our
discussion as representing a particular stage in the evolution of the
model. However, if we also want to explain why some of the family farms
may become landless laborers faster than others, so that at some point
of time in history, there can exist the family farm, the capitalist
farm and also the landless laborer, we will have to allow for some
variation among the family farms themselves, say, in their landownership,
in the description of the initial state.
2. To simplify calculations, the parameter y was assumed to be
constant. This assumption, however, can be relaxed and the implications
of a variation in V analyzed. We have seen in Section 3 that y can
be considered as depending on L2 and L2: = y(L2 ,L2) with
y/aL 2 > 0 (opportunity cost) and 3y/3I 2 < 0 (economics of scale).
Since df2 /dt > 0 and it is expected that dL2 /dt > 0 , the sign of y
can go in either direction. If dy/dt < 0 , then there will be yet
another -force to depress the value of y, and as a result the tendency
toward stagnation will only be strengthened. On the other hand, if
dy/dt > 0 and if w also increases corresponding to that, the effect
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will be similar to the one that followed from the family farms
collectively bargaining for wages. However, given the characterization
of the initial state in terms of a slow rate of capital accumulation, it
is unlikely that the effect of an increase in L2 will be strong enough
to overcome the corresponding effect of an increase in L2 , so that
the initial behavior of y is more likely to be as in the first
situation. And, then, with its negative feedback on capital accumulation,
it is also possible that the downward tendency of V and of capital
accumulation may start reinforcing each other without the second
possibility, dy/dt > 0 , ever getting materialized.
3. Technological progress was assumed in our model to be
exogenous and the reason was again essentially to simplify algebra. It
is possible to endogenize technological progress by adding another input,
to represent, say, the category of biochemical inputs, into the producttion
function and then regarding that input as the vehicle of technological
progress. The allocation decision with respect to this input will be
essentially similar to that of capital, only the number of equations and
variables will increase.
4. It may be recalled that in the description of the initial
state of the model, the labor market, unlike the credit market, was not
assumed to be segmented. However, as a consequence of imperfection in
the credit market and the possibility of nonrepayment of loan, it is
possible for this initial state in the labor market to be replaced by
localized monopsony requiring that the family farms supply their labor
105
to the local capitalist farm. In the face of nonrepayment of loan,
imperfection of credit market may also give rise to monopsony in the
commodity market in the sense that the family farms may have to sell
their output to the capitalist farm at a price lower than the competitive
market price. This kind of monopsonization, for one thing, may represent
additional institutional means through which the process of immiserization
of the family farm will go on. For another, by reducing the number of
sellers in the commodity market, it may also give rise to some form of
regionally localized monopolistic competition in the commodity market,
in which case a part of the burden may also be shifted to the consumers
outside the agricultural sector.
5. It is possible to include some other institutional forms
of agriculture within the basic structure of our analysis. Inclusion
of sharecropping, for example, will alter some of the allocation rules,
but it can be shown, and here some of the results of Bhaduri's model
can be profitably used, that the basic tendencies of the agricultural
sector will not change in their qualitative properties. In the same
vein, a more interesting generalization can be made if the money lenders
and the capitalist farmers are considered as two separate classes. In
a sense, it is somewhat difficult to visualize this situation, because
it is not clear why, given an unequal distribution of income and the
assured profitability of an imperfect credit market, a capitalist farmer
will not consider money lending as another source of income. But if,
because of reasons of uncertainty or some other non-economic consideration,
e.g., the influence of the caste system, such a separation really exists,
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then it will have a significant effect in eliminating the basic source
of conflict responsible for the agricultural stagnation.
6. Finally, the results obtained exclusively within the
agricultural sector can be generalized to accomodate the interactions
with the industrial sector. The basic characteristics of this industrial
sector have been outlined in Section 2. It is known to be partitioned
into a private sector producing consumer goods and a government sector
producing capital goods. The product as well as the credit market of
this sector will have characteristics of imperfection. The imperfection
of the product market will be implied in the properties of the relevant
average revenue curve, whereas the credit market imperfection will be
reflected by the dependence of the terms of borrowing on the wealth of
the borrower. Because of the existence of these two kinds of imperfection
at the same time, it will be found that a problem of conflict will again
arise in the decision making about industrial expansion, and this conflict
will have some similarity with the one faced by the capitalist farm in
agriculture.
Given this structure of the industrial sector, its two most
important links with agriculture will be through the commodity market
and the labor market. The labor market link can be characterized by a
Harris-Todar type of migration rule, and the, product market by an
expression of terms of trade involving the price and the income elastici-
ties of the sectoral demand and supply functions. The interaction through
labor market will have the effect of making the rate of growth of labor
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supply, g , dependent on the effects of the industrial sector, whereas
the impact of product market interaction will be felt in terms of the
variation of P . With these variations in g and P precisely
characterized, it will be possible to generalize the allocation rules
of our basic model, which were initially derived with constant g and
P , to accommodate these variations and, through them, the interacting
effects of the industrial sector.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Name: Asim K. Dasgupta
Date and place of birth: October 29, 1945, Calcutta, India
Citizenship: Indian
Marttal Status: Single
Education: Presidency College, Calcutta University
B.A., Economics Honors, 1964
M.A., Economics, 1966
Lecturer in Economics: Calcutta University, 1967 - (on study leave)
Graduate Student: M.I.T. (September 1970 - June 1975)
